Edited by Roger A. Brooks

The Lehrman Auditorium The Heritage Foundation April 12,1990

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I These comments reflect the personal views of Mr. Manning, not those of the State Department or any US. Government agency.

other on the continent. During the late 1970s, this bipolarity in Europe increased as super- power competition intensified, and was exported by Moscow to Asia as well. Thus, when Gorbachev took office in 1985, he was confr onted with tremendous economic dynamism and a multipolar security environment in Asia. Realizing the Brezhnev approach was inadequate, Gorbachev looked for a new strategy to deal with Asia. Though many foreign observers point to Gorbachev's July 1986 Vlad i vostok speech as the beginning of this new approach, it was actually foreshadowed on April 24, 1986, in a Soviet government statement on the Far East published in Pravda, which outlined Moscow's new Asian agenda. In actuality, Gorbachev's "new thinking" o n Asia is not quite as new as some would have us believe. Gorbachev has put forward two basic concepts. The first concept is an Asian ver- sion of the "European common home," an idea borrowed from Charles deGaulle. The second concept is one of mutual secur i ty where the theory of class struggle is no longer operative, having been superseded by the global perils of the nuclear era.This is borrowed from former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and the Paline Commission. Gorbachev has emphasized this second con c ept at Vladivostok and elsewhere. Given these two core concepts, what we have seen since Vladivostok in 1986 has been rapid change in Soviet foreign policy toward Asia. In the past, for example, the Soviet Union denounced Japan for its security alliance w i th the United States. At Vladivostok, however, Gorbachev described Japan as a front-ranking power. Where the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) often was denounced as an afterthought - as a latter- day Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEAT O ) - Gorbachev spotlighted ASEAN at Vladivostok. In general, Gorbachev is saying that the U.S.S.R. would like to improve rela- tions across the board with all the countries in Asia. This more benign Soviet approach toward Asia reflects two additional eleme n ts of cur- rent Soviet foreign policy. First, we can see a "de-ideologization" of Soviet policy. Second, I think that the Soviets have now given a much lower priority to the Third World in general, including Soviet clients. In what ways are the Soviets im p lementing their new foreign policy approach in Asia? In many ways, I think that their rhetoric has outpaced reality to a large extent. One important factor has been a flood of arms control proposals. This began at Vladivostok and continued in the Indonesi a n Merdeka newspaper interview in 1987, which helped open the door to the INF accord in which Gorbachev adopted "the double zero option" on the SS-20 missile. Again, in the Krasnoyarsk speech of September 1988, there was a general recycling of various idea s for nuclear-free zones, curbing naval activity, and so on. Finally, Gorbachev's September 1988 United Nations speech, in addition to adopting a position of troop pullbacks in Europe, included an announcement for a 200,000-man troop reduction in Asia. How has this new strategy played out? Setting aside the question of ultimate objectives, I think what we have seen is a whole set of new attitudes and tactics. One clear result has been an unprecedented amount of diplomatic exchanges. I think it is dramatized in a num- ber of events. Virtually every ASEAN head of state has been or will be going to the U.S.S.R. Thai, Malaysian, and Indonesian leaders have all been to Moscow, and I believe that Corazon Aquino is expected there later this year. On the other side, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand in 1987. Just recently, a principal Soviet government official, Nikolai Ryskov, visited Australia, Singapore, and

Thailand. All of this clearly underscores the new importance the Soviets have accorded the region. And this has provided a modicum of success in altering Moscow's image there. In analyzing Soviet foreign policy in Asia, we should break the region into thr e e areas. The first is Southeast Asia, including ASEAN and the Indochinese states. The second is Northeast Asia, including Japan and Korea. Finally, the centerpiece of Soviet Asian policy has been, and continues to be, China. Even in the Vladivostok speech , which was full of rhetoric, perhaps one of the most important aspects was the number of positive references Gorbachev made to Chinese reforms. Gorbachev even came up with a territorial conces- sion which is rare indeed in Soviet diplomacy. The new detent e we now see between China and the Soviet Union is the result of a symmetry of interest. That is, both Beijing and Mos- cow have a very clear interest in reducing tension and creating a peaceful international en- vironment because both of them have the sam e priorities: modernizing their economies. This urgent need to modernize their economies really is what is driving Soviet foreign policy in general, and policy toward Asia in particular. One of the clear objectives in Vladivostok and all of the other Sovie t public statements has been an attempt to integrate the Soviet Union into the Pacific Rim and plug into the economic grid of the Pacific Basin. The Soviets to date have had very little trade with Asia. It has amounted to less than 10-12 percent of their t o tal, and most of that is with their socialist clients. Now, after clearly dis- covering that Asia works, they want to become part of it. I think this is a positive step. One surprising result of this effort to improve trade ties in Asia has been the Sovie t policy toward South Korea. Back in 1987 it would have seemed very unlikely that Moscow would today be so close to normalizing full diplomatic relations with Seoul. What really ac- celerated this process was the 1988 Olympics, which led to a normalization of relations be- tween Hungary and South Korea. Significantly, this was a severe diplomatic blow to North Korea because the North Korean ambassador to Budapest was a son of Kim II-Sung. Since that time, we have seen the establishment of consular offices i n Moscow and Seoul. In addi- tion, Soviet trade with South Korea has more than doubled over the last year or so, with the potential for further gains should the Soviets start to import high-quality, inexpensive con- sumer goods. While there have been some c oncrete changes in Soviet policy, there remains a large de- gree of ambiguity, particularly in the area of arms control proposals and regional conflicts. For example, the Soviets remain ambiguous on the subject of conflict in Korea, Cambodia, and Afghanis t an. Thus, on the one hand, Moscow has been enormously forthcoming and very positive toward Seoul, while at the same time maintaining a strategic relationship with Pyongyang. In fact, in 1984-1985, the Soviets enhanced their relationship with 'North Korea, presumably by exchanging overflight rights for MiG-29 fighters. In Afghanistan, on the one hand we saw a Soviet withdrawal, yet the Soviets continue to pour military equipment into Afghanistan for the Najibullah regime. Similarly, in Cambodia, Moscow appe a rs to have played a role in convincing Hanoi to withdraw, yet the Soviets continue to provide enor- mous amounts of military aid to the Hanoi-backed Hun Sen regime. While there is this ambiguity, I think in many respects U.S. and Soviet interests may not be that far apart on many issues, particularly, the Korean Peninsula. For example, both sides see a benefit to getting North Korea to place nuclear plants under International

Atomic Energy safeguards. Thus, in some respects, I think there may be less o f a divergence than a lot of people think. The one glaring omission of Soviet Asian policy is Japan. While Sino-Soviet relations have improved steadily, Moscow's ties with Tokyo have been pretty much static. Trade has been roughly in the $5-6 billion rang e for a number of years. Yet I would argue that, ul- timately, the success or failure of Soviet Asian policy will hinge on Japan. The Soviet approach to Japan has been complicated by two major considerations. First, the Japanese have made a resolution of t h e Northern territories issue the centerpiece of any breakthrough for Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. While there has been an enormous amount of speculation on this issue at the unofficial level, there does not seem to be any progress at the official level. In fact, the Soviet position seems to be hardening over the past year. At the same time, Soviet military capabilities in Asia appear not to have diminished. You can play numbers games with this. Certainly, the number of ships, and to some extent the numbe r of planes, is lower.The Soviets have pulled their MiG-23 fighters and someTu-16 bombers out of Cam Ranh Bay; this is a welcome development, and I think it testifies to the kind of retrenchment that is characteristic of their policy. However, in terms of o verall air, naval, and strategic forces, the Soviets have removed some antiquated equipment and replaced it with much newer, more capable high-technology equipment. So in terms of raw net capability, Soviet military capabilities do not appear to have decr e ased. On this point, I think Secretary Cheney was correct in saying that Soviet military capability remains potent particularly if one is sitting in Hokkaido, only a few miles away from the NorthernTer- ritories. I would like to turn again to the subject o f arms control proposals. Other than North Korea's Kim 11-Sung, I do not know anybody in Asia who is terribly excited about these proposals. The reason for this lies in Asia's diversity: multi-polarity in Asia means that there is a multiplicity of threats . As a result, with so many varied threats, any kind of collective security approach, which is what is behind these proposals, is not terribly exciting. At the same time, I think we have seen in Asia during recent years what I would call a very informal - a nd very Asian - kind of arms control process. For example, the Chinese reduced their military by a million troops in the mid-1980s; the Soviets have thinned out their divisions on the Chinese border; and the Vietnamese have de-mobilized some troops withdr a wn from Cambodia. Given the peculiar security arrangements currently seen in Asia, I suspect that this informal arms control process will continue on both a unilateral and reciprocal basis. The problem I have with these Soviet arms control proposals is co n ceptual. The underly- ing assumption to many of these proposals is that the American presence in Asia is a source of tension and instability in the region. However, from what we have seen in the region, nobody believes that. In fact, I would argue that th e American presence in Asia is in the Soviet interest, and that real sources of tension are regional conflicts and territorial dis- putes: the Korean Peninsula, Cambodia, tension over the Northern Territories, and so on. This being said, I would add that t he one area that holds some promise for an arms c on- trol agreement is the Korean Peninsula. Significantly, I think the Korean Peninsula is the

one area in Asia that is roughly analogous to Europe. I think that there is potential for beginning a confi dence-building process that could lead to European-style reductions there over time. However, the real problem is North-South Korean dialogue, and the North Koreans simply have not been forthcoming. They talk about sweeping arm control reduc- tions, yet t h ey balk when the South Koreans ask for confidence-building measures like mail exchanges. Arm control agreements in Asia are complicated by a number of factors, among them being the fact that the U.S. is a ma or naval power in the region, and the Soviets, w hile having two-thirds of their territory in Asia, are not. Therefore, it is very difficult to find any kind of symmetry that can be translated into an arms control process. Moreover, as the new centers of power in Asia continue to expand, the American ma r itime presence is not going to become less important; it is going to become more important. I hope that the U.S. Con- gress understands this. The forthcoming Nunn-Warner report, due out later this month, should contribute to its understanding of this issu e . In conclusion, I think that since Gorbachev's 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech, we have seen Soviet foreign policy in Asia run out of steam. In a sense, Moscow doesn't know quite what to do for an encore. At the same time, they have been increasingly preoccupied with inter- nal developments. While integrating themselves into the economic life of the Pacific is part of their economic reform, this remains hindered by the fact that rubles still cannot be con- verted. In the 1986 Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev said he wanted to turn Vladivostok into a commercial center, yet it remains a closed military city; access to Vladivostok was recently denied to several prominent American visitors. At Krasnoyarsk, Gorbachev talked about Chinese-style special economic zones, yet t hese have not been formed. It is the success of perestroika that will determine Moscow's ability to be an economic player. In short, the ball is in the Soviet court in that I think everybody in the Pacific, including the U.S., welcomes their economic part i cipation. But in terms of their own economic com- patibility within the region, the Soviets have not yet arrived. They have set their own limita- tions, and while Moscow has been willing to buy $100,000 worth of Philippine sandals or Thai rice just to sta r t a trade relationship, there really is not a lot of potential for serious economic relations. In sum, I would say that in this first phase of Gorbachev's Asia policy, Moscow has been moderately successful in altering its image from one of confrontation t o one of cooperation. Continued success will require Soviet economic success, concessions to Japan if a marked improvement in Soviet-Japanese ties is to occur, and a distancing from traditional 1,eninist allies in the region along with implementing a "reas o nable sufficiency" defense posture in East Asia as it has begun to do in Europe. Mr. Brooks: All of us who have been watching events in Asia in the last several years would agree that Moscow's emphasis on establishing better relations with the countries o f Asia has been unprecedented. Those improved relations, however, have not always been sought for the purpose of establishing peace and harmony in the region. Since the early 1920s, Moscow's priority was to promote revolution. Most early Asian communist pa rties were formed with help from Josef Stalin's Comintern, and Soviet assistance was critical to the creation of communist regimes in China, North Korea, Vietnam, Uos, and Cambodia.

Today, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's interest in Asia surely is prompted by the region's growing political and economic clout. Few would disagree with the notion that Gor- bachev wishes to attract substantial Asian investment and trade, as his 1986 speech in Vladivostok and 1988 address in Krasnoyarsk indicated. In 1 9 87, total Soviet trade with Asia, including India, was only around $13 billion, or about I I percent of Soviet trade with the rest of the world, while U.S. trade in the region last. year exceeded $290 billion, or about 37 percent of its trade with the res t of the world. Ile Soviet Union has sought new business ties in South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. The Soviets also seek both Japanese and Korean investment in Siberia, primarily by proposing the creation of "special economic zones" in th a t region. And they have sought membership in various regional economic organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, the Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation Council (PBEC), and the recently con- ceived Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. T h e Soviet Union also wishes to reduce its burden of supporting clients in countries like Vietnam and North Korea by helping those countries attract Western capital and know-how. Since becoming Soviet leader in 1985, Gorbachev has sought to transform Moscow ' s public image in Asia from hostile expansion to peaceful political and economic engage- ment. Since 1985, most Asian leaders have visited Moscow or have been visited by such -high-level officials as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and others. What d o es all this mean for U.S. interests and goals in the region? While the U.S. itself is in the midst of re-defining its goals and objectives in the region, it also is taking a different look at the goals and capabilities of the Soviet Union in the same area . Soviet goals have not always been easy to understand, since so often in the past Soviet activities in the region have belied the good intentions of their leaders' promises. Yet, it seems to be increasingly clear that there is no longer a "zero-sum" game f or us to play with the Soviets in Asia - or for that matter, elsewhere in the world. This is because the Soviet Union, and what we saw as the "Soviet Empire," is not in the same shape it was even a year ajo. If, for example, a year ago Moscow and Seoul ha d proposed bilateral diplomatic recogni- tion, as they did at the end of last month, we might have been much more unified in our con- viction that Moscow's gain would be our loss. Or, if Mikhail Gorbachev had gone to Japan a year or two ago with a definiti v e proposal for the NorthernTerritories in hand, we might have had much more reason for concern than we probably will have in 1991 when he is scheduled to travel to Japan. Evidence, moreover, has become increasingly clear that the web of relations involvin g the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China (PRC), is no longer part of this zero-sum game. This may mean that the U.S. does not necessarily gain if Chinese-Soviet relations cool, nor does the U.S. necessarily lose if those relations c o ntinue to improve. Indeed, with the changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union in the last year, there is only one place that Beijing has pilloried in official statements more than Washington - and that is Moscow. And the Soviet Union may remain mo re of a "threat" to China than the U.S., primarily because of its proximity to China, but also because Beijing believes that Mos- cow has abdicated its role as "pathfinder" along the Marxist-Leninist road.

The improvement in ties b etween the Soviet Union and many of the prosperous free market and increasingly democratic governments in the region also might be viewed by Americans with increasing optimism. We know that there is an almost subversive nature to the ideas that such free m arket economies engender. And the Soviet Union may not be able to resist completely such subversion if they open their markets and their borders to trade and investment from Asia. While we have reason to take a new look at the validity of the idea of a "z e ro-sum" game, and while we have reason to be encouraged by changes within the Soviet Union, there are still. areas where we are very much concerned about Soviet intentions and goals. In particular, while we have seen some substantial Soviet military reduc t ions in Asia, par- ticularly a reduction of ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border, there has been no real decrease in the operational capabilities of the recently-expanded Soviet Pacific Fleet, or the Kremlin's nuclear, naval, or naval air capabiliti e s in general. Moreover, Gorbachev's glasnost has yet to translate itself into serious reductions of Soviet and East European bloc support for what has been the disruptive and destabilizing regimes of North Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan. In addition, the Soviets seem to retain their interest in stimulating anti-U.S. movements throughout the Asia-Pacific region, par- ticularly in the Philippines and South Korea. To further examine the nature and direction of U.S. and Soviet goals in the Asia-Pacific region , we are fortunate to have a truly outstanding panel of well-known and respected Asia and strategic experts. Leon Aron is The Heritage Foundation's Salvatori Fellow in Soviet Studies and has been at Heritage almost three years, during which he has become o n e of Washington's top-rank- ing Kremlinologists. His writings have appeared in such journals as Commentary and Public Opinion Quarterly. Yevgeniy Afanasyev is Counselor for Asia Policy at the Soviet Embassy. He has been in Washington since 1987, when he l e ft Moscow and a post in the Foreign Ministry as Assis- tant to the Deputy Foreign Minister. Before that, he was a staff member in the China Department of the Foreign Ministry (1984-1985); again in the Soviet Embassy here in Washington (1976-1984); and ear l ier in the Soviet Embassy in China (1970-1975). Dalton West is a political economist and strategic studies specialist with fourteen years of direct field experience in Asia-Pacific development and security issues, especially Soviet Asia-Pacific affairs, U . S. defense policy, strategic planning, regional integration, and tech- nology transfer. He is, among other things, Director of The World Technology Foundation inWashington. Aleksandr Churilin is a counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, responsible for political-military affairs. He has been in the U.S. since 1989, and before that, was in the Policy Planning Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. His overseas service includes a tour in Zambia from 1970 to 1974. I trust that our discussion today wi ll be at least as successful as the recently-concluded Pepsi-Stolichnaya barter arrangement.

YevgeniyV. Afanasyev: Thank you very much. First of all, I would like to thank The Heritage Foundation and Roger Brooks for the invitation to speak about Sovie t and American goals in Asia. I might tell you that the planning for this conference took a long time - more than a year - and one of the major reasons for this delay was the absence of a ten-foot-tall diplomat in the Soviet Embassy. But after last July, w hen my friend and school- mate, Alex Churilin, came to the Embassy, we realized that together we measured more than ten feet, so we decided that we could then move ahead with the final plans for the con- ference at Heritage. I totally agree with President Feulner's remarks that the purpose of this meeting is to try to find some of the similarities, some of the possibilities for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. Actually, if you would like to find diverge n ces or confrontational points, it's very easy. You could just look at the history, at the map, at the statements made, and it's very easy. It's much more difficult, but I think it is very rewarding, to find some common ground. And I would like to emphasiz e in my presen- tation some of these points, as I see them. I am speaking personally here, as an expert on Asia. I would like also to say that Bob Manning's remarks were very interesting to me. His last year's book is on my table, and if I need inspiration for new ideas, I look at his book. I dis- agree with some points he made, both in the book and today. For example I think that it's very popular in the United States to say that the Soviet Union is a land power, while the United States is a sea power. And out of that many different perspectives arise. I would say that the Soviet Union is also a major sea power. Our sea coast in the Asia-Pacific region is even longer than the American Pacific sea coast. It runs for thousands of miles. I would say that the i d ea which we often hear in this country that the American Navy in the Pacific Ocean is something like railroads in the Soviet Union, does not form the basis for a fair comparison. It is like the comparison I saw a few years ago here in Washington between S o viet nuclear submarines and the Washington Monument. A very interesting fact is that Vladivostok and Khabarovsk and other areas in the Soviet Far East receive more goods by sea from the European part of the U.S.S.R. than by land, through the trans-Siberia n rail- road. So, the safety of these navigational routes is as important for the Soviet Union as for other countries. Historically, the Soviet Union has been a part of this region. And we have major political, economic, cultural, and other interests in th i s region. We think that the Soviet "new policy" in Asia is a major factor, and it is a positive factor in Asia. Certainly we understand that the United States plays a very important role in the Asia-Pacific. That's why all Soviet proposals on Asia, as a m u st, include consideration of American interests. I would like also to say that our approach to the Asia-Pacific takes into account the impor- tance of all our bilateral relations in this region. We do take necessary account that this region is part of a " m ulti-polar" world, and is increasingly so. So, there are many actors in the Asia-Pacific region that play an active part in the solutions of its problems, be it China, or Japan, or India, or the ASEAN countries, or other countries. We do take into conside ra- tion that without the cooperation and understanding of all of these states, there cannot be real security and cooperation in the region.

I wouldn't like to enumerate all our proposals and all our major statements on the Asia- Pacific region. I would just mention that the Vladivostok speech by Mr. Gorbachev in 1986 was a landmark in our Asian policy, as well as his Krasnoyarsk proposals in 1 988. And this policy of the Soviet Union in Asia is the same policy that we pursue in Europe or worldwide. There are no "two" Soviet approaches, one for Europe and another for Asia. It's a wrong notion. There is one Soviet foreign policy of "New Thinking" that is being pursued in both these regions and globally. And I would describe the major components of this policy as follows: 1) freedom of choice; 2) the non-interference into internal affairs of others; 3) the equal participation in the solution of all international and regional problems; 4) guaranteeing equal security for all states on the basis of decreased military presence in the area; and 5) respect for the na- tional peculiarities and historical traditions of each people. In our foreign policy in t he Asia-Pacific region we start from the presumption that our in- ternal developments, economic and political, demand a non-confrontational, open policy in Asia. We need a peaceful environment in Asia as well as in Europe. And this is the major reason for our new policy and new proposal. I also would like to emphasize another point, that is whatever was said by our leaders in the Soviet Union about Asian policy is not just words or rhetoric. These words are being transferred into real deeds. If you look at the nearly five-year period after the Vladivostok statement (1986 to the present), you would see that this is really the case. This is the case, for example, in Soviet participation in finding solutions to the situation in Afghanistan, Cambodia, or on the Korean peninsula. Everywhere, despite the difficulties, we see some positive signs and positive input by the Soviet Union. Or take, for example, Soviet bilateral relations with other countries in the region. China was mentioned earlier as an example. Of c o urse, China is the most visible example of the concrete results of this new policy. Our relationship with China is on a much different, and qualitatively newer level than ever before. And I think that this is a major achievement not only for the Soviet Un i on and China, but for the region and the world as well. We have both difficulties and successes in our bilateral relations with other countries, and Japan was mentioned here. I would say only as a brief remark that a Chinese proverb says that you can appl a ud only with two hands. So, when we are speaking about bilateral rela- tions, reason and desire to develop relationships are necessary on both sides. Only on this basis can this relationship really develop. We think, in general, that the situation in the A sia-Pacific region has not yet caught up to the changes globally in Europe and the world in general. And that's very unfortunate. We think that this region should not be singled out or removed from this positive progress going on in the rest of the world. And I would note that, despite our numerous suggestions and proposals - and certainly my American colleagues know them in detail - that there is not yet a necessary negotiating mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region for such a dialogue, especially on milita ry issues. For example, unlike Europe, there is no system of confidence-building measures in Asia yet. There is no mechanism for monitoring or controlling military activities. There is no con-

tractual or legal mechanism in the Asia-Pacific region t hat would help to reduce the pos- sibility of confrontation. And that's a major deficiency for the region, and we hope it can be solved in the years ahead. I would bring your attention to the latest statements by our leaders, that our goal in Asia is to e n d Soviet military presence outside of Soviet borders in Asia. Tbat's a major goal. So, by changing our military strategy in the Far East, we certainly expect that other participants, other countries in the region also would show restraint in the military a rea. It would be il- logical if some countries would decrease their military presence, as we already are doing, when other countries would continue to increase or modernize their forces. So, we think that reciprocity is very much needed here. And that the case can be made even more strong- ly, if you take into consideration the fact that, according to our official and published data, the forces of the United States and Japan, in some very important areas, have substantial su- periority over Soviet forces i n this region, especially in the area of naval arms. And this fact is being recognized by American experts as well. We certainly welcome the desire of the United States to reassess American policy in Asia, including the military, taking into consideration t he changes that are taking place in the world and in the region. At the same time, we give due attention to the positive develop- ments in the world, in the Asia-Pacific region and in Soviet-American relations. A lot more can be done. And we are ready for that. The Soviet Union is in general ready to cooperate with the United States in the formation of such a structure of political interaction in the Asia-Pacific region that would help to cre- ate stable security for the region on the basis of balance of i n terest. We think that the time is right to start a concrete dialogue on this important subject. We certainly cannot agree with the logic that justifies the presence near our borders of dozens and maybe hundreds of American military bases and installations . We think that "NewThinking" is needed not only on the Soviet side, but on the American side as well. And we hope that this "NewTbinking" will be evident in the near future. We have no intentions to undermine legitimate American economic, political, and o t her interests in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, I see in the American press the idea that the more trade the United States has in the region, the more military forces it needs in the region. I think that this idea is illogical, it is against c o mmon sense and it is not com- patible with the new situation in the region and in the world. By decreasing the military component of our presence in the Asia-Pacific Region we are at the same time trying to raise substantially the level of our economic in v olvement. We un- derstand quite clearly that our economic interaction with the region is too low. I have some figures here that show that Soviet trade with major Asian countries of this region is just 5.8 percent of our overall trade. And this is because o f historical, economic, and other reasons. This is a fact of life. It's also been reflected in the fact that our "Asian part" is not yet that developed. For example, in the Far Eastern regions of the U.S.S.R., we have only 2.6 per- cent of our population, and 2.9 percent of our overall industrial production. But we are very serious in our goal of developing the huge potential of these areas, taking into considera- tion their natural resources and in order to develop economic relations with all countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

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