(Archived document, may contain errors)

177 April 8, 1982 HOW THE U.N. AIDS MARXIST GUERRILLA GROUPS INTRODUCTION The PLO, an international terrorist organization, is awarded "permanent observer1I status at the U.N. and given a U.N budget for interfiational publicity to sene as an expert on airplane hijacking permanent observer1' at the U.N., preparing students to be guer ri l la soldiers at U.N.-supported schools in Angola ANC and PAC, communist-dominated guerrilla and terrorist groups operating across the South African border, enjoy at least 9 million biennial U.N. aid plus U.N. political approval e The PLO is invited to a U. N . conference on civil aviation SWAPO, a Southwest African terrorist group, becomes a The U.N. officially endorses violent "armed strugglet1 by the PLO, SWAPO, ANC and PAC against U.N. member states includ ing tacit approval of terrorist attacks on civilia ns mhese are just a few highlights of U.N. aid and support of Marxist-oriented, Soviet-backed guerrilla movements. The links are no secret and appear in United'xations official documents.

Yet U.N. funding and political support for armed guerrilla warfare whether conducted by Marxists or others, is not authorized by the U.N. Charter. The Charter, in fact, mandates that !#All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful mean s in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered Chapter 1, Article 2, para. 3.) 2 Despite this, the U.N.'s own records show that since 1975 at least $116 million has been spent or.budgeted to .support what the U.N. c alls "national liberation movements1 NLMs). About 25 percent of this has been and is being contributed by the American taxpayer.

Some of these NLMs, such as the MPLA of Angola or FRELIMO of Mozambique, have already seized power and are the governments of t heir countries. ZAPU and ZANU, now the chief political parties of Zimbabwe, were.also heavily backed by the U.N. as guerrilla groups. These former NLMs all are Marxist and either are or were aligned with the Soviet Union and its allies U.N. support of NLM s has been curiously selective. No backing, for instance, has been given to pro-Western national liberation movements, such as UNITA (now fighting a successful guerrilla war against the Marxist government of Angola). Nor has the U.N. been willing to recogn i ze non-Marxist representatives of the Palestinians or the democratic political parties of Namibia in southern Africa. Instead, the General Assembly recognizes the PLO and SWAPO as the,llsoleil representatives of the Palestinian and Namibian peop'les respe ctively. Yet there are many other representatives of both peoples who get neither recognition nor assistance from the U.N.

U.N. support of guerriila liberation movements ranges from gifts of food, housing and health services to radio channels for broadcast ing propaganda. Both SWAPO and ANC of South Africa, for instance, make wide use of U.N.-sponsored radio propaganda broad casts U.N. officials interviewed for this study scrupulously avoided even'hinting that the U.N. is aiding the military training of NLM s . It is obvious, however, that guerrilla armies need food, medicine and civilian training for their cadres, as well as arms. These necessities they have been able to obtain in abundance from the U.N Military arms, equipment, training and advisors for thes e NLMs are provided by the USSR, Cuba and Eastern bloc nations.

But much of their ''humanitarian aid" comes from the United Nations.

And most of the money abcut 65 percent for this humanitarian aid comes from the U.S. and other Western industrial democracies.

Probably more important than the actual aid and development projects is the international political legitimacy which U.N recognition confers on the NLMs. Offical U.N. recognition, for instance, is enjoyed by four communist-oriented guerrilla groups t he Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAFO), the African National Congress ANC and the Pan-African Congress (PAC). This U.N. seal of approval gives them an unfair advantage over their political rivals at h o me. It gives them money, aid projects, publicity and international lobbying power not available to their competitors. 3 It also distorts their image on the international scene making them appear to be the true representatives of their respective peoples t hough, in reality, all four are actually fighting for political survival at home.

How did the U.N. stray so far from its charter? Several historians trace the organization's support of guerrillas to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Following the Arab defeat in t hat conflict the Soviet Union formed a political alliance in the U.N. General Assembly with the Arab states. The res'ulting Soviet-Arab-Third World bloc led to a series of General Assembly resolutions beginning in 1969, affirming what is called the "inali e nable rights of the Palestinian people.11 A number of experts on the U.N. maintain that the Soviet Union, its satellites and client states, along with Arab oil nations and the Marxist liberation movements of southern Africa, created the U.N. voting bloc t hat opened the door to PLO chief Yassir Arafatls appearance at the U.N. in 1974.' He addressed the General Assembly and the Security Council as if he headed a legitimate and sovereign state.

With the General Assembly vote to.welcome Arafat as !!the represe ntative -of the Palestinian people,I1 the PLO, the world's most notorious international terrorist organization, was clothed in a new respectability and accepted in international diplomacy at the U.N. This occurred just two years after the PLO murders of t h e Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich. PLO terror did not stop after Arafat's U.N. appearance, but this did not prevent the PLO from gaining official observer status at the U.N Other guerrilla and terrorist groups soon got the message that they could be le gitimized and obtain international political credentials at the United Nations.

In 1976, another leading guerrilla organization scored a critical victory when the General Assembly voted to support SWAPO l'i?s the sole and authentic representative of the Na mibian people 3.N. Resolution 31/146, para. 2.) As in the case of the PLO the U.N. recognized SWAPO as the sole party of the Namibians despite many other political parties in Southwest Africa. In the same resolution, the General Assembly supported SWAPO I f in their struggle, by ali means, including armed struggle, to achieve self-determination, freedom and national independence The General Assembly similarly recognized the two- Marxist guerrilla groups the ANC and the PAC as the sole legitimate represen tat i ves of South Africa, wnile stripping the government of South Africa of its General Assembly voting rights Seymour Maxwell Finger The PLO at the United Nations American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, January 1979; and Paul Johnson Barba r ous Parliament The New Republic, December 20, 1975. 4 Dramatically reflected in these actions is the U.N.'s increas ingly ubiquitous double standard. How can a self-proclaimed peace-keeping organization like the United Nations sponsor guerril las and terr orists? And why are the only recipients of such U.N backing Marxists and anti-Western groups? It is hyprocrisy and double standards of this kind which discredit the United Nations make it an object of derision, and undermine its support in the U.S.

WHAT THE PLO GETS FROM THE U.N.

Before U.N. recognition, the PLO was viewed as an unpredict able and dangerous international terrorist organization. The world's law enforcement agencies have not changed their minds about that. But since Yassir Arafat's speech at the U.N. and the creation of two PLO-dominated U.N. commmittees the Inalienable Rights Committee and the IISpecial Unit on Palestinian Rights the PLO is now able to wave its U.N. identification badge and call itself a legitimate national liberation movem ent. PLO spokesman Abdul Abdu Massur, for example, broadcast a startling statement on Radio Damascus as justification for the murders of two innocent Israelis by a PLO terrorist assault group on June 15, 19

75. He declared We sponsored! the operation becau se it is our right to fight for our rights, and the whole world sponsored it and our operations along with us, because the United Nations General Assembly has approved the right of the Palestinians to pursue their. struggle with all means to regain usurpe d rights. It The Damascus broadcast, intended for an Arab audience demonstrates how the PLO uses its U.N. credentials to boost its image among other Arabs. This kind of public relations campaign is essential to the PLO's political existence, especially sin ce 70 percent of the Palestinians in the Middle East live in either Jordan or the West Bank, where the PLO is banned. It was an Arab leader, King Hussein, who banned the PLO in Jordan.

In 1975, following a PLO initiative, the General Assembly created Ifthe Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.Il Though not a member of the Committee the PLO was allowed to participate in the closed sessions of the Committee's drafting group. Consequently, the Committee's recom mendati o ns essentially echo the PLO Covenant rejecting concili ation or negotiation with Israel. Thus, the U.N. tacitly endorses terrorism by its recognition of the PLO, an avowedly terrorist group, as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians Letter from the National District Attorney's Association, Chicago, Illinois to Gerhard Mueller, Executive' Secretary, 5th U.N. Congress on the Preven tion of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, August 27, 1975, p. 4 5 Through the creation of the Inalienable Ri g hts Committee the U.N. also makes itself a propaganda voice of the PLO, giving PLO terrorist attacks respectability. The Committee on Inalienable Rights, with the PLO as its chief consultant, was able to persuade the General Assembly in 1977 to create ano t her U.N. organ, the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights.3 Secretariat, this unit has been useful to the PLO in several ways. Its mandate instructs it to turn out publications.and direct a public relations campaign for the Palestinian cause including an ann ual IIInternatioIial Solidarity Day with the Pales tinian People.It All these activities are under the direction of the Inalienable Rights Committee, which, in turn, is heavily influenced by the PL0.4 Established within the U.N.

The pamphlets of the Special Unit implicitly support the PLO as the only real representative of the Palestinians. One such booklet, sold in the U.N. bookstore and distributed to U.N centers worldwide, is entitled The International Status of the Palestinia n People. It lauds Yassir Arafat as a freedom fighter.

It justifies Arafat's and the PLO's use of terrorism by noting how successful the "Palestinian commandos1' have been through terrorism in bringing the Palestinian question to the world's attention.

Last year's annual U.N. Palestinian Solidarity Day saw the PLO set up an unapproved exhibition in a U.N. corridor featuring a PLO flag and a. map of ''Palestineii that did not include Israel.

Despite protests from Israel, the PLO propaganda display was allo wed to stand after the PLO representative, Zehdi Labib Terzi told U.N. security guards he would !'use force if necessaryi1 to keep the flag and the map in place.5 Full observer status for the PLO has been voted by several U.N. agencies, including: UNESCO, the International Labor Organi zation (ILO the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Interna tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). When ICAO awarded this privilege to the PLO in October 1977, it allowed the PLO to send observers to all.meetings whe r e the U.N. discusses air security. The rationale for this: the PLO has had considerable experience with air piracy (as.skyjackers, of course) and the PLO's advice could prove valuable to these meetings.6 A few years earlier, the PL0,was invited to attend the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, It held in Geneva, Swi",serland, September Harris

0. Schoenberg Terror Legitimized Midstream, March 1979, pp 7-8.

Ibid.

Washington Post, December 1, 1981, p. All.

Robert W. Lee, The United Nations Conspiracy Boston, Los Angeles Western Islands, 1981 p. 211 6 1, 19

75. This drew a vigorous protest from the U.S. National District Attorneys Association, which called for the withdrawal of the invitation to the terr orist group. In its letter, the NDAA quoted from the IIPLO Spokesman,l' the official newspaper which boasted only months after the Munich massacre, in its September 1972 issue We have to kill the most famous. Since statesmen are difficult to kill as they are well protected, we have to kill artists and athletes Gerhard

0. W. Mueller, an American who is Executive Secretary of the U.N. crime prevention congress, refused to withdraw the invitation, citing the PLO's official observer status. Mueller further no ted that: "those acts of violence which are caused by political and ideological frustration cannot be expected to cease until the world community succeeds in dealing with the underlying causes.118 In the case of PLO terrorism, the underlying cause accordi ng to the PLO's own Covenant, is the existence of Israel.

On July 27, 1977, the PLO was admitted to the U.N. Economic and Social Council's (ECOSOC) Commission for Western Asia. This was the first time that full membership status was ever given to a non-cou ntry. The PLO since has been allowed to chair the Commission THE PLO AND TJ3E U.N. BUDGET In the 1982-83 U.N. biennial budget, the Committee for.the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People is scheduled to receive $71,8

00. The Special Unit has budgeted 6,156,500 for the two-year period. This includes money for conferences related to Palestinian rights lavishly funded United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA programs' for Palestinian refugees in the Miadle East. John Miles, direct o r of the UNRWA's New York liaison office, say's that all of UNRWF,'s 17,000 worldwide employees, except for about 120 international staff are Palestinians. There is strong evidence that this nearly entirely Palestinian-run organization is dominated by the PLO. There is further evidence that the PLO controls the U.N.!s Palestinian refugee camps. The Associated Press reported on June 18, 1979 hat PLO terrorists controlled three Palestinian refugee camps around Tyre, and Lebanon's southern and eastern outskir ts. These are UNRWA camps But there is also evidence the PLO may have infiltrated the NDA4 Letter, op. cit.

Letter from Gerhard

0. W. Mueller, Chief of U.N. Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Section to NDAA, Chicago, Illinois, September 25, 1975 7 In the AP dispatch, the PLO liaison officer for Tyre, Major Saed, said: "Running the camps and handling their defenses is a PLO res p onsibility [together] with the Lebanese government. I'1 Another Pales.tinian refugee camp, Tell a1 Zaater, in Beirut Lebanon, came to the public's attention during the Lebanese civil war. On August 10 1976, both Radio Beirut and Radio Palestine reported t h at the camp was a major PLO military base with rein forced concrete bunkers. The radio reports also confirmed the presence of armed terrorists and artillery emplacements in'the camp. Other intelligence sources reported that the camp's bunkers were "canouf l aged by civilian hovels inhabited by the refugees of the PLO.lt Even more conclusive evidence of PLO use of U.N. refugee camps is the statement of the Lebanese Ambassador, Edward Ghorra in a letter to former U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim The Palest i nians increased the influx of arms into Lebanon they transformed most of the refugee camps if not all into military bastions the camps, in fact, became centers for the training of mercenaries sent and financed by other Arab states.I'll Attached to this le t ter by Ghorra to Kurt Waldheim was another letter from the deputy prime minister of Lebanon to the 5th conference of Heads of Non-Aligned States in Colombo, Sri Lanka The Palestinians] have breached their accords with Lebanese authorities in 1969 by insta l ling heavy weapons in the camps They have even occupied the UNRWA cffices in the camps UNRWA's annual budget is about $200 million. Most of that pays for over 600 Palestinian elementary schools, according to Miles. Roughly $20 million a year goes to the c amps in Lebanon.

Whether the PLO directly gets any of this money is not the point; what is critical is PLO access to the refugee camps which serve as valuable recruiting centers, bases for military training and indoctrination and, as reported by these Leba nese officials as actual military installations PLO leader Yassir Arafat has made it clear recently at PLO plans for national liberation include regions besides Palestine.

Arafat told the General Federation of Palestinian Writers and Journalists this January that PLO guerrillas serve in Nicaragua 1o Associzted Press, June 18, 1979.

Letter from Lebanese Ambassador to U.N., Edward Ghorra, to Secretary General of the U.N Kurt Waldheim, August 17, 1976, U.N. Document A/31/179. a El Salvador and Angola. Arafat emphasized the links between the PLO and other Ifnational liberation" groups around the world. He added that PLO pilots were flying planes in Nicaragua.l The U.S. State Department confirmed Arafat's boast in early March, acknowledging that Soviet-trained PLO pilots apparently were flying ammunition drops from Nicaragua to guerzillas in nearby El Salvador. The'Palestinians, Newsweek-reported can fly large helicopters and transport aircraft that the Nicaraguans have not mastered I l Since it is highly likel ythe PLO plays a large role inside UNRWA, should the U.S which contributed $62 million-to UNRWA in 1981, continue to participate in the Palestinian refugee program?

And why should the U.S. taxpayer underwrite this PLO-dominated organization when the 01.1-rich Arab states contribute very little to UNRWA? Saudi Arabia and eleven other Arab states in 1981 contributed' only about $18.5 million.

SWAPO AT THE. U.N In 1976, the U.N. General Assembly recognized the Southwest African People's Organization as the "s ole and authentic" repre sentative of Southwest Africa, the South African trusteeship often known as Namibia. SWAPO, however, is only one of forty-five political parties representing Namibia's one million people, but is tightly tied through military aid a n d training to the Soviet Union. It also has a well-documented record of terrorist attacks against civilians dating from the late 1960s Following a pattern it was to repeat in the case of Arafat and the PLO, the U.N. General Assembly invited SWAPO's leader Sam Nujoma, to speak at the U.N. in May 19

73. On that occasion Nujoma said I pledge here and now that we will continue to talk to South Africa in the only.language they understand and that is intensification of armed liberation struggle SWAPO will contin ue to mobilize the masses and intensify and expand military operations until all the objectives of the struggle are realized.

United Nations recognition and support of SWAPO is very similar to U.N. treatment of the PLO. Like the PLO, SWAPO relies heavily on the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc nations for military equipment, supplies and military training. For humani tarian aid, SWAPO turns to the U.N. Namibian refugees, scattered l2 "Arafat Says PLO Aids Foreign Guerrilla Units Wall Street Journal Janua r y 14, 1982 l3 "The PLO on the Wing in Nicaragua Newsweek, March 15, 1982, p. 19. 9 over four or five southern African countries, are cared for by a dozen U..N. agencies. SWAPO plays a major, and often a controlling role in the administration of these U.N. relief programs. Through these programs, as the only representative of the Namibians recognized by the U.N., SWAPO in 1981 had access to about $28 million worth of food, education, medical and vocational training projects. And the United Nations Industria l Development Organiza tion (UNIDO) recently requested an additional $17.6 million for an industrial management training program for Namibia. (U.N.

Document A/36/154/add. 1.) This would almost certainly be domina ted by SWAPO.

Another source of U.N. backi ng for SWAPO is the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR From 1979 to 1981, it allocated about $10 million for the Namibian refugee camps principally in Angola, SWAP0''s main staging location for terrorist operations into Namibia.

The World Food Program, meanwhile, has given SWAPO $5.4 million worth of food since 19

74. The current WFP food gift budget for SWAPO is $2.8 million. With WFP food, SWAPO can feed Namibian refugees in Angola, thus using U.N resources to. ingrati ate itself with the refuge e population. This surely helps SWAPO attract young recruits from within the camps. A Reagan Admini stration aide reports that SWAPO is even kidnapping young recruits from Namibia, luring them with promises of medical school fellow ships SWAPO secured abo ut $5 million in food aid from WFP for Namibians 'in Angola from early March 1978 through October 1979.

When the South African Army raided SWPSO bases in Angola in the summer of 1979, food cartons from WFP were found in the guerrilla camps. SWAPO obviously used U.N. food to feed its terrorist troops as well as the Namibian refugees.14 SWAPO AND THE U.N. BUDGET The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) budget for 1977-81 earmarked $7,750,000 for SWAPO; another $7,750,000 has been recommended by UNDP off icials for the 1982-86 budget UNDP will receive another $4,477,870 for Namibia via the recognized by the U.N. for Namibia, .SWAP0 will play a leading role in the distribution of this sum also Namibia Trust Fund. As the sole "national liberation movement"

The World Eealth Organization SWAPO from 1974-81, while the Food also gave about $256,000 to and Agriculture Organization l4 Robert W. Lee, op. cit p. 209; Lee Affairs Research Institute report on is quoting from a 1979 London Foreign SWAPO 10 gave $90,00 0 to SWAPO in 19

80. UNESCO has a separate fund of about $4 million called "Aid to Refugees and Natkonal Liberation Movements,lt divided among the PLO, SWAPO and the two South.African terrorist guerrilla groups, the ANC and the PAC.

Namibia in New York, w hich, in turn, funnels funding for aid projects to SWAPO through the U.N. Fund for Namibia'and the U.N.-sponsored Institute for Namibia. The United Nations Commis sioner for Namibia, with offices in New York, Luanda (the capital of Angola) and Botswana al s o receives U.N. funds for aid.to SWAPO U.N. aid is also channeled to SWAPO by the U.N. Council for The U.N. and its specialized agencies have allocated a grand total of at least $40 million in aid either directly or indirectly to SWAPO for programs begun between 1977 and 1981 and for programs beginning and continuing during 1982-

86. The United States contributes about 30 percent of this.

Another $17.6 million is on the drawing boards via UNIDO.

The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) also has submitted a large proposal for national liberation,funding which would direct yet more funds to SWAPO, ANC and PAC l'to provide an opportunity for the leadership of the NLMs to be more fully acquainted with the activities of UNCTAD in the area of inte r na tional economic relationsit and to build up' Ilmanagement capacity of NLM cadres U.N. Document TD/B/WP/16, p. 20 In the $17.6 million UNIDO proposal for the training of industrial managers is found the U.N. rationale for these types of wide-ranging and comprehensive U.N. development programs intended for SWAPO.

The proposal is broken down into three parts: pre-indepen dence, transitional and post-independence aid. This program like all. the U.N. programs for Namibia/SWAPO, takes place outside Namibia an d is dominated by SWAPO recipients. The intent is. to train the professional cadres of the future independent Namibia.

Why then is SWAPO the main beneficiary of these programs? Why has the U.N. decided that in some future Namibia, these profession als wil l come from the ranks of SWAPO? The U.N in effect, is feeding, clothing, educating and giving civilian training to the SWAPO guerrilla army. But the U.N. is also training SWAPO candi dates as government functionaries for the day when SWAPO seizes the rein s of power in Namibia. What about the non-SWAP0 groups in Namibia? Why do they not qualify for help from the U.N.? Why are they victims of the U.N. double standard?

SWAPO'S PROPAGANDA W MEDIA BONANZA AT THE U.N.

Through U.N. Resolution 34/92F (1979 SWAPO is guaranteed a free international public relations service provided by the U.N.

Department of Public Information of the Secretariat. This resolu11 tion notes the need Itto intensify the wide-spread and continuous a dissemination of information on the str uggle for liberation being waged by the people of Namibia, guided by their liberation movement sic] the SWAPO.II Because of this resolution, SWAPO distributes propaganda through U.N. press releases on Namibia and through U.N. publications and periodicals. SWAPO.also has access to the U.N. Department of Public Information (DPI) Radio Service, which broadcasts worldwide. SWAPO airs special programs on Namibia Day. It also provides its own radio material to broadcasting organizations, including a special seri es of six quarter-hour programs in English, French, Spanish and German for international distribution.

The U.N. Visual Service, meanwhile, screens such SWAPO films as !'Namibia, a Trust Betrayed lfColonialism: A Case Study Namibia and "End of an Era DPI al so provides photographic and exhibition services for special SWAPO events displays later used as semi-permanent exhibits at the United Nations Headquarters and offices in Geneva and Vienna. Copies go to all the worldwide Information Centers of the United N ations. None of the other Namibian movements enjoys such generous and valuable treatment by the U.N. The Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, for example, has no privileges or standing at the U.N SWAPO'S PRIVILEGED U.N. STATUS SWAPO became an l'observerlt to th e U.N.'s Council for Namibia in 19

67. As such, the Marxist group accompanies the Council on its missions away from New York. From its reports, it seems that the Council not only makes no moves without consulting SWAPO, but responds to SWAPO initiatives. S WAPO also is invited to the international conferences of several U.N. specialized agencies such as the ILO, FAO, WE-0, UNCTAD and UPU (Universal Postal Union are part of the Council of Namibia budget, as are travel and subsistence expenses of SWAPOIs memb e rs travelling with the Council's missior,s 67,000 in 1979 of c::mxultation,ll diplomatic trips to win support for its aims to twenty-three countries in 1980 including the U.S France Great Britain and West Germany and used the opportunities to convey the S W APO philosophy of "armed struggle awarded "permanent observer1' status in .the General Assembly in 1976 and since 1971 has been invited by the Security Council to participate in Security Council meetings on Namibia. No other Namibian 'group is so privileg e d SWAPO's office expenses in New York 182,300 in 1979 A SWAPO representative was present on the Council's llmissions In a dramatic application of the double standard, SWAPO was 12 Oespite the U.N.'s intimate association with SWAPO, the U.N. seem ignorant o f SWAPO's startling record of terrorist attacks on civilians and government officials tactic is the planting of land mines at random on public roads in Namibia mines parties terrorist attacks against black civilians. Former Secretary General Kurt Waldheim ignored completely evidence of 969 terrorist attacks mounted by SWAPO, including 227 deaths, 385 abductions and 227 serious injuries A favorite SWAPO terrorist Local residents have been the main vi'ctims of these SWAPO has also assassinated officials of r i val political The U.N however, has never criticized SWAPO for its SWAPO'S USE OF U.N. REFUGEE CAMPS Mirroring the PLO SWAPO is using U.N. refugee camps to recruit and train guerrillas. New York Times reporter Bernard Nossiter visited a UNHCR refugee camp f or Namibian exiles in Angola. In his March 28, 1981, dispatch he reported that the camp, designed for 10,000 Namibian school children on a coffee plantation 200 miles south of Luanda, is training its students to "return as guerrillast1 to Namibia. The stu d ents, he wrote ranged from 5 to 18 years. old, "most of them well under 16 Center million, of which the UNDP contributes $612,857. (U.N. Document DP/153 the camp's programs and maintenance The UNHCR camp is called the Namibia Health and Education Nossiter estimated the yearly cost cf the camp at $2 Other U.N. agencies also may be contributing a share of Nossiter reported that daily use of the camp's resources are in the hands of SWAPO. Nossiter added that it would be easy for SWAPO to deceive UNHCR about c a ching arms or conducting military tra1ning.h the camp. The UNHCR inspector makes the rugged trip to the camp only once a month As Nossiter was leaving the Center, a choral group from the nearby women's camp (population: 25,000) sang a refrain for the depa rting visitors We are determined that Namibia must-be free. Marxism Leninism is our ideology, founded on scientific-socialism.

The United States funds about 25 percent of all U.N. programs Namibia, including this camp.

ANC AND THE PAC OF SOUTH AFRICA In addition to SWAPO, two other guerrilla-terrorist movements in South Africa are recognized and supported by the U.N African National Congress (ANC) and its offshoot, the Pan-African Congrzss (PAC). Both have vowed the des t ruction of the present South African government The 13 The 1980-81 U.N. budget for ANC and PAC development and support programs was about $9,700,000, not including assistance to ANC and PAC from most of the U.N. specialized agencies. Nor did it include as sistance from the Trust Fund for South Africa and the U.N. Educational and Training Program for South Africa.

The 1981-83 UNESCO budget, for instance, clearly earmarks about 830,000 for ANC and PAC. Another $3,294,000 is budgeted to be split among the PLO, SWAPO, ANC and PAC. UNCTADfs proposal for trade and developmentll assistance for SWAPO also includes money for ANC and PAC.

At least seven U.N. bodies fund educational projects, health care, food, scholastic and training fellowships and refugee aid for the ANC ana the PAC. This includes about $6.7 million from UNHCR and almost $3 million from UNDP.

Then there is the U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa. Its $4 million is used to pay for attorneys for ANC and PAC members jailed by South Africa and for the support of their families.

Many of these prisoners are accused of terrorism and sabotage.

Once again, the United States pays about 25 percent of the U.N. programs benefitting ANC and PAC.

The General Assembly, meanwhile, has asked all organs of the U.N. to invite the ANC and the PAC to attend all meetings concern ing southern Africa There are other U.N. fringe benefits for ANC and PAC. Like SWAPO, the two groups have been anointed by the General Assembly as "the national liberation movements of South Afric a" and, as such the authentic representatives of the South African people in their just struggle for liberation1 the most recent statement of this is U.N. Resolution 35/206 A 1980).

Since 1974, the General Assembly has denied South Africa its right to answer charges against it. The Assembly has rejected the credentials of South Africa, a sovereign and independent nation and a U.N. member state.

CONCLUSION United Nations funding of terrorist-oriented Ifnational liberation movements,Il L1 of them with ties t o the Soviets, the Eastern bloc nations or to mainland China, is a threat to the security of the U.S. and its allies. The goal of the PLO is the destruction of Israel. Yet the U.S. tacitly supports the PLO through numerous U.N. programs, including the- UN RWA refugee ezfort.

South Africa and the Cape of Good Hope, both strategically critical to the U.S., are threatened by terrorist sabotage and subversion through ANC and PAC. Still the U.S. pays 25 percent 14 of the nearly $40 million in U.N. support now go ing to these two groups and to the SWAPO guerrillas attacking Namibia. Should the Marxist governments in South Africa and Namibia?

U.S. pay for the upkeep of terrorist forces who would bring in The answer clearly should be ltno.ft Washington should cut off contributions to U.N. "national liberation movementIf programs.

UNDP, for instance, has recommended that SWAPO, ANC and PAC be assisted with $22 million in aid projects during 1982-

86. The U.S. contribution in voluntary funding to UNDP in 1980 was at 17.5 percent. At that rate, the U.S. would pay almost $4 million to SWAPO, ANC and PAC during the next four years.

The U.S. contributed about $97 million to the World Food Program in 19 80, or about 27.5 percent of the budg,et. Over the past seven years, WFP has exceeded all other U.N.'bodies in contributions to natonal liberation movements (NLMs Between 1974 and 1981, the World Food Program paid almost $44.5 million in cash, commodities and services to NLMs, most of them Marxist.

The Soviet Union, by comparison, which gives arms and military training to the same NLMs, gives nothing to WFP and never has.

Exactly how much guerrilla and terrorist groups get from the U.N. directly and from the U.S. via the U.N. is unknown. The totals could be much higher than the documented figures of this study. What is needed .to uncover the full amount is a thorough investigation of the funding of all U.N. agencies by the General Accounting Office and th e U.S. Congress which has powers to subpoena documents and take testimony under oath. The focus of the investigation should be'on the amount of funding and assistance of all kinds funneled through these organizations to NLMs. All international organization s related to the U.N., such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, should also be probed to determine how much U.S. and Western European money is funding loans to current and former guerrilla groups.

Washington also should try to convince America's allies to stop funding guerrilla-terrorist groups through the U.N.

If the Soviets, Africans and Third Worlders insist on using their voting majority in the U.N. General Assembly to fund terror ist, anti-U.S. national liberation movements, then U. S. funding of agencies like UNESCO, the FAO, WFP, WHO, UNHCR and UNDP (all of which have NLM programs)'should be cut back or eliminated.

The U.S. Mission to the U.N moreover, should monitor and report to Congress on whether U.N. forums, such as the U.N.

Commission en Human Rights and the Special Committee Against Apartheid, are being exploited by terrorist groups'like the Tupa maros of Uruguay. If terrorists cannot be banned from these forums and international meetings of U.N. agencies, then the U.S shou l d demand that those who oppose the terrorists also be given the chance to speak. 15 New schemes to extend U.N. support of guerrillas to groups in South and Central America (including Puerto Rico and elsewhere should be carefully.monitored and reported to the U.S. Congress.

Both Congress and the GAO should investigate thoroughly the suspected use of UNHCR and UNRWA refugee camps by guerrillas and terrorists for storing arms; for military training or indoctri nation centers; for political indoctrination; and for recruitment.

At present, the U.S. is doing almost none of this. Congress has passed into law three provisions cutting off U.S. Contributions to the U.N. destined for the PLO and SWAPO. But the total funds withheld in 1980 and 1981 only amounted to $900,3

25. The actual amount of U.S. money which went to national liberation movements through the U.N. that year was nearly $2 million from four organi zations alone UNDP, UNHCR, WHO and FAO.

Congress can avoid the annual wrangle over cutting U.S contribu tions to the U.N.-sponsored guerrillas by writing a permanent cut-off of funds to the PLO and other terrorist guerrilla groups into the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 or into the State Department Service Act It is time to act. At stake not only are those U .S. national interests threatened by the PLO, SWAPO and other guerrilla groups but the credibility and integrity of the United Nations the United States maintain its own integrity'while associated with a U.N. that supports terror Nor can Thomas G. Gulick United Nations Assessment Project