The
plague of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the
despotic military junta that rules in Burma, is no longer simply an
issue of human rights abuse and economic mismanagement inside
Burma's borders. The SPDC's arbitrary and secretive decisions are
causing vast human suffering across Asia, including
rampant drug production and smuggling, displacement of
millions of political and economic refugees, and now the
spread of deadly diseases such as HIV/AIDS across Burma's
borders.
Refugees, Drugs, and Disease. There are more than
500,000 documented Burmese political and economic refugees in
India, China, and Thailand. The number of undocumented Burmese
refugees living in Thailand is estimated to be in the
millions.
Burma is the world's second largest producer of opium and heroin
and a major supplier of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS), the
world's newest illicit drug. The drugs are smuggled out of Burma
through Thailand, India, and China, and substantial evidence
indicates that the SPDC is involved in drug production and
smuggling.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Burma is spreading into neighboring
countries, especially along drug trafficking routes. Despite the
alarming situation, the SPDC has refused to cooperate with efforts
by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to control the
pandemic, finally provoking the UNDP to close its Burmese program
in 2005. The junta's willful neglect of disease control portends a
black future for efforts to control avian flu and other
transnational diseases.
Sanctions Versus Engagement. The SPDC is
remarkably adept at evading the international community's
uncoordinated economic sanctions and efforts to freeze its
assets. Without the cooperation of front-line states including
Thailand, China, and India, unilateral U.S. sanctions will neither
prevent international commerce nor ameliorate the regime's
harshness. For example, congressional sanctions on financial
services and attempts to freeze targeted assets in 2003 netted very
little of the SPDC's money and disrupted its financial
transactions only briefly, until the junta switched
monetizing contracts from dollars to euros.
The junta is as indifferent to political engagement as it is
to sanctions. In 2002, it purportedly agreed to the engagement
strategies of Burma's Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) partners and announced a "new day" of national unity by
offering a series of steps toward the restoration of democracy
that included releasing Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest,
releasing other political prisoners, and promising universal
participation in the political process.
Many observers greeted the announcement as a success for the softer
engagement strategy practiced by ASEAN, India, and China over
the punitive sanctions policy used by the United States and
the European Union.
However, a year later, unable to endure even the pretense of
reform, the SPDC rearrested Aung San Suu Kyi, closed the offices of
the National League for Democracy (her political party), and
arrested many other party officials. The military also arrested
Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the author of the proposed road map to
democracy, and replaced him with the harder-line General Soe
Win.
Growing Regional Frustration. Until recently, the
other ASEAN members have been Burma's biggest apologists. The
traditional ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other member states has dominated the group's policy
toward Rangoon. Yet now there are strong indications that the
manifest failure of ASEAN's "constructive engagement" has
convinced them to abandon their long-standing policy toward the
junta.
The ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Caucus Promoting Democracy and
Human Rights in Burma best exemplifies this new policy environment.
This group of parliamentarians from six of the 10 ASEAN countries
rejects the policy of noninterference, demands the release of
Aung San Suu Kyi, and promotes genuine national reconciliation.
However, ASEAN members remain reluctant to impose punitive economic
sanctions without a multilateral mandate from an international
body.
In January 2006, Razali Ismail, the U.N. special envoy to Burma,
resigned in frustration because the SPDC would not permit him to
enter the country. Additionally, Burma watchers in Thailand say
that even China, the junta's patron state, was dismayed by the
arrest of Khin Nyunt and is now looking for ways to restrain the
SPDC's worst excesses.
The time is ripe for a U.N. Security Council resolution on
Burma. A resolution would be a first step in harmonizing
international pressure on the junta to implement a national
reconciliation program and give U.N. relief agencies and
disease control organizations unhindered access to
Burma.
A Realistic Resolution. A Security Council
resolution is the most likely diplomatic tool to build a
policy consensus among the countries interested in resolving the
Burmese problem. Realistically, a resolution supported by all
U.N. Security Council members would probably not contain sufficient
sanctions to please Congress or force the hardheaded Burmese
military to immediate compliance, but it could become the
justification for an internationally coordinated, gradual
escalation of punitive measures until the SPDC complies or
falls.
The Security Council resolution should call for:
The release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political
prisoners,
A program for national reconciliation that includes the National
League for Democracy,
Immediate and unhindered access to all parts of Burma for U.N.
relief agencies and other international humanitarian
organizations, and
A timeline for compliance and punitive sanctions if the SPDC
fails to comply.
Conclusion. Since 1962, when the Burmese military
overthrew the civilian government, the international community has
unanimously condemned the junta's behavior. Yet the junta will
continue to survive for as long as the international community
remains divided on its strategy. A Security Council resolution
would move the international community toward an effective,
coordinated process for restoring democracy in Burma.
Dana R. Dillon is Senior Policy Analyst for Southeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.