After every terrorist
scare, Congress wants to help -- usually by throwing money at the
problem. Whatever the "danger du jour" happens to be (airplane
plots, subway bombings, hurricanes, leaky borders), lawmakers'
first inclination is to spend.
But wars -- particularly long wars -- aren't won by simply writing
checks. The first thing to do in a war is think. Long wars are won
by sound strategies: understanding the enemy, understanding
yourself and crafting the right response.
If members of Congress really want to help the Department of
Homeland Security do its job well, there's something they can do:
They can help the department "think smarter." When Congress created
DHS in the wake of the 9-11 terrorist attacks, it spent a lot of
time arguing about which agencies to include and wasted countless
hours debating civil service rules, such as which pension plans DHS
employees could join.
What Congress spent almost no time worrying about was how this
vast army of Coast Guard cutters, border agents, airport screeners,
immigration and custom investigators, and emergency mangers would
be commanded. The result was a bulky bureaucracy with a very small
head that didn't even have an office to coordinate policies,
planning and strategy. This was a predictable problem. When the
United States geared up to fight the new and unprecedented
challenges of the Cold War, neither the newly established Pentagon
nor the State Department had anything worthy of being called a real
policy or strategy office. Both had to create them. The State
Department's newly established Policy Planning Office was run by
George Kennan, father of the strategy of containment that guided
U.S. action throughout the long stand-off with the Soviet
Union.
Soon after Michael Chertoff took over as the head of the DHS, he
also created a policy directorate. But more than a year later, and
five years after 9-11, Congress still hasn't allocated the
resources that DHS needs to get the job done.
Building the capacity to think about how to fight and win the long
war isn't as attractive to politicians as bringing back millions of
dollars of homeland security grants to their districts. And it's
less appealing than granting billions in contracts for fancy
screening technologies and razor-wire fences on the southern
border. But it would do a heck of a lot more to make Americans
safer.
The idea behind Chertoff's policy directorate was simple enough:
Give Homeland Security a core group of people, reasonably insulated
from the day-to-day operations of the department, to focus on
determining the right risks to confront and the right priorities to
address. This group also would make sure that all the disparate
parts of the department were supporting a common cause and working
well with other parts of the government and friends and allies
around the world. Unfortunately, reality has not matched rhetoric
thus far.
Although an earnest and hard-working policy directorate has been
stood up and ably led, that isn't good enough. The policy shop
remains desperately understaffed (with about half as many employees
as it needs to be effective), and the leader is a mere "assistant
secretary" instead of the higher and more appropriate
"undersecretary" -- a title given to similar positions in the
Departments of Defense and State. The net result is that the
directorate is a lawn mower engine trying to drive an SUV. Before
anyone decides to dramatically increase spending on various
technologies or shift dollars from one pet program to another, the
first and most effective step that should be taken is to beef up
the policy shop. The cost of adding a few dozen employees will
inevitably yield highly valuable dividends, and at the same time
will prove to be far less costly than immediately pouring tens of
millions of dollars into any given research-and-development rabbit
hole.
Having a staff robust enough to look beyond its in-box is
especially important.
Today, DHS suffers too much from an all-hands-on-deck approach,
marshalling everybody to deal with every crisis. Stung by Hurricane
Katrina, for example, the department spent more time during the
last year preparing for the next hurricane season than it did
readying for the next terrorist attack. That is ultimately
counterproductive because it fails to allow any one unit in DHS to
maintain a long-term vision of future challenges.
Lurching from crisis to crisis isn't the best way to protect the
nation. And it ignores what should be a fundamental part of the
Department of Homeland Security's mission: getting the terrorists
before they get us.
James Jay Carafano is
senior fellow for homeland security at the Heritage Foundation and
author of "G.I. Ingenuity." Brian Finch is a lawyer specializing in
homeland security with Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin &
Oshinsky.
Distributed nationally on the McClatchy Tribune wire