380 September 19, 1984 THE GRENADA RESCUE MISSION IS. NOT OVER INTRODUCTION The Reagan Administration's bold a ction to restore democracy and a free market economy to Grenada is now threatened by a com- bination of political inertia and renascent leftist subversion.

The strategically located island, scene of last October's historic intervention by forces from six Caribbean islands and the United States, may be in danger of returning to the unstable political and economic environment preceding the 1979 Marxist coup d'etat that carried Grenada solidly into the Soviet/Cuban camp.

Reagan Administration. possible given the overwhelming tactical superiority of the rescue forces, a prolonged campaign or the chance that the U.S. medical students would be taken as hostages by the Grenadian Marxists could have had severe domestic and international politi- cal repercussions b loc forces from Grenada.l Recognizing the need to restore the shattered Grenadian economy, the White House moved quickly to promote public and private aid to the island. beset with burgeoning problems that could frustrate the develop- ment of democratic i n stitutions and provide opportunities for ex- members of the Marxist People's Revolutionary Government (PRG to regain power. American initiatives equally as bold as the rescue mission are now needed to restore the positive momentum generated in the afterma t h of last year's action The Grenada rescue mission was politically risky for the Although a military defeat was hardly The rescue did not end with the defeat and removal of Soviet Yet Grenada remains For a.description of the events leading up to the U.S a c tion, see Leninism in Grenada I Problems of Communism, July-August 1984, pp. 33-41. .2 BACKGROUND The dramatic events of October 1983 left Grenada in a politi- cal vacuum and economic shambles. Government had largely dissolved through fratricidal assassin a - tion and imprisonment even before the allied intervention. Sir Paul Scoon, the Grenadian-born Governor-General who had retained his vestigial colonial office throughout the revolutionary period, assumed de ure control of the island's affairs following t he a nine-member "advisory council" under the chairmanship of Nicholas Braithwaite to serve as an interim governing body.

Grenada was an economic dis aster following 4% years of socialist experimentation and mismanagement. Anti4.S. rhetoric had frightened away most of the tourist trade, while confiscatory taxation and suppression of private enterprise nearly strangled the native business community.

Fro m 1981 to 1983, economic growth was concentrated in the public sector; all.other sectors declined, with the exception of contruction (due to work on the Point Salines airport). In 1982 Grenada's Gross Domestic Product was $107 million, with imports reachi n g 66 percent of GDP. Foreign exchange earnings from cocoa, the most important cash crop, fell from 10 million in 1979 to $4 million in 1983 1978 to 9,000 tons in 1983, and land under banana cultivation dropped from 5,000 acres in 1978 to 3,200 acres in 19 8 3 Commercial banks and other credit sources on the island, such. as insurance companies, had no cash to lend in the aftermath of the allied rescue mission because the People's Revolutionary Government's insatiable appetite for funds had drained them of th eir reserves. By March 1983, the net credit extended to the public sector amounted to roughly 35 percent of total deposits up from approximately 14 percent at the end of 19

81. Additional credit was extended to ex-Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's Marxist re gime in the form of purchases of government paper, overdrafts, and commercial loans. Grenada's current account deficit grew from the equivalent of 1 percent of GNP in 1978 to 33 percent in 1982 The People's Revolutionary suspension -5- o allied martial la w . The Governor-General appointed Banana production declined from 26,000 tons in PROBLEMS AFTER THE RESCUE MISSION The Political Climate Members of the advisory council were chosen to be as non- partisan as possible in the confusing Grenadian political mil ieu.

One major criterion was that they should have "no vested interest" in the island. international civil servants with no training in playing an active role in the government processes. The advisory council has re- moved several of the most extreme Marxi sts from diplomatic and As a result, most interim government members are 3 civil service posts, and made token efforts at decreasing some of the most odious tariffs imposed by the PRG on such items as basic foodstuffs It has not developed, however, new in v estment incen- tives or made changes in the tax codes to encourage private in vestment. Although members of the advisory council are aware of the various problems confronting Grenada and probably are sympa- thetic toward the need for a more dynamic approa c h to their solu- tion, apathetic inertia has become the council's trademark This is the central flaw with the interim advisory council. Because the government is provisional--appointed rather than elected--its members feel that they have no authority to e n act the series of measures needed to put Grenada back on its feet. The island's governing authority therefore exists in a political limbo, having no mandate to do more than make cosmetic changes and prepare for the election of a parliament. Advisory counc i l inertia is reflected in the widespread mood of apathy and cyni- cism among the electorate. Public opinion polls have revealed that Grenadians are unsure about their political future and even less certain about those politicians who aspire to lead them m o unting. Dissatisfaction with the interim government seems to be we have examined the interim administration closely and it is now abundantly clear that they are hamstrung by the limitations they have placed on themselves and will never make certain import ant decisions that need to be made The editor of the Grenadian Voice wrote in March 1984 Let us prepare to thank them for their 2 The most scholarly of these polls was conducted by Professor William Adam of George Washington University in January 19

84. Approximately 84 percent of those islanders interviewed were unable to name anyone they wanted to see emerge as Grenada's next prime minister, an answer repeatedly quali fied by the statement that "there were no good leaders they could trust."

Many Grenadia ns voiced objections to holding elections in 1984 and said that an interim government should rule with U.S. support for at least a few years people questioned would like for Grenada to officially become part of the United States, demonstrating that Grenad i ans seem to have temporarily lost confidence in their ability to rule themselves Not surprisingly, the survey revealed that 75 percent of the The validity of the George Washington University poll is borne out by subsequent surveys conducted by a variety o f regional and international organizations. For example, a survey taken by the Grenadian Voice news paper in March concurred in most respects, with an overwhelming majority of respondents (82 percent) stating that elections should be postponed until 1985 o r 1986 turning from exile, and the enumeration of voters has been extended to accommodate them Both voters and would-be politicians are still re- .14 efforts and send them back to their chosen fields of endeavor and let us do so before they have a chance t o make too many mistakes Grenadians apparently fear, however, what is commonly called the ''election threat the possibility that divisiveness and inexperience among centrist political groups could result in a victory, by default, of either the corrupt, ecc e ntric Sir Eric Gairy or the surviving members of the Marxist People's Revolu- tionary Government. Responsible islanders believe that Grenada has not had sufficient time to recover from years of political strife, and that the mistakes of the past may be re peated unless new leaders with fresh ideas are allowed the time necessary for organizing and campaigning.

The Political Situation Six known political parties are preparing candidates for the next general elections. These are: Grenada United Labor Party (GU LP Grenada National Party (GNP Grenada Democratic Movement GDM National Democratic Party (NDP Christian Democratic Labor Party (CDLP and Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM The GNP, GDM, NDP, and CDLP formed a coalition on August 26 1984, called the N ew National Party.

GULP, the party of former prime minister Sir Eric Gairy, began actively rebuilding its party organization within days of the rescue mission. The Grenada United Labor Party grew out of the trade union movement organized by Gairy in 1950 t o defend agricultural workers; it continues to draw strong support from predominately older members of the black peasantry. Although Gairy states that he will not participate personally in the next elections, he remains GULP'S dominant force and will almo s t certainly maneuver his way into Parliament if his party forms a. government. Critics of Gairy charge that he and his party are on the far right of the political spectrum. In truth, however, they are populist, with a strong emphasis on traditionalism and reli- gion (including Obeah and Shango, the Grenadian variants of Voodoo GULP is currently the strongest political party and probably would win 25 to 30 percent of the vote if the elections were held now. This could enable GULP to capture enough seats in t he 15-member Parliament to form a government, especially if the remainder of the vote were split among other contending parties. In.the island's last elections, held in December 1976, GULP received 52.2 percent of the votes and captured nine of the fiftee n seats; the remainder was split, with Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement (NJM) receiving 3 the Grenada National Party (GNP) 2, and the United Peoples Party (UPP) 1 The Grenadian Voice, March 31, 1984, pp. 1, 8, and 9. .5 The GNP, second oldest of Grenada ' s political parties, was founded in 1955 by Dr. John Watts, a dentist educated at Michigan State University. Although an early GNP manifesto declared that it was Ildemocratic socialist, Watts disavowed trade union con- nections and shaped the party to hav e a multi-class appeal--a philosophy inherited by Herbert Blaize, a barrister and civil servant from the dependency island of Carriacou. He has led the GNP since 1957 The GNPIs main support is drawn from the old merchant and planter classes as well as from a portion of the new, conserva- tive black middle class. Based on its record when it held office from 1957-1961 and from 1962-1967, the GNP is business-oriented. Its 1961 budget proposed to turn over the government-owned tele- phone and electricity servic e s to private enterprises and to grant tax llholidaysfl to a wide range of enterprises The Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM chaired by Dr. Francis Alexis, emerged in May 1983 as an alliance of various exile groups opposed to the Bishop regime. Centrist in i deology, its members comprise a greater number of university-educated Grenadians than the GNP, including several former supporters of the PRG who became disenchanted with its Marxist-Leninist orientation. The GDM had been allied with the GNP for several m onths prior to the formation of the New National Party.

The GDM 1ost.a number of its younger followers when the National Democratic Party (NDP) was formally launched this June by George Brizan, an economist and educator. The NDP appears social democratic ' in ideological orientation emphasizing employ- ment creation through an interrelated program of tourism, agri culture, fishing, and light industry.

GNPIs Blaize and GDMIs Alexis had been negotiating with Brizan for several months in an attempt to draw his NDP into a coalition. alliance that could lead to a Ifgovernment of national reconcilia- tion, disagreements have hindered progress. Blaize, now leader of the New National Party, reportedly clashed with Brizan over economic policy and his unwillingness t o relinquish coalition leadership. Winston Whyte, chairman of. the Christian Democratic Labor Party, also resisted efforts to be drawn into a coalition until the Prime Ministers of Barbados, St. Vincent and St. Lucia personally intervened.

With the exception of GULP, individual electoral strengths of the other parties are difficult to estimate.

Whyte, youthful leader of the Christian Democratic Labor Party (CDLP was elected to parliament in 1976 on the United Although all three leaders say they want to for m an G.N.P.'s Plan for Grenada (1955 p. 11: Peoples Party (UPP) ticket. Imprisoned and tortured by the Bishop regime, Whyte has emerged as something of a hero in Grenada, and is considered to have a good chance of regaining his seat. recently won the supp ort of younger GDM defectors who view him as a conservative counterweight to the liberal Brizan.

The coalition New National Party could win enough seats in the upcoming Grenadian elections to form a government, although its members are still squabbling ove r division of constituencies and the party platform. One important factor that may polarize the vote even further, however, is the resurgent Left, repre- sented by the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM He New Threat From the Left The political vacuu m and quarrelling among moderate politi- cal elements is being exploited by those Marxist revolutionaries who launched the Cuban-supported 1979 coup d'etat that brought Maurice Bishop's PRG to power. Last January, ex-PRG ministers Kenrick Radix and George Louison established the Maurice Bishop and Martyrs of October 19, 1983 Memorial Foundation, which led in June to a new political party called the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM).

Although publicly disavowed by former PRG moderates such as Tourism Minister Lyden Ramdhanny, the MBPM plans to field candi- dates for all 15 parliamentary seats and appears to enjoy at least a moderate degree of support from young leftist sympathizers in the civil service and teaching professions as well as unem- ployed members of the disbanded Peoples Revolutionary Army. Covertly funded by Cuba and Libya, the MBPM began distributing its Indies Times newspaper in April.5 circulation of around 2,500, repre s enting about 5.3 percent of the 46,900 registered voters. The MBPM is also openly subsidized by support groups such as the New York-based Grenada Foundation, Inc which is linked to similar organizations in Canada, Sweden and Britain. The Grenada Foundatio n counts among its -supporters such personalities as Representatives John Conyers and Ronald Dellums, Judge Margaret Burnham, sin er/composer Pete Seeger, and The tabloid now has a the American Association of Jurists 2 Former PRG officials such as Organiza t ion of American States Ambassador Dessima Williams and Press Secretary Don Rojas travel widely in the West and socialist bloc nations, promoting Bishop Ira true Marxist-LeninistI'--as a popular and heroic leader mur- dered by a "killer clique1' with possi ble CIA connections.?

I Information from Leslie Pierre, Editor, The Grenadian Voice, Washington D.C August 1, 1984 The Grenada Foundation, Inc News Release, June 19, 1984, p. 1.

Prague, Rude Pravo in Czech, May 5, 1984, pp. 1, 7 (FBIS, May 10, 1984 p. Sl 7 Grenadians are advised to continue Ifresistance against the invadersi1 while, over media such as Radio Havana, MBPM spokes- men proclaim that "very soon (Grenada) will be liberated by,a second revolution which, according to the laws of history, is inevi t able 118 Such resistance is not empty rhetoric. Crime, particularly theft, is increasing on the island, reportedly encouraged by MBPM activists who advise unemployed and disaffected youths to "liber- ate" items from llimperialistll tourists. This alone co uld set back Grenada's economic development by keeping away visitors. The erosion of effective "law and order" is exacerbated by the fact that the U.S. is forbidden by Congress from training the Grenada Police Force.

Leftists also remain in the Grenadian g overnment, most notably within the New York consulate and on the dependency island of Carriacou, where an ex-PRA officer and youth organizer has been reappointed to the District Office. employees were dismissed from the Ministry of Information, which inte r im government chairman Nicholas Braithwaite said was "packed with people who are not genuine workers'but are committed to an alien ideological cause.Il9 Braithwaitels words could also be used to describe the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Education, Labor , Social Affairs and Women's Affairs In late May, ten Grenadian sources indicate that While the MBPM's electoral base may be small, its domestic network, financial resources and contacts with international leftist organizations give it potential influence. Bishop remains a hero to many young Grenadians who have no real Marxist sympathies, a factor being exploited. Although the MBPM probably does not, as yet, enjoy enough popular support to win any seats in the next parliamentary elections, it may well split the 'Ianti-GairyIl vote in key districts and ensure a victory for GULP candidates. Indeed, this may be part of a long-range MBPM strategy: a GULP government would provide the Left with a much greater base for public dissent than would a centrist coalition A public opinion poll conducted by a Trinidad research organization showed that 38 percent of the respondents felt that, on the whole, the Bishop regime had been good for Grenada; of this 55 percent of those aged 16-21 said the PRG was good for Grenada, a n d 41 percent of those identified as Illower class" took this view Maurice The several hundred Grenadians earlier sent on lleducationalll programs to the socialist bloc are also a source of potential Havana Domestic Service in Spanish, May 30, 1984 (FBIS, J une 1, 1984 Bonaire Trans World Radio in English, May 25, 1984 (FBIS May 30, 1984 PP- Qll, Q12 p. Sl r 8 subversion or terrorism officers (two of whom are now in prison) who attended advanced courses in the USSR and four Grenadians who received Soviet int e lligence and security traininq. Since March, approximately 40 students have returned to the island from socialist countries, although 172 remain in Cuba 14 in the Soviet Union and 7 in East Germany. At least six of these youths were attending MOSCOW'S Int e rnational Leninist Party School, where mandatory courses included IITactics of Revolutionary Movementsi1 and IISocial Psy- chology and Propaganda These included three Grenadian military DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE IN PERSPECTIVE The Reagan Administration has c ommitted itself to restoring the political and economic viability of Grenada. To achieve this a variety of public and private assistance projects have been initiated in cooperation with other nations and several international agencies.

Public Sector Aid Ev en as sporadic fighting continued during the last days of October 1983, the U.S. Agency for International Development began air-ferrying emergency supplies to Grenada. In mid-November, the U.S. Congress provided $15 million for medium- to long-term eco- n o mic development on the island, including a $5 million balance of payments grant to help provide liquidity for resumption of commercial lending to the private sector, assist the government of Grenada in meeting local costs of development programs, and help finance essential supplies of food, raw materials and spare parts.

Overall, U.S. aid to Grenada is estimated at $57.2 million in EY 1984 and FY 1985, the bulk of which will go to projects in the early phase of implementation 10 million airport comple- tio n ($19 million); and various other development projects. The controversial Point Salines airport is scheduled to open offi cially for commercial flights on October 25, 1984--the first anniversary of the allied rescue mission--and will employ an estimated 300 Grenadians.

Restoration of the island's badly deteriorated infrastruc- The Agency for Inter- ture has been given priority by the U.S national Development is also cooperating with the Ministry of Education to find.places in Western universities for Gren adian students who choose to return home from socialist bloc countries. American Peace Corps volunteers arrived on the island in January to fill teaching and technical positions left vacant by Cuban instructors. The U.S. government also is encouraging and assist- ing Grenada to accelerate economic reforms in 1) divestiture of state-owned enterprises, 2) return of agricultural lands to the private sector, 3) marketing of agricultural imports and prod ucts, and 4) usury laws. Australia, and Canada have follo wed the United States in assisting Grenada.

Such Western nations as Great Britain 9 Private Sector Aid I. I Enduring stability for Grenada can only come through private sector jobs creation 30 percent overall, with a much higher percentage among the under 25 age group--is one of the island's most serious problems putting together an investment promotion proqram for Grenada early last November. The Reagan Administratlon also appointed Ambassador Loren Lawrence--a career foreiqn service officer with an impre s sive background in Caribbean business--as U.S. charg6 d'affairs in Grenada Unemployment--conservatively estimated at The White House Office of Private Sector Initiatives began Despite an initial euphoria on the island generated by the combination of exper t promotional work and Grenada's undeniably great potential, a number of once enthusiastic businessmen from the U.S. and other countries are now hedging on committing capital to the island. Would-be investors have been frustrated by the lackadaisical attit u de and inertia of the interim advisory coun- cil. Senior corporate executives on-whirlwind visits to the island have been kept waiting for hours by unconcerned government officials who often fail to show up for meetings. Sir Eric Gairy reportedly has atte mpted to solicit 'Icampaign funds" from busi- nessmen, threatening to revoke the concessions of those who rebuff him if GULP wins the elections.

Many participants on the White House-sponsored investment missions have stated that their prime concern is the vacuum in political leadership in Grenada coupled with the uncertainty of the investment tax codes. The only new development legislation enacted--the Investment Incentives Ordinance 1984--is inadequate, being simply an ambiguous rehash of codes dating bac k to the 1950s, which are noncompetitive in the mid-1980s Caribbean. Other 'Iincentives'l such as the Income Tax Act of the People's Law No 20 of 1980 are actually disincentives due to their socialist nature. These offer no real tax relief for entrepreneur s and restrict foreign investors to a narrow range of options.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Political A truely democratic future for Grenada must be a reflection of the will of the people. conversations reveal that a majority of Grenadians do not wish to rush in to one of the most crucial elections in their island's history.

A compromise is needed: a national referendum should be held in late October or early November to give Grenadians the chance to vote on a slate of issues including the date of parlia- mentary elections and a new constitution. election dates should be included on the ballot, with late! November 1984, March 1985, and November 1985 as possibilities Public opinion polls and private A choice of firm 10 A referendum would allow Grenadians to test t h eir democratic process and demonstrate to the world that they are truly masters of their own destiny. to approve or disapprove of the interim advisory council. Such a plebiscite would also permit them Given the fragility of democratic institutions in Gren a da at present it should be helped by the recently established U.S National Endowment for Democracy. is precisely to encourage development of democratic institutions and procedures, and a democratic political culture. Grenadian projects would be a most cos t -effective utilization of Endowment resources The purpose of the Endowment Economic Grenada must follow the example of such Caribbean islands as the Caymans, the Bahamas and the Turks and Caicos in establishing an innovative and highly attractive climate f or investment. Only a restructuring of the existing investment incentives and tax code will give Grenada the chance to compete economically with more developed and experienced West Indian states. ment legislation is too important to the island's political , social and economic stability to be left in the hands of a single ministry or consulting firm: working group comprising members of the Grenada Chamber of Com- merce, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the White House Office of Private Sector Initia t ives, and others New invest it should be the product of a The Grenada Chamber of Commerce is a strong and unified force in the community, with excellent leadership. The Chamber has formulated a strategy for development which centers on tour- ism and agric u lture. Its recommendations have won support from U..S. Agency for International -Development and OPIC. The Chamber advises that the banana, cocoa and nutmeg associations be imme- diately returned to cooperative management and control; that the hotels owne d by Grenada Resorts Corporation be sold to the private sector; that light industrial facilities such as the Agro-Indus- trial Plant and the Sugar Factory be sold to private firms; that television and radio be operated privately and that Marketing and Impo rt Board operations be limited to the distribution of local fruits and vegetables, not imported commodities.

Tourism has the greatest potential for providing jobs and an infusion of much-needed hard currency into the Grenadian economy. Due to the terms of Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative, light manufacturing also promises to be an important component of the Grenadian economy. Intelligent land use and sound zoning regula- tions could help foster tourism and light industrial growth. Southern Grenada is id e al for tourist-related development because of proximity to the new international airport and port of St. George's as much as for its unspoiled beaches. Land in this area is limited, however, and thus should not be marred by industrial parks. north of St. George's, particularly in the Temp6 valley (where a Industry should be encouraged in the undeveloped areas bottling plant and flour mill exist) and in the environs of the town of Grenville, which has a port suitable for expansion.

The often overlooked depe ndency of Carriacou--16 miles north of Grenada--should be designated an "enterprise zoneii or tax haven using ideas borrowed from Britain's Thatcher government and the 1981 Companies Ordinance and Insurance Ordinance adopted by the Turks and Caicos Island s . Carriacou, an 11-square-mile island with 7,000 inhabitants, is well suited for light manufac- turing, food processing and related enterprises it is relatively flat and dry and has an airstrip and a sheltered harbor with great development potential An in novative scheme for virtually laissez-faire development would serve to provide employment for inhabitants of both Carriacou and Grenada, as well as serving as an ongoing publicity vehicle for the island group as a whole.

Security The joint U.S./Caribbean Peacekeeping Force (including 300 American military personnel, 100 of whom are military police) must be maintained for the foreseeable future to guarantee sta- bility. should be included in a national referendum to allow t he Grenadian people to express their wishes on the subject ro tem ore basis should be granted to the interim government to 5i-r-5 ea wit subversion and terrorism. Acts of sabotage recently have occurred and authorities believe that arms caches still exist on the island. Persons considered security risks-such as ex-PRG members who continue to travel to the Soviet bloc--should have their passports revoked Whether to keep.the peacekeeping forces on the island Special powers on a The Grenada incident highlight s the necessity for the strengthening of the federation of Caribbean states to mutually defend against external aggressions A more extensive regional security program requires 1) an increase in U.S. security assistance funding and 2) relief from the clause of section 660 of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which bars U.S. training of security forces. The resulting increased funds should then be used to expand the existing multinational Regional Defense Force into a more permanent Caribbean Defense Force cons i sting of primarily combat infantry troops. Most of the Caribbean nations rely on regular police forces to both maintain internal law and order and defend against external aggressors. Increased Military Assistance .Program and International Military Educat i on and Train- ing funding is needed to train the 3,370 police in the Eastern Caribbean, of which only ten percent possess any kind of para- military training, to help offset shortages of regular regional army forces in the event of any escalation of hosti lities.1 Report of the Delegation of Eastern Caribbean and South American Countries February 1984, U.S. Government Printing Office.

CONCLUSION 12 In the long term, the best means of assuring the political stability of Grenada is by the election of a modera te, reform- minded government to administer an economy as free from legis- lative encumbrances as possible. climate for the growth of free enterprise can produce the jobs needed to alleviate Grenada's chronic, and potentially explosive, unemployment probl e m. providing Grenada with a largesse of recuperative aid is wise, and should ultimately be the basis for a new era of U.S.-Carib bean relations. However, to guarantee that the Grenada rescue mission remains victorious, the White House must be wary of allo w ing itself to slip into a position of benign neglect toward the island: wise and decisive actions are once again needed to regain.the positive momentum generated last October encouraged by the National Endowment for Democracy, that will allow Grenadians t o decide the timetable for parliamentary elec- tions'and a new constitution. Next, the country's economy must be rebuilt. The Grenadian Chamber of Commerce has a promising market-oriented development strategy. The White House Office of Private Sector Initi a tives should work with it to restructure investment incentives,and the tax code, and U.S. aid should sup- port Grenadian tourism and agriculture projects that will bring jobs and needed hard currency to the island. Finally, to guard against external aggre s sion, the U.S. should grant security assistance to expand the current Regional Defense Force into a' more.permanent Caribbean Defense Force. Grenada can become yet another example of the benefits of democ- racy and free market development Only the creatio n of a fertile The Reagan Administration's policy of First among these should be a speedy national referendum With proper guidance Prepared for The Heritage Foundation by Timothy Ashby President, Caribbean Financial Consultants Arlington, Virginia