(Archived document, may contain errors)
64
September 17, 1980
"SUPERFUND'" LEGISLA TION
(H.R.85, H.R.7020, S.1480)
INTRODUCTION
Enactment of "superfund" legislation is a high priority for both the Carter Administration and environmentalists. Its initial focus was land pollution, which had been overlooked when the environmental movement of the 1970s successfully lobbied for air and water pollution regulations.
Until recently, land has always been plentiful and cheap. However, it can no longer be perceived as a natural sponge which is able to digest and cleanse itself of disposed wastes. Paradox- ically, the great prosperity brought about by American industry since World War II has produced a tremendous volume of wastes, some of which have had adverse effects, and some of which could 1 conceivably have caused environmental and public health problems.
The Carter Administration reacted to these growing concerns with introduction of 11superfund" legislation last year. What makes the fund "super" is its sweeping nature; the proposal is ambitious and far-reaching in its scope and its funding and liability schemes. While there is plainly a need for some kind of response to the problem of hazardous wastes, the proposal by the Carter Administration and its subsequent initiatives may be more hazardous than the wastes themselves.
The Carter Administration and environmentalists seek a single comprehensive "superfund" large enough to deal with all hazardous substances (disposal sites, oil spills and chemical spills).
1. See Louis J. Cordia, OSHA and Environmental Health," He'ritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 116, April 21, 1980. The complexity of the hazardous waste problem has become glaringly apparent as Congress has tried to come to grips with the intricacies of "superfund.11 The Congress cannot find common ground for a fair and equitable solution. The House and Senate have completely reversed themselves each time'a proposal moves from subcommittee to full committee and, by sequential referral, to other committees.
The several major pieces of legislation would create a fund anywhere from $100 million to $4.1 billion, financed totally or in part by industry and government (federal and state), to pay for clean-up of any or all hazardous waste disposal sites, oil spills and chemical spills," and in some cases for compensation of victims allegedly injured by these substances.
Despite these irreconcilably different approaches to dealing effectively with hazardous substances, Congress may still pass some form of "superfund.11 For a Congress already beset by budget overruns, it would be attractive if not irresistible in an election year to create a stringent and expensive "superfund" financed primarily by industry.
Regretably, no economically sensitive initiative exists. Instead, "superfund" proposals charge industry not because they necessarily are responsible for hazardous effects or wastes, but simply due to association with wastes that eventually could have hazardous effects.
PROPOSALS
The full House will soon act on two bills that would create "superfunds" to clean up oil and chemical spills (H.R. 85) and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites (H.R. 7020). Meanwhile, the Senate Finance and Commerce Committees completed their hearings last week on the all-encompassing version (S. 1480) as reported by the Environment and Public Works Committee.
With an October 4 adjournment rapidly approaching, it seems less and less likely that the-drastically different approaches of the two Houses will first pass and then be reconciled in conference. However, Congress may fall back on the looming lame duck session to work out the differences this year.
H.R. 85 (Comprehensive oil Pollution Liability and Compensa- tion Act) would establish two funds, evenly splitting $750 million, to clean up oil and hazardous substances (chemical) spills and, in certain circumstances, to compensate victims of such spills.
H.R. 7020 (Hazardous Waste Containment Act of 1980) would set up a $1.2 billion fund to clean up abandoned hazardous waste (chemical) sites without provisions to compensate victims.
S. 1480 (Environmental Emergency Response Act) is much more far-reaching than either House bill or the Carter Administration proposal. It would establish the most expensive fund ($4.1 billion) which would deal with the most broadly defined hazardous substances and would impose the strictest liability coverage, including victim compensation.
House Action:
On H.R. 85, the Ways and Means Committee substantially modified the funding mechanism. It converted the administrative- ly adjustable fee system to a fixed excise tax. Concerned about unlimited liability, the Committee's second major change was to strike three of the claims categories authorized by the Merchant Marine Committee bill: (1) loss of the use of real or personal property; (2) loss of tax revenue; and (3) loss of the use of natural resources.
On August 21, two major changes were made to the Ways and Means amendments. First, petrochemicals used as fuel were exemp- ted from the excise tax. Secondly, all persons (not only fisher- man, the sole exemption allowed by Ways and Means) were entitled to compensation up to two years of income lost due to spills.
Before the changes by Ways and Means, the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee reported H.R. 85, which created a $200 million fund entirely financed by industry to clean up oil spills. Two key provisions which remain part of the proposal prevent states fromlestablishing similar funds and provide a mechanism to seek repayment from responsible parties.
A year after the Merchant Marine Committee reported the oil spill bill, the Public works and Transportation Committee added hazardous substances (chemical) spill provisions. Essentially, the difference was a separate $100 million fund tacked onto H.R. 85 to finance clean-up of these other spills.
The Comprehensive oil Pollution Liability Trust Fund and the Hazardous Substance Pollution Liability Trust Fund would absorb or replace several other federal funds relating to oil and hazar- dous substance clean-up and liability.
Regarding H.R. 7020, there were not many changes made, but they were significant. The Ways and Means Committee doubled the size of the fund from $600 million to $1.2 billion (which, inci- dentally, was'the amount in the legislation that was first intro- duced). At the same time, it increased industry's contribution from 50 percent to 75 percent.
Senate Action:
Both the Finance Committee and the Commerce Committee reques- ted that S. 1480 be referred to them after it was reported by the Environment Committee.
Last week, both Committees completed their separate hearings. It is uncertain what steps will be taken next. Finance was concerned about the tax-raising provisions while Commerce wished to see how the proposal affected existing transportation laws and regulations regarding oil and chemical spills. The Finance Committee has the choice of either getting referral and then marking up the bill or reporting it out of committee with amend- ments. Commerce, on the other hand, can choose only between a floor fight over jurisdiction and merely reporting the bill out of committee with amendments. It cannot mark up S. 1480 because it has not proved that it has jurisdiction over the bill.
A breakdown of the proposals follows.
Title H.R. 85 H.R. 7020 S. 1480 Comprehensive Oil Hazardous Waste Environmental Pollution Liability Containment Emergency Response and Compensation Act Act of 1980 Act
Purpose to provide a compre- to amend the Solid to provide for liability, hensive system of Waste Disposal Act compensation, clean- liability and compen- to provide authori- up, and emergency sation for oil spill ties to respond to response for hazardous damage and removal releases of hazardous substances released costs. waste from inactive, into the environment hazardous waste and the clean-up of sites which endanger inactive hazardous public health and waste disposal sites. the environment; to establish a Hazardous Waste Response Fund; to establish pro- hibitions and require- ments concerning inactive hazardous waste sites; to provide for liability of persons respon- sible for releases of hazardous waste at such sites.
Scope oil and hazardous inactive hazardous all substances substance (chemical) waste disposal sites. defined under sections: spills into navigable waters - 112 of the Clean Air Act
- 307 & 311 of the Clean Water Act
- 3001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act)
- 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act H.R. 85 (Cont.) H.R. 7020 (Cont.) S. 1480 (Cont.)
- in addition to a hazardous substance generically defined as follows:
flany element, substance, compound, or mixture, including disease-causing agents, which after release into the environment and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or assimilation into any organism, either directly from the environ- ment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will or may reasonably be anticipated to cause death, behavioral abnormalties, cancer, genetic mutation, physio- logical malfunctions (including malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformations, in such organisms or their offspring."
Funding $375 million (oil) $1.2 billion over 5 $4.1 billion over - Size, and $375 (hazardous years with 75% from 6 years with 88% Duration, substances) (chemi- industry and 25% from industry and and Contri- cals)) over 5 years from the federal 12% from the bution (%) with 100% from government. federal government. industry. The new funds absorb or (Previously: the replace other Commerce Committee federal funds. recommended $600 (Offshore Oil million over 4 years Pollution Compensa- with 50% from indus- tion Fund, the Trans- try and 50% from Alaska Pipeline the federal govern- Liability Fund, the ment) Deepwater Port Fund, and the Section 311 revolving fund of the Clean Water Act.)
Previously the Merchant Marine & Fisheries Committee recommended a $200 million fund (oil) H.R. 85 (Cont.) H.R. 7020 (Cont.) S. 1480 (Cont.)
and the Public Works Committee recommended a $100 million fund (chemicals)).
Source determined at the determined at the determined administra- tax rates below: tax rates below: tively, the annual fees may not exceed:
crude oil - 1.3 cents crude oil - 0.6 cents crude oil - 3 cents per per barrel of crude per barrel barrel oil hazardous substan- specified petrochemical primary petrochemicals ces - $1.18 per ton feedstocks - $2.54 $20 per short ton on specified petro- per ton chemical feedstocks and 31 cents per ton specified inorganic inorganic raw materials on specified inor- feedstocks - $2.33 $10 per short ton ganic feedstocks per ton
the revenues to be the revenues to be the revenues to be produced are esti- produced are esti- produced are estimated mated as follows: mated as follows: as follows:
FY 81 - $138 million FY 81 - $164 million FY 81 - $250 million
oil - $69 million oil - $32 million oil - $38 million
petrochemical petrochemical primary petrochemicals feedstocks - feedstocks - $162 million $46 million $99 million
inorganic feedstocks inorganic feedstocks inorganic raw $23 million $33 million materials - $ 50 million
FY 82 through 85 - FY 82 through 85 - FY 82 - $525 million $150 million per year $179 million per or $600 million year or $716 million
oil - $75 million oil - $35 million oil - $75 million
petrochemical feed- petrochemical feed- primary petrochemicals stocks - $50 million stocks - $108 million $338 million
inorganic feedstocks inorganic feedstocks inorganic raw materials $25 million $36 million $112 million
FY 83 through 86 - $700 million per year or $2.8 billion H.R. 85 (Cont.) H.R. 7020 (Cont.) S. 1480 (Cont.)
oil- $100 million
primary petrochemicals $450 million
inorganic raw materials $150 million
in addition to: in addition to: federal federal appropria- appropriations tions
FY 81 - $50 million FY 81 - $35 million FY 82 - $75 million FY 83 - $75 million FY 82 - $75 million FY 84 $100 million FY 85 - amount author- FY 83 through 86 - ized but not yet $100 million appropriated
Liability strict, joint and strict, joint and strict, joint and several liability several liablity several liability for owners and for persons who for all damages operators of caused or contribut- which result from the vessels and facili- ed to a release or release of hazardous ties. threatened release. substances (unless the defendant can Liability was limited However, if the demonstrate that his to include: defendant (owner, action was not a (1) removal costs, operator, generator "significant" factor (2) i 'njury to, or or transporter) in causing or contri- destruction of, real establishes that buting to the damage). or personal property, only a portion of (3) injury to, or the damages is attri- Liability will be im- destruction of, butable to his posed on manufacturers, natural resources, waste, then he is users, transporters, and (4) certain losses liable only for such treaters, storers, of opportunities to portion. disposers, and releas- harvest marine life ers of hazardous due to injury to, or Also, there is no substances for all destruction of, compensation to removal costs and all natural resources. persons whose health damages for economic is affected by loss or loss due to A person would be releases. personal injury or allowed to file loss of natural claims against Lastly, liability is resources (including the fund for 2 years not retroactive. third party damages). of lost income due to destruction of liveli- By definition they will hood, with some be considered engaged limitations. in "ultrahazardous activities." H.R. 85 (Cont.) H.R. 7020 (Cont.) S. 1480 (Cont.)
Liability is not Also, it provided that retroactive victims may sue responsible parties in federal courts and that when a plaintiff has shown a "reasonable likelihood" that the disease resulted from a toxic substance, a 11presumption" is created in his favor so that his case cannot be thrown out of court on purely procedural grounds.
Liability is not retro- active except for personal injury and then only back to January 1, 1977.
Defenses when the cause of a where the release or when a person can prove spill is (1) an act threatened release is that the discharge, of war, (2) a natural caused by: (1) an release, or disposal phenomenon of an act of war or act of was caused by an act of exceptional, inevit- God, (2) negligence war or an act of God. able and irresistible on the part of the character, which could federal government, not have been prevented (3) an act or ommission or avoided by the of a third party (so exercise of due care long as the defendant or foresight, (3) an establishes that he act of or omission of exercised due care), a third party and and (4) any combina- (4) due to gross neg- tion of the afore- ligence or willful mentioned. miscondut of the claimant.
(For additional information, see the appendix to this paper.)
BACKGROUND
oil and Hazardous Substances:
Because a number of federal and state, along with interna- tional, oil spill liability and compensation mechanisms have been established, a single federal program seemed needed to replace the piecemeal approach. In addition, highlighting the oil pollu- tion problem were the 1967 Liberian tanker "Torrey Canyon" which grounded off the coast of England, the 1969 Santa Barbara blow-out of an oil well, the 1976 grounding of the "Argo Merchant" off Nantucket Island, the 1978 wreck of the carrier "Amoco Cadiz" off the coast of France, and last year's Campeche Bay runaway oil spill.
At the federal level alone, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 addressed clean-up of oil spills and established a $35 million fund with limits of liability. Three other laws include their own specialized provisions. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Act of 1973 established a $100 million fund for clean-up and damages resulting from oil spills associated with the pipeline; the Deepwater Port Act of 1974 set up another $100 million fund for those damages caused by deepwater port operations; and the Offshore Oil Pollution Fund established in 1978 providing $200 million for damages resulting from offshore facilities on the Outer Continental Shelf.
Although these funds collectively provide for liability and compensation for both oil and hazardous substances, they do not provide protection of persons who may be injured.
For years, Congress has attested to the need for a comprehen- sive uniform liability and compensation statute, but has failed to complete action. In 1976, the House 'adjourned before it could .vote on H.R. 14862, which provided a comprehensive system covering inland waters as well as ocean-related spills. Again, in 1978, 1 the Senate adjourned without taking action on legislation signi- ficantly amended by the House to accommodate concerns of the Environment and Public Works Committee. The major disagreement was over whether hazardous chemical spills should be covered by the bill.
Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites
After focusing on air and water pollution problems in the 1970s and on future land pollutants in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Congress began to realize that it had neglected consideration of inactive hazardous waste sites. As the disposal sites, especially Love Canal, received national attention, congressional concern grew over the magnitude of the problem.
First, a private contractor hired by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted a study to determine the number of inactive hazardous waste sites. In 1979, he estimated that there were 32,000 to 50,000 disposal sites scattered throughout the country and of those, 1,200 to 2,000 may be posing a serious risk to public health. Causing even more concern than this great number of potential hazards was EPA's charge that 90 percent of the waste now generated is being handled in an "environmentally unsound manner." The number surveyed by the House Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation was much smaller. Late last year, it released results that found 3,383 sites were created by 53 com- panies which operated 1,605 facilities and disposed of 765 million tons of chemical wastes. Clearly demonstrated was the need for a national accounting of on-and-off site, as well as active and inactive, disposal sites. Too many abandoned sites were found at such places as tennis courts, church parking lots, cemetaries, and abandoned oil wells.
Thirdly, the Chemical Manufacturers Association released preliminary results earlier this year from inventories in 33 states. The states identified 4,196 waste disposal sites of which 431 may be hazardous. In addition, the states found only 174 orphan sites which may or may not be hazardous.
No one really knows how many hazardous sites there are in this nation; and the estimates' wide variance confirms the uncer- tainty. However, it appears that no matter how many there are, the fact is that they will be perceived to be as dangerous as the' horror stories making headlines. The ten stories below are representative in the public mind.
Love Canal - Niagara Falls, New York
During the 1940s, the Hooker Chemical Company, a unit of Occidental Petroleum Corporation, dumped wastes into a canal on the edge of the city of Niagara Falls, New York. In 1953, the site which had been capped with clay was acquired by the city which built a school and playground on top of it. Houses were built alongside it, the construction of which apparently damaged the cap.
After many years, foul-smelling liquids and sludge appeared in nearby basements. Tests were run and revealed toxic chemicals. The State Health Department found serious health problems in the area: miscarriages and birth defects were three times the normal level and there was a high incidence of liver disease. In August 1978, the state declared the canal an imminent health hazard, closing the school and evacuating 235 families nearest the site. The same month, President Carter declared Love Canal the first official national disaster area caused by toxic chemicals. Again on May 21, 1980, President Carter declared a federal emergency and 710 more families were moved to temporary housing.
Valley of the Drums - West Point, Kentucky
In 1978, an abandoned waste site known as "Valley of the Drums" contained some 20,000 decomposing chemical drums, some of which were found floating in streams feeding into the Ohio River.
Montague, Michigan
Hooker Chemical Company agreed to pay $15 million for clean- up of some thirty toxic chemicals it had been dumping for thirty
years on its 880-acre plant site. Traces were found in nearby White Lake and water wells.
Elizabeth, New Jersey
In April of this year, ironically on the day the tenth anniversary of Earth Day was being celebrated, a fire broke out at an abandoned site for highly explosive wastes dumped by the Chemical Control Corporation. Estimated clean-up costs are set at $10-$15 million.
Hardeman County, Tennessee
During the 1960s, 300,000 drums of pesticide waste were dumped in unlined trenches in the town of Toone. The local wells were contaminated by chlorinated hydrocarbons. Residents have responded with a $2.5 billion damages claim.
Woburn, Massachusetts
Merriman chemical Corporation, Monsanto, Stauffer and others used this 800-acre site for their hazardous wastes. Since the State Health Department has found the city's cancer death rate sharply higher than the state's as a whole, and since children's leukemia is higher than normal, the residents have displayed very deep concern. Some substances that have been discovered are explosive methane gas, arsenic, chromium, lead, and trichloro- ethylene, which contaminated two nearby municipal water wells.
Jackson Township, New Jersey
Investigation of a state-licensed, town-owned landfill revealed evidence of chemical dumping and contamination of nearby wells. Residents have reported a high incidence of kidney problems, rashes, and premature deaths. The site has been closed and a new water system has been planned.
Charles City, Iowa
Arsenic and benzene have seeped into the valley aquifer (underground stream) which supplies drinking water to one-third of the population in the state. Salisbury Laboratories, which created the five-acre dump site, is cooperating with the federal government to seal the site, but more containment may cost far above what this small, family-owned company can afford.
Warren County, North Carolina
In 1978, "midnight dumpers" sprayed 32,000 gallons of waste- oil contaminated with highly poisonous PCB's (polychlorinated biphenyls - heat resistant chemicals once widely used in high- temperature manufacturing devices such as electrical transformers) along 250 miles of rural roads. The state now has to dispose of 40,000 tons of contaminated soil. Curtis Bay, Maryland
PCB's are now stored in a federal supply depot at Curtis Bay, just south of Baltimore. The state circuit court cleared the way for storage of the 30,000 gallon shipment from an abandoned tank farm in Sharptown, Maryland, to the new site over the objec- tions of local residents. The chemicals will be destroyed before their removal date of January 1, 1981 in incinerators under construction at either Deer Park, Texas or Elwood, Arkansas.
Beyond a doubt, these tragic stories have caused many hard- ships. Love Canal is the most infamous, but even-it is not a clear-cut case of corporate disregard for the environment and public health. Twenty-five years ago, when the area was owned and used as a dump site by Hooker Chemical Company, it was threatened with seizure through eminent domain by the city of Niagara Falls. Consequently it deeded the property to the school board in 1953, warning that chemicals were buried there. When the school board put the land up for sale, Hooker issued a second warning: construction could disturb the clay covering over the chemicals. The courts will decide if Hooker gave enough warning, but they will also have to determine how much responsibility should be placed on the United States Army and the local government for also dumping wastes in the Love Canal area.
Love Canal, nevertheless, instills fear in people living near other dumpsites. Curtis Bay is a good example of communities that are fearful of a "Love Canal" in their backyards.
ALTERNATIVES
Currently, there is a shortage of site disposal facilities. In the next few years, the situation will be exacerbated, as old, improperly disposed wastes require careful disposal, as new wastes are generated, and as strict new federal regulations are issued and enforced.
Some companies have been exploring the possibility of shipping the wastes overseas. But this suggestion has met with stiff opposition from the federal government because of the potential impact on international relations. Another way to solve the siting problem might be to locate dumps on public land. But this plan would soon meet opposition from the communities designated to receive the wastes.
Ironically, technology, the source of the problem, seems to provide the best solution.
Recycling and incineration offer the best choices, for they eliminate wastes and the natural costs associated with future monitoring and future liability. Given proper controls, these two approaches can be the safest, cleanest and most effective way to dispose of hazardous wastes. Thus far, however, neither option has been economical for industry to undertake. In the past, the cost of recycling materials has generally been much greater than the cost of new materials; and incineration is the most expensive and energy-intensive disposal method. Critics of the "superfund" approach argue that the government should focus more of its attention on making these methods cost-effective than on establishing a "superfund" to pay for past practices condoned during their time.
Other disposal methods to consider could be deep-well injec- tion where liquid wastes can be drained or pumped into underground tavities that are well below the earth's surface. Although economical, these wells must be located in geologically stable areas well below usable groundwater supplies. Such guarantees cannot be made for it is unknown what the process may cause.
Chemical fixation is another approach, mixing certain chemi- cals together to form a cement-like material that can be dumped in unlined landfills. The costs of solidifying these wastes are at present relatively high.
Despite the many alternatives currently available to dispose of hazardous wastes, there are a great many materials that are too low in value to recycle, nonflammable so that they cannot be incinerated, too thick to inject into deep wells, and of a parti- cular substance so that they are impossible to chemically fixate. For most of these materials, one of the last disposal methods is burial in a secure landfill.
. The problem then is to make the landfill secure. Previously, the cost was low because the technology was simple. Typically, a hole was dug and lined with clay; it was filled with chemicals, and then it was covered with clay to keep out rain and other water which can cause leaching. Rain falling on the surface or liquids in the waste can seep into the ground and carry contami- nants, thereby threatening groundwater supplies.
The costs will rise when the effects are felt from the new regulations proposed by EPA under the provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. In effect this past spring, they set specific standards for construction and opera- tion of the site. They also discourage use of landfills for liquid wastes and ban use of certain volatile and flammable materials. Above all, they require monitoring of the landfill for twenty years.
CONCLUSION
All three bills (H.R. 85, H.R. 7020, and S. 1480) have tremendously different approaches to the question of who will pay, how much, and for what. The-final version forwarded by Congress dealing with these three concepts of liability, funding and scope will undoubtedly lack cost sensitivity for the sole sake of hurriedly passin g some form of "superfund" in this elec- tion year.
Careful deliberation might result in at least a separation in H.R. 85, so as to treat the carbon-copy hazardous substance fund differently than the oil pollution fund. Toxicity of hazar- dous substances and their removal are worlds apart from oil products, for example. The quantities transported even vary tremendously. It is easy, but unfair to treat them the same.
In essence, oil spills, hazardous substance spills, and inactive hazardous waste sites should be considered separately given, for one, their varying physical properties.
A prudent approach to funding the inevitable industry contri- bution to "superfund," especially as it relates to hazardous waste sites, would be to build in economic incentives. For example, by placing a fee or tax on wastes at the point of disposal, a charge with a sliding scale based on the potential hazard (the toxicity) of the waste, the government would encourage industry to seek more economically feasible alternatives such as recycling or incineration.
Lastly, any liability scheme besides the strict, joint and several provision would be an improvement. With its imposition, a person with even a peripheral connection to the damage caused by a substance could be held responsible for all costs.
However Congress resolves these issues, it is important to try to achieve the goal of reducing hazardous wastes and their adverse effects at the same time it balances economic variables which consider the consequences such actions will have on industry.
Reaching down into the "deep pockets" of industry, especially with regard to the limitless compensation to victims allegedly injured because of exposure to hazardous substances, just may result in another "welfare" program that drives industry bankrupt as it is doing to the federal government.
Louis J. Cordia Policy Analyst
APPENDIX
House Report 96-172, Parts I, II and III, House Report 96-1016, Parts I and II, and Senate Report 96-848 define petro- chemical feedstocks (in H.R. 85) to be any of the following substances:
Ethylene, propylene, butylene, butadiene, butane, propane, benzene, toluene, xylene, napthalene, methane, carbon black, and ethane.
Inorganic feedstocks will be:
Arsenic, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, and the equivalent weight of the foregoing elements in arsenic trioxide, chromite, chromic acid, sodium dichromate, potassium dichromate, lead oxide, chlorine, hydrochloric acid, hydrofluoric acid, and the equivalent weight of bromine in methyl bromide and ethylene dibromide, phosphoric acid, sulfuric acid, nitric acid, potassium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide, ammonia and the equivalent weight of ammonia in ammonia nitrate.
In H.R. 7020, petrochemical feedstocks will mean any of the following substances:
Ethylene, propylene, butylene, butadiene, butane', benzene, toluene, xylene, napthalene, and methane.
Inorganic feedstocks will be:
Arsenic and the equivalent weight of arsenic in arsenic trioxide, cadmium, chromium and the equivalent weight of chromium in chromite, sodium dichromate, potassium dichromate, lead and the equivalent weight of lead in lead oxide, mercury, the equivalent weight of barium in barium sulfide, antimony and the equivalent weight of antimony in antimony trioxide and antimony sulfide, cobalt, nickel, the equivalent weight of tin in stannic chloride and stannous chloride, chlorine, the equivalent weight of fluorine in hydrofluoric acid, bromine, the equivalent weight of hydrogen in phosphoric acid, sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, or nitric acid, and elemental phosphorous.
Lastly, S.' 1480 defines primary petrochemicals to be any of the following substances:
Acetylene, benzene, butane, butylene excluding that portion used to make butadiene, butadiene, ethylene, methane exclud- ing that portion used to make ammonia and ethylene, naptha- lene, propylene, toluene excluding that portion used to make benzene, and xylene. Inorganic raw materials will be:
Antimony and the equivalent weight of antimony in antimony trioxide and antimony sulfide, arsenic and the equivalent weight of arsenic in arsenic trioxide, the equivalent weight of barium in barium sulfide, cadmium, chromium and the equivalent weight of chromium in chromite and potassium dichromate and sodium dichromate, cobalt, copper (with some exceptions), lead and the equivalent weight of lead in lead oxide, mercury, nickel, the equivalent weight of tin in stannic chloride and stannous chloride, zinc and the equiva- lent weight of zinc in zinc oxide, chlorine, bromine and the equivalent weight of fluorine in hydrogen fluoride, phosphoric Acid, sulfuric acid, hydrochloric acid, nitric acid, potassium hydroxide, sodium hydroxide in hydrogen fluoride, elemental phosphorous and ammonia excluding that portion used to make nitric acid.
