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New Department of Defense Infrastructure Study Would Delay BRAC Until 2021

May 21, 2018 7 min read Download Report

Frederico Bartels

Former Senior Policy Analyst, Defense Budgeting

Frederico was a senior policy analyst for defense budgeting in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

Summary

The current National Defense Authorization Act has a provision, section 2812, that would require the Department of Defense to develop its third infrastructure capacity study since 2016. So far, every study has shown substantial excess infrastructure that would be best disposed through a new round of Base Realignment and Closures. Congress has been unwilling to authorize a new round despite repeated requests by the Pentagon. Requesting this redundant study would only serve to fuel the delay on authorizing a new round and saddle the American public with the bill for maintaining unneeded infrastructure.

Key Takeaways

The DOD carries excess infrastructure and needs a new round of BRAC to reduce the excess and save $2 billion. Congress is unwilling to authorize it.

Congress is going to make it harder and more painful to execute a new and necessary round of BRAC by requiring an overly detailed and unwise new study.

Current NDAA requires a new infrastructure capacity study that would effectively delay any BRAC decision until 2021. It should be changed.

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On May 10, 2018, the House Armed Services Committee marked up and voted on its version of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year (FY) 2019.REF The bill sets the 2019 congressional guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD). However, it contains language that would effectively delay any action on the Pentagon’s excess infrastructure until 2021, saddling taxpayers with the cost of the operation of unnecessary defense infrastructure.

Without any discussion, the current version of the NDAA, like its previous seven iterations, prohibits the expenditures of funds on a new round of Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC). In this manner, Congress has been able to not authorize a new round of BRAC since the DOD started requesting one more than seven years ago. With the 2019 NDAA, Congress went a step farther, requiring a third infrastructure capacity study that will assess the adequacy of force structure to the Pentagon’s physical infrastructure.REF Section 2812 of the legislation contains the parameters for the study.

Section 2812’s Required Infrastructure Capacity Study

Section 2812 requires the DOD to develop an infrastructure capacity analysis assessing its adequacy to the force structure described in the FY 2018 NDAA.REF The assessment is due in February 2020, accompanying the President’s budget request for FY 2021.

The bill calls for determining a force structure plan for each of the military branches in line with the end strength levels authorized last year.REF From there, the department would develop a model of installation capabilities needed to host the planned force structure. Once these two elements are settled, the DOD would then assess the adequacy of the current infrastructure to carry out the requirements of the force structure. This assessment would be required to identify deficits and surpluses in the infrastructure for each military department and “for locations within the continental United States and territories.”REF

The Section 2812 Study Will Generate Obstacles to Sensible Real Property Management

At first glance, the proposed section 2812 study seems like a good and thorough requirement that will enhance Congress’ visibility on the Pentagon’s real property management posture. Nonetheless, both the intended and unintended consequences of this study will serve as obstacles to the DOD enacting sensible real property management.

A Useless Repetition. In the past two years, the DOD has fulfilled two congressional reporting requirements on its infrastructure capacity. The first, from March 2016, established that the Pentagon has 22 percent of excess infrastructure.REF The second, from October 2017, after Congress increased the force structure to be considered, established 19 percent of excess infrastructure.REF A third infrastructure capacity study will likely lead to different numbers, since Congress is once again changing the parameters, but will not change the fact that the Pentagon carries excess infrastructure.

Despite the possible changing numbers, a typical round of BRAC reduces only 5 percent of the department’s infrastructure.REF Because of the size of the marginal effect, the DOD is unlikely to close or realign more infrastructure than is needed.

The repeating requirement for new infrastructure capacity studies with slightly modified parameters costs both time and resources for the DOD and for the American taxpayer. The previous two studies cost a combined $468,000.REF A third study would likely add at least $200,000 to the tab, but probably more since the Section 2812 study would require more data than its previous two iterations.

This third study carries a sense of a fishing expedition by opponents of a new round of BRAC. Opponents of BRAC have twice delayed the DOD’s request by asking for more data, and they dismissed the results of the studies. Now they are modifying the parameters of the study and spending more resources on a new one.

Irresponsible Data Requests. The most substantial change between the previous two infrastructure capacity studies and the one outlined by Section 2812 is the requirement to detail deficits and surpluses in specific locations within the U.S.REF It would be unwise to release this type of data to Congress and the public. Any installation that shows excess infrastructure would be considered a possible target for BRAC actions and it would have immediate economic effects on that base and community.

The area’s real estate market would respond in expectation to lowering demands. The individuals working on that base could assume that their base will be closed and start looking for different employment opportunities, regardless of the DOD’s need for the mission still executed at the base.

BRAC is a holistic process that assesses the military value of installations and their missions, rather than just their physical capacity. Thus even if an installation has excess capacity it might have military value that might justify bringing additional mission to fill that capacity. Forcing the DOD to identify installations and states that carry excess infrastructure would short-circuit this process.

Closing or realigning a military base has effects in the community. Hence, most of the legislative language that determines a BRAC round addresses economic adjustments for the region and how to dispose of excess property.REF The process’s goal is to minimize the impact in the community and set a solid foundation for usage of the disposed property. This requirement would erode this process and settle the communities with possibly destructive impacts of a base closure without the remedies traditionally available with a new round of BRAC.

A Costly Delay. The NDAA requires the study to be delivered to Congress with the President’s budget request for FY 2021, thus establishing the deadline in February 2020. If this study is indeed required, opponents of a new BRAC round will continue their opposition and rely on the need to wait for the results of the study, effectively punting any decision to the NDAA for FY 2021. In the meantime, the American taxpayer will continue to pay for unneeded infrastructure.

The back of the envelope calculation on the study’s costs is simple. The study would cost around $200,000 and would prevent the estimated savings of $2 billion for each year that the study delays authorization of a new round.REF With the study moving the authorization of a new BRAC round from the FY 2019 NDAA to the FY 2021 iteration, the three-year delay results in $6 billion in non-realized savings and over $200,000 in direct costs for the study.

The Path Forward

The current BRAC process requires a few changes and reforms. While there is a path forward on how to modernize and improve upon the shortcomings of previous BRAC rounds,REF the Section 2812 study is not it. In order to improve the military’s real property management, Congress should:

Remove Section 2812 from the NDAA. The section as currently written will serve, at best, as a delay tactic to push a new round of BRAC to 2021, or, at worst, as a major disrupter for defense communities that will have to cope with the effects of a BRAC without the shielding provided by a formal BRAC process. The Section 2812 study does not benefit the DOD, the defense communities, or the American taxpayer.
Reform BRAC. The legislation that determines the BRAC process should be modified to require reduction targets, have a permanent BRAC staff, and establish broader standing authorities.REF
Authorize a new round of BRAC. Without the holistic perspective and the possibility of action provided by a new round of BRAC, these infrastructure studies have little consequence and serve more to fuel political debates than to actually inform decisions on real property at the DOD. Authorizing a new round would give the DOD and the defense communities a substantial level of certainty and predictability.

Conclusion

Regardless of the intentions of the writers of Section 2812, the range of possible outcomes for the required study go from bad to worst. The study will undoubtedly confirm that the DOD carries excess infrastructure. Further, if it actually names locations and installations that currently have excess capacity, it will have negative impacts on the lives of the people that work at the installation and those that live close to the installation, without the holistic approach of a BRAC round.

The U.S. and the military would be better served if Congress were to authorize a new round of BRAC instead of punting on the decision via yet another infrastructure capacity study. Left unfixed, the Section 2812 study will put the bill once again in the hands of American taxpayers.

—Frederico Bartels is Policy Analyst for Defense Budgeting in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Heritage Foundation.