726 September 21,1989 MEETING THl3 THREAT OF BAIHSITC MISSILES INTHETHlRDwom INTR ODUCTION As tenswns mountjiemely between Washington and Th overtheir myriad of accumulatingdisqgreements, dcal Iranian leaders launch a bcruistc missilk, tipped with highly &adly chemica13~ at New Yo& City.

Determined toficU their vow to drive Israel into the seq mdicalAmb leadem? perhaps in conbvl of Imq or Sh launch a couple of ballistic inkilk canyingprintitive nuckar wadeads, at TelAviv Muammar Qad vows to show the world that he is still to be reckoILed with and launches a bauistiC midi armed with tax k bwlogical compo at Washingtoa Finding himse~immmingly isolated &pbmatic Libyan dictator Such nightmares no longer are the stuff of B-grade made-for-TV movies By the end of the century they probably will be reality, exposing the United States and its alli e s and friends to terrifying new threats. ManyThird World countries long have had the ability to fabricate crude nuclear weapons. And in their marathon war, Iran and Iraq demonstrated that Third World M~~OIIS can obtain or manufacture and use chemical weap o ns build the ballistic missiles that can deliver these deadly payloads over enormous distances. According to Central Intelligence Agency Director Very Serious Threat. Now Third World states are beginning to learn how to William Webster, some fifteenThird W orld countries areploping ballistic missiles and could deploy them by the end of the century. For good reason therefore, did 81 percent of respondents tell pollsters in July and August 1988 that the spread of nuclear weapons to theThird Wyld poses an extr emely serious or very serious threat to U.S. security.

The spread of ballistic missiles also poses a threat to regional stability.

Nowhere are the serious implications of missile proliferation more evident than in the Middle East. Both Iraq and Syria now possess both ballistic missiles and chemical munitions. Israel is particularly threatened by these missiles. If the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars had been fought with missiles now in the possession of Syria, both wars would have been far more destructiv e and civilian casualties would have been far higher. Israel could not then nor can it now defend itself against such a missile attack from Syria.

Inadequate Control Policy. Ea rlier this decade the West tried to deal with the proliferation of ballistic missiles through arms control measures to limit Third World access to ballistic missiles, missile components, and technologies.The U.S Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, and West Germany sponsored the MissileTechnology Control Regime (MTCR) in 19

87. It is an export control policy to prevent the proliferation of missile components or technologies for ballistic missiles that can carry a 1,100-pound payload 185 miles or more. An y country that participates in the MTCR legally cannot export missiles, their major components and production equipment, and technology.The MTCR is good as far as it goes. By itself however, it is unlikely to stop the threat of missile proliferation.

To m eet this threat, the U.S. must go beyond the MTCR arms control approach. What the U.S. and its allies need is to develop and deploy defenses against those missiles. Such missile defenses would reduce the threat of attack from even thoseThird World countri es that refuse to sign or abide by arms control agreements.

Danger to U.S. Allies. Despite two years efforts to control the spread of ballistic missiles through the MTCR, more countries in theThird World continue to obtain these weapons.The fifteenThird Wo rld countries that currently have ballistic missiles (including countries that have obtained missiles from outside) are: Afghanistan, Argentina, Brazil, India, Iran, Iraq Israel, Kuwait, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, South Korea; and South Yemen.

At this time, of course, it is mainly Americas allies that are directly threatened by Third World missiles. Yet, this is certain to change as the missile ranges lengthen. To address this approaching danger, the U.S. needs a comprehensive polic y that should include 1 This statement was made by Mr. Webster before theTom Hall of calilornia, Los Angeles, California March 30,19

89. Webster made similar statements on other 0ccasions.This fgwe excludes misSdesThird World countries obtain from outside sources. 2 Americans Talk Security, Notional Survey No. 8 (Boston: Marttila Kiley, 1988 p. 56 2 4 4 Developing ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. against 4 4 Continuing to develop missile defenses in cooperation with key allies The U.S. is wo r king with its European allies and Israel to build and deploy defenses against the tactical missiles already possessed by a number of Third World countries missile defenses available to allies facing a threat from hostile neighbors possessing ballistic mis s iles The U.S. traditionally has provided less expensive and sophisticated military equipment to allies so that they can protect themselves against armed, hostile neighbors. Exporting ballistic missile defenses will allow these allies to defend themselves a gainst ballistic missiles ballistic missile attacks 4 4 Formulating an export policy that makes cheap and less sophisticated 4 4 Expanding the coverage of the MTCR By inducing such countries as China and the Soviet Union to participate in the effort to co n trol the spread of ballistic missiles and missile technology the MTCR will become more effective and could evolve into a treaty limiting missile proliferation similar to the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 4 4 Globalizing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty to eliminate all ballistic missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union already have agreed to destroy their missiles with these ranges.These two countries should start pressing other countries to eliminate their missiles with the same ranges THE GROWING BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT FROM THE THIRD WORLD Missiles now possessed byThird World countries vary from the 30-mile-range, U.S.-built Honest John deployed by South Korea, to the 1,350-mile-range , Chinese-built CSS-2 now deployed by Saudi Arabia and set to be delivered to Syria. NoThird World countries yet possess missiles of the 3,400 mile range or more required to strike the territory of the U.S. from most places in the Third World. Third World missiles have payloads ranging from the 200 pounds of the Israeli Jericho 11 to the 2,000 pounds of the Indian Agni.

Most of these weapons can carry conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads. Conventionally armed missiles, for example, were fired by Iran and Iraq at each other in the 1988 War of the Cities, devastating blocks of urban areas in both countries. In the case of chemical weapons, the effects would be much more widespread. Example: a Soviet-built SCUD-B ballistic 3 missile armed with a chemica l warhead could cause fatalities over one square mile? Even a missile with only 10 percent of the payload capacity of a Soviet SCUD-B missile, armed with chemica14agents, could kill over 32,000 people in New York, if it could reach the U.S. Nuclear-armed m i ssiles would be the most deadly. A Soviet 75-mile-range SS-21 ballistic missile can carry a 300 kiloton warhead, which is ten times more powerful than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima are armed with conventional warheads, chemical and eventually nuclear a ttacks cannot be ruled out. Several of those countries trying to acquire ballistic missiles either possess or are attempting to obtain nuclear or chemical weapons. These include India and Pakistan in the case of nucIear weapons, and Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria in the case of chemical weapons.

While ballistic missiles could be armed with deadly biological agents, such missiles are not the most effective means of delivering these agents. A small amount of a biological agent, for example, could be more easil y and cheaply delivered by covert operatives into public water supplies. Also, it is easier for Third World nations to develop chemical agents than biological agents.

Nevertheless, it is possible that Third World countries could develop biological weapons The Threat to the US.

Since no Third World country now deploys intercontinental ballistic missiles, the immediate threat to the territory of the U.S. is limited. If aThird World country were to obtain such missiles in the future, it most likely would att ack the U.S. by striking a densely populated urban center. A handful of missiles thus would kill millions of people.To transform this threat to reality Third World countries need only to extend the ranges of the missiles they are developing and arm them w ith nuclear or chemical warheads.

Americas policies to deter Soviet attack would not necessarily deter Third World countries. The threat of retaliation may not trouble a leader like Libyas Muammar Qadhafi. He and others like him may view an attack on the U .S. as a way to demonstrate their anti-Western credentials, or a means to retaliate against the U.S. for past grievances, real or imagined, or just to heighten their prestige at home and among other radical leaders. Relying exclusively on offensive remato ry forces could prove insufficient to prevent a devastating missile attack on select areas of the U.S. by aThifd World leader.

Increasing Range and Accuracy. The invulnerability of the U.S. to aThird World missile attack is shrinking as missile ranges incr ease.The Indians test Nuclear and Chemical Weapons. While most Third World ballistic missiles 3 US. SenateRepublican Policy Committee, A Theat to AmericCr: Ballistic Missiles From Developing Counrnks, April 19,1989, p. 4 4 hid. fired theirAgni missile May 22,1989, rhich has a range of almost 1,500 miles and carries a payload of 2,000 pounds. The Saudis possess and the Syrians are scheduled to acquire the CSS-2 missile, which has a range of some 1,350 miles and payload of 1,650 pounds. In both instances the se missiles have vastly greater ranges and payloads than anything these countries possessed earlier. Intercontinental- range ballistic missiles (ICBMs) may not be far off for Third World countries.

Accuracy is also likely to improve asThird World countries are obtaining more sophisticated guidance systems from outside military powers. And the raw number of Third World missiles will also grow.The greater their number the more serious the threat to th e U.S. and its allies The Threat to Regional stability The immediate threat posed by ballistic missile proliferation is to U.S allies. Possession of ballistic missiles by hostileThird World countries could alter the balance of power in such important regio n s as Europe, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. As long as ballistic missiles continue to proliferate throughout theThird World, with no corresponding means of defense increased regional instability is inevitable to Israel have ballistic missiles: Alger ia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and SouthYemea6 Most of their ballistic missiles come from the Soviet Union and include such systems as the Frog-7, the SCUD-B, and the SS-

21. Many of these missiles can reach Israeli territory easily if fired from Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Iraq. Some of Iraqs and Syrias missiles could be armed with chemical warheads To protect itself against this, Israel, is working with the U.S. to develop a missile defense system calledAmw. It may be ready for deploymen t sometime in the 1990s Pakistan is threatened by Indias missile prograraThe IndianAgni missile with its almost 1300 mile range, can strike anywhere in Pakistan. While India denies that it intends to arm the missile with nuclear warheads, India does have a proven nuclear weapons capability. It therefore must be assumed that theAgni is a nuclear system Israel faces the most immediate threat. Eight Middle East countries hostile 5 Richard M. Weintraub, IndiaTests Mid-Range A

Missidle: The Washington Post, May 23,1989 6 W. Seth Carus, Missiles in the Middle East: A New ntteor to Stabilily (Washington, D.C The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1988 pp. 11-12 5 DEFENDING U.S.TERRITORY AGAINST THIRD WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILES To defend itself against theTh i rd World missile threat, the U.S. would need only a limited deployment of missile defenses. One option, being considered by the Pentagon is called the Limited Protection System (LPS While not yet a fully defined concept, LPS is generally thought to consis t of 100 interceptor missiles based at the Grand Forks, North Dakota, site allowed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty If deployed, LPS, could intercept and destroy up to 100 re-entry vehicles launched at the U.S. Such a system thus could defen d the U.S. against the relatively limited number of missiles and missile warheads (tens as opposed to thousands) that could be launched by aThird World country. While the U.S. surely would retaliate with overwhelming force to an attack on its territory, th i s would not restore the American lives or property destroyed by the attack. This could be done only by a system that shields the U.S. from the attack Shielding the U.S. Such a shield could consist of up to several hundred ground-based missiles capable of i ntercepting incoming enemy missiles outside and inside the atmosphere. The High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI is a ground-based weapon that could destroy ballistic missile re-entry vehicles after they enter the atmosphere by colliding with the m. The Exoatmospheric Re-entry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (EMS is also ground based and could destroy incoming re-entry vehicles outside the atmosphere.

These weapons are being developed in the Strategic Defense Initiative program. They could be support ed by the Boost surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS a space-based sensor system, and the Ground Surveillance and Tracking System (Gm) and the Ground-Based Radar (GBR) ground-based surveillance systems that detect warheads and help direct the intercepto r missiles to their targets.

The single-site defense system, consisting of 100 interceptors and supporting sensors and battle management systems, would cost approximately $10 billion and could be fully operational in 1997.8 Addip two more sites of 100 inte rceptors each is estimated to cost $6 billion more.

These additional sites would provide near complete coverage of U.S territory. A Grand Forks, North Dakota, site could not protect the coastal areas of the U.S. This would require basing 100 interceptors on each coast 7 This system is sometimes called an Accidental Launch Protection System, or ALPS.ThLE was suggested by Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia when he spoke before the Arms Control Association in January 1988 8 Statement of W.C. Loomis of Loclrheed Cor p oration, A Case for Deployment of Gmnd-Based Ewatmospheric Intempton forActive Stmtegic Defense, given at Washington, D.C March 10,1989, p. 8 9 Interview with Bill Haney, Program Manager for the Ground Surveillance and Tracking System at McDonnell Douglas Corporation, July 17,1989 6 PROTECIING U.S. ALLlES AGAINST THE THIRD WORLD MISSILE THREAT Many of Americas allies already fall well within the range of Third World missile forces. For example, Libya launched two Soviet-built SCUD-B missiles at the Italian island of Lampedusa on April 15,; 86, bringing Italy to a state of war alert for the first time since WorldWar II.

Working with Allies. There are two ways to address the threat to U.S. allies.

The first is for Washington to work with these allies to buil d missile defenses as it is doing with Israel in the Amw program. The second is for America alone to build an inexpensive missile defense system to be exported selectively to its allies. The U.S. is working to provide its NATO allies with such defenses. I n fact, corporations located in several of these allied countries are participating in these SDI programsThis participation has facilitated agreements between the U.S. and Britain, Italy, Japan, and West Germany that allow these corporations to bid on SDI p rojects. Much of the research performed by these foreign corporations is focused on developin defenses against tactical missiles (missiles with ranges less than 300 miles 8 51 Three tactical missiles being developed by the U.S. are candidates for a The fi r st is the U.S. Pahior surface-to-air missile. It was designed initially to tactical missile defense system provide a defense against attacks by aircraft but has been upgraded to intercept and destroy enemy missiles. The Pmbt system consists of a single-st a ge missile with a high explosive warhead and relies on an advanced integrated phased-array) radar for guidance that can switch its focus from one target to the next at great speeds.The Patriot was tested successfully in 1986 against a Lance surface-to-sur f ace tactical missile The Patriot system is deployed by the U.S. Army and has been made available to several NATO allies and Japan. In fiscal 1989, the Army is to purchase 815 of the missiles for about $780 millionu Not Insignificant Defense. The PatriOt s ystem cannot destroy its targets completely, which means that areas in the vicinity of an intercept could be exposed to the radiation or chemicals of a partially destroyed ballistic missile.

But the Patriot can still prevent enemy missiles from hitting their targets.

While the U.S. and its allies research more effective missile defense systems 10 Loren Jenkins, Attack on Island Prompts War Alert, Washington Post, April 17,1986 11 The United States has signed memoranda of understanding with: Britain, Israel , Italy, Japan and West Germany. Allied fvms have research contracts With the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization that cover theater defense architecture, propulsion systems, millimeterwave radar systems, and sensor systems, just to name several. Fo r a more complete description of allied involvement in the SDI program see: 1989 Report to the Congress on the,Stmtegic Ddense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1989 12 Janes Weapon Systems 1987-88 (London: Janes Publ i shing Company, Ltd., 1987 pp. 184-85 13 Reptt of the Senate Apptvpnations Committee on the Depattment of Defense Apptvpnation Bill, 1989 Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1988 p. 83 pp. B-1 to B-6 7the Patriot could provide an imperfect, though not insignificant, de fense until the more advanced interceptor systems being developed under the SDI program are ready for deployment.

The second tactical missile defense system is the Extended-Range Interceptor (ERINT) missile. Under development by the U.S. Army ERINT is a su rface-to-air interceptor missile that could destroy tactical missiles by colliding with them at low altitudes ERINT is derived from the Flexible Light-weight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE) tests that the Army conducted between 1984 and 19

86. FLAGE was a n experimental interceptor missile that used ground radars to track the target, predict the intercept point, and launch the FLAGE missile to destroy it. An additional FLAGE test flight successfully intercepted And destroyed a Lance short-range surface-to- surface missile in 1987.

Improving on Pat&. The ERINT system consists of a ground-based tracking radar that detects and tracks enemy missiles, a ground-based fire control system that directs the missile, a P&t surface-to-air missile radar and an on-board m illimeter radar, which operates at very high frequencies.

The ERINT could be launched from Patriot surface-to-air missile canisters.

Improving on Patrot, ERINTs hit-to-kill capability is likely to destroy ballistic missiles completely. Thus, residual radiation or chemicals would not likely remain after a successful intercept, which would provide a more effective defense against nuclear or chemically-armed missiles.

The third system that could provide U.S. allies with a defense against ballistic missiles is the Amw missile, which the U.S. and Israel are developing together; the U.S. is providing 80 percent of the $150 million cost of the program and Israel 20 percent.Amw, like the other two American systems, is a surface-to-air interceptor missile. A series of three flight tests of the system are scheduled to take place in Israel starting next year. The Amw program could be a model for U . S. production agreements with other allies for defenses against a ballistic missile attack ARMS CONTROL: A MEANS FOR CONTROLLING BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD The proliferation of ballistic missiles and missile technology throughout the Third Worl d is.prompting a-chorus of demands to control missile technology.

Jeff Bingaman, the New Mexico Democrat who chairs the Senate Defense Industry and Technology Subcommittee, wrote on March 29,1989, Not enough is b in done to stop the spread of these fearful weapons [ballistic missiles].QVk President Dan Quayle in a speech on June 29,1989 14 US. Army Strategic Defense Command Fact Sheet, June 1989 15 Jeff Singaman, NewThreat: Poison-Tipped Missiles, The New Yonk Tunes, March 29,1989 8 declared: I have been a c tively committed to strengthening this regime MTCR] since my years in the Senate, and I remain so.16 World, it can make it more difficult for countries to obtain missiles and missile technology and provide political incentives for them not to acquire such weapons. When coupled with ballistic missile defenses arms control can be made even more effective. Defenses against ballistic missiles would diminish the military utility of missiles, which could create more incentives forThird World countries to partici p ate in an agreement to stop the proliferation of missiles Limiting Access to Missile Technology. The first approach to slow the spread of ballistic missiles is to limit access to the technology that Third World countries need to develop and deploy such mi ssiles An arms control agreement limiting access to sensitive technologies would be similar to the multilateral Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, which came into force in 1970 and now has some 140 participating countries.

The second approach is to ban posse ssion of certain classes of missiles such as those of intermediate range. Such an agreement would be like arms control agreements pursued by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, such as the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (I) Treaty.

The U.S along with i ts allies, is already trying to control the spread of missile technology through the Missile Technology Control Regime. While still in its embryonic stage, the MTCR has been marginalbeffective in delaying a number of missile projects in theThird World. Th e major shortcoming of MTCR is that neither mainland China nor the Soviet Union is involved. Since both are major exporters of missiles, no agreement to stem the spread of ballistic missiles can be effective without their participation.

Modest Contribution . The U.S. and other MTCR nations should invite all nations to negotiate an agreement to stop the spread of ballistic missiles; such an agreement would be similar to the existing Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea.ty. It would require countries that do not ha v e ballistic missiles to pledge that they will not obtain them and that countries that do possess such weapons pledge not to export missiles, missile components or sensitive technologies to countries that do not participate in the agreement. The Nuclear No n -Proliferation Treaty, while not perfect, has been moderately successful in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons and technology and channeling nuclear development programs in the Third World toward peaceful purposes. A future ballistic missile non-pr o liferation treaty could make the same sort of modest contribution While arms control cannot stem the spread of ballistic missiles in theThird 16 Speech to the American Defense Preparedness Assodation on June 29,1989, p. 10 17 Statement of the Deputy Assis t ant Secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy, Jim E. Hinds, before the Senate Subcommittee on Defense Industry and Technology, May 2,1989, p. 4 9 Banning Classes of Missiles. The second approach for controlling the spread of ballistic missiles is to p u rsue global agreements to ban entire classes of missiles, which are normally classified according to range. Former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Kenneth Adelman this April prgosed globalizing the INF Treaty between the U.S and the Soviet Union. He argues that the idea could be raised at the Committee on Disarmament (a 4

nation panel that deals with disarmament together by the U.S. and the Soviet UnioaThe result could be a multilateral agreement to ban the development or deploym ent of missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles, which includes several types of missiles already either possessed or under development by someThird World countries including the Saudi CSS-2 and the Argentine Condor 2 ballistic missiles non-prolif e ration agreements. Countries cannot be forced to join nor even to comply with the agreement if they join. India, for example, has stated that it will not agree to drop its& program Also, verifying compliance with the agreement is likely to be difficult. A n effective verification program would require access to weapons plants and laboratories not normally open to outsiders The shortcomings of such an agreement are similar to those of A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE MISSILE PROLIFERATION PROBLEM Combining ba l listic missiles defenses with prudent arms control initiatives is the most promising way to counter the spread of ballistic missiles throughout theThird World. Defenses will reduce the likelihood of a successful Third World missile attack on the U.S. dire c tly. Also, they will decrease the likelihood that missiles will be employed inThird World conflicts. Arms control agreements could slow the spread of sensitive technology and provide inducements to halt the further spread of these weapons defense more eff e ctive.This two-track approach requires the that U.S against a missile attack kom any quarter, including the Third World to protecting its territory against aThird World missile attack.The Soviet Union remains the most significant threat to U.S. security a n d must be the most important consideration for those designing missile defenses to protect U.S. territory. Still, a SDI deployment could be made to address theThird World threat as a first step toward more comprehensive defenses. Such an SDI deployment co u ld locate Exoatmospheric Re-entry Interceptor By limiting the scale of the threat, arms control could make the missile Develop and deploy ballistic missile defenses to protect U.S. territory It would be inappropriate for the U.S. to deploy defenses dedica t ed solely 18 Ken Adelman, Curing Missile Measles, The Wmhingtm Tunes, April 17,1989 10 Subsystem (ERIS) and High Endoatmospheric Defense Interceptor (HEDI missiles in three sites around the country for about $16 billion Continue to develop and deploy tact ical missile defenses in cooperation with allies, as now is being done with Israel.

The U.S. is now developing three systems that provide a defense against tactical ballistic missiles: Pahiot, ERINT, andAmw.These systems are designed to intercept and destr oy the types of missiles possessed in the greatest number byThird World powers, including the Fmg-7, the SCUD-B and the SS-

21. SDI budget cuts now contemplated by the House of Representatives threaten some, if not all, of these programs. These developmen t programs should continue and the systems deployed as soon as possible sophisticated missile defenses available to allies threatened by hostile neighbors As the PQtriot, ERINT, and Amw programs progress, the U.S. should provide these systems to select al l ies.This means determining whether the technology involved could advance Soviet military efforts if it fell into Soviet bands and also involves reducing the costs of such systems so that allies can afford them. Such an export policy would provide U.S. all i es with the means to defend themselves against the threat of a ballistic missile attack if arms control efforts fail Formulate an export policy that will make cheap and less Expand the MTCR to include other countries Eventually, an expanded MissileTechnol o gy Control Regime could provide the foundation for a multilateral treaty to stop missile proliferation similar to the existing Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty, which limits the proliferation of nuclear weapons. While the achievement of such a treaty is li kely to be years away, the increased security and stability that could result will make it worth the effort Apply the restrictions imposed on the U.S. and the Soviet Union by the INF Treaty to other countries.

The broadeningof the INF Treaty, if fully enfo rced, could eliminate completely missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles.The U.S. and the Soviet Union could cooperate in this effort. While arms control, including effort to broaden the MTCR and the INF Treaty, can play an'important role in slow i ng and even stopping the proliferation of ballistic missiles, it cannot do the job alone. Arms control will work best when coupled with missile defenses The threat to the U.S. and its allies by the proliferation of ballistic missiles throughout theThird W o rld is growing.The U.S. needs to develop a policy for addressing this threat that is comprehensive and realistic.This means pursuing arms control negotiations to limit the spread of ballistic mbiles and 11missile technologies. More essential, it means dev e loping the missile defenses needed if the arms control process fails Through the Strategic Defense Initiative program the U.S. is developing a defense against ballistic missiles for itself and its allies.The U.S. need not wait until it faces a serious cri sis in theThird World or finds its owll citizens endangered because a hostileThird World country threatens to use ballistic missiles.The U.S. should start to take steps now by pursuing realistic arms control initiatives and developing missile defenses.

Baker Spring Policy Analyst 12