Supply-side economists should be smiling these days.
After all, the Congressional Budget Office recently confirmed that
President Bush's 2003 tax-cut package has been wildly successful.
Federal revenues rose $206 billion (13%) during the first nine
months of this fiscal year. This follows last year's record surge
in revenues, when Uncle Sam's coffers grew by $274 billion (15%).
Not surprisingly, the White House lowered its projection of the
current year's budget deficit by more than $100 billion.
But free market economists such as my colleague Dan Mitchell were
unfazed. "The supply-side tax cuts of 2003," he told the Washington
Post, "are working exactly as we would have expected. Lower taxes
on work, saving and investment leads to more work, saving and
investment. It's not exactly rocket science."
The fruits of this additional work, savings and investment are
evident. In the two years preceding the cuts, economic growth
averaged a paltry 1 percent and too many job-seeking Americans (6
percent) were unemployed. Since then, we have experienced three
years of solid 4% growth, 5.4 million new jobs have been created,
and the unemployment rate hasn't budged from its historic low of
4.6%. This growing economy may prove to be Bush's most impressive
domestic policy achievement.
But The New York Times didn't know what to make of all this. It
breathlessly described how this "unexpectedly steep rise in tax
revenues from corporations and the wealthy...is surprising even
seasoned budget analysts."
The confusion can be traced back to the official revenue
scorekeepers on Capitol Hill, the Congressional Budget Office and
the Joint Committee on Taxation -- and their failure to predict the
consequences of changes in tax law.
Back in 2003, Senate moderates such as Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) and
George Voinovich (R-Ohio) pressured Bush to limit the overall
"cost" of the tax package to $350 billion over 10 years. Working
within this artificial constraint, and bound by CBO's and JCT's
static revenue forecasts, the final bill managed to reduce the top
marginal rates on income, capitol gains and dividends, but did so
within a confusing matrix of start dates, phase outs and other
technicalities. Even Voinovich appeared to regret the shortcomings
of his self-imposed straight-jacket, musing that he would have
liked "to see larger tax relief for small businesses and working
families" but only "if we can offset the additional cost."
Sure enough, CBO informed lawmakers in May 2003 that the tax cuts
would cost the treasury $94 billion in 2006. But it now appears
that the cuts generated so much "unexpected" economic activity that
the original CBO projection for 2006 was off by an astounding $124
billion! Add in last year's underestimation of $89 billion, and the
$25 billion oversight in 2004, and you have a cumulative CBO
mistake that now totals $238 billion.
In addition to swinging and missing on the bill's revenue effects,
the Joint Committee on Taxation also struck out on its economic
benefits. The legislation, it predicted, would generate only minor
and short-lived gains which would be "outweighed by the reduction
in national savings due to increasing federal government
deficits."
One wonders whether congressional liberals who rejected these cuts
in 2003 will acknowledge their own underestimation of the power of
pro-growth tax relief.
"This tax bill," ultra-liberal Mark Dayton (D.-Minn.) fretted back
then, "is one of the most dangerous, destructive and dishonorable
acts of government that I have ever seen." Kent Conrad (D.-N.D.),
called it "a policy of debt, deficits and decline" that "will
weaken America, not strengthen it." Ted Kennedy (D.-Mass.)
ridiculed the "ideologically rigid" economic theory underlying the
cuts. "Republicans," he sneered, "think that if you give tax breaks
to the wealthiest taxpayers, they will invest more and the economy
will grow. It is called...trickle-down' economics." It is destined
to fail, he insisted, because "the wealthy may not use the money in
ways that create jobs and expand production."
Three years later, some tough questions are in order. Had
hand-wringing moderates known then what they know now about the
gusher of revenues that Bush's cuts would usher in, would they have
supported a more robust package of pro-growth reforms? Will
liberals like Ted Kennedy ever concede that Reaganesque tax
policies lift the economy without creating huge fiscal holes? And
will lawmakers ever, ever, oust the economists at the Joint
Committee on Taxation whose flawed revenue estimates limit our
ability to implement the truly pro-growth tax policy we
deserve?
Michael Franc who
has held a number of positions on Capitol Hill, is vice president
of Government Relations.
First appeared in Human Events