This has been a wretched year for Kofi Annan. The U.N. secretary
general has looked a forlorn figure on the world stage: Hugely
overshadowed as a global leader by George W. Bush and Tony Blair,
he has appeared weak and clueless in confronting major problems,
including terrorism, WMD proliferation in Iran and elsewhere, and
genocide in Sudan. At the same time, the massive scandal over the
U.N.'s administration of the Iraq Oil for Food program has brought
the world body's reputation to an all-time low. To cap it all, in
the wake of a series of internal scandals, the U.N.'s own employee
union has just passed a vote of no confidence in the U.N.'s senior
management: a thinly veiled protest against Annan himself.
The secretary general is now an embittered spectator of world
events, and lets barely a week pass without a sermon on the perils
of America's supposedly unilateralist foreign policy. A spectacular
failure, as well as a great mediocrity, Annan is looking
increasingly ineffectual and isolated. His attacks on the U.S. over
its decision to go to war with Iraq indicate a U.N. in steep,
possibly terminal decline, struggling for relevance.
As for the Oil for Food scandal, it is more than just the biggest
scandal in the U.N.'s history; it may well be the biggest financial
fraud in modern times. Set up in the mid-1990s as a means of
providing humanitarian aid to Iraqis, the Oil for Food program was
subverted and manipulated by Saddam Hussein's regime, allegedly
with the complicity of U.N. officials, to help prop up the Iraqi
dictator. Saddam's dictatorship was able to siphon an estimated
$21.3 billion from the program through oil smuggling and systematic
thievery, by demanding illegal payments from companies buying Iraqi
oil and kickbacks from those selling goods to Iraq. All this took
place under the noses of U.N. bureaucrats: According to the report
of U.S. weapons inspector Charles Duelfer, Benon Sevan -- Annan's
appointee as executive director of the Iraq program -- received
from Saddam a voucher for 13 million barrels of oil.
On Capitol Hill, Oil for Food has become one of the hottest
investigative issues in years, with huge amounts of evidence
indicating corruption and bribery on an epic scale. The program is
now being investigated by no fewer than five congressional
committees: the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; the Senate
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations; the House International
Relations Committee; the House Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats and International Relations; and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce. Several other committees are also
likely to launch investigations. In addition, there are three U.S.
federal investigations underway -- by the General Accounting
Office, the Department of Justice, and the U.S. Treasury. In a
further embarrassment for Annan, the Justice Department is
investigating his son, Kojo, in connection with his role as a paid
consultant to Cotecna Inspection SA, a Swiss-based company that
received a contract for inspecting goods shipped to Iraq under the
Oil for Food program.
Highly damaging questions are being asked regarding Kofi Annan
himself: Did the secretary general turn a blind eye to U.N.
mismanagement and corruption in overseeing the Oil for Food
program? Did he sympathize with the efforts of Saddam and key
members of the Security Council to lift U.N. sanctions against
Iraq? Was he influenced in his decision-making regarding the
program by his son's involvement with Cotecna? The secretary
general's refusal to cooperate with congressional investigators has
led to widespread anger and exasperation on Capitol Hill. Sen. Norm
Coleman, the Republican chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Investigations, and his Democratic counterpart, Carl Levin, accused
Annan of "interfering with our ability to get information we need"
from the U.N. Speaking to CNN, Coleman blasted the U.N. for
"proactively interfering with our investigation."
Frustration is also growing in Congress with former Federal Reserve
chief Paul Volcker, who was appointed by Annan to head the U.N.'s
own "independent" investigation into Oil for Food. Volcker,
possibly acting under instruction from his employer, has so far
refused to release 55 internal U.N. audits of Oil for Food. The
refusal to hand over these audits to congressional investigators
suggests that their contents may be hugely damaging to the
reputation of Annan and the U.N. leadership. Volcker has also
rejected requests from the Senate for U.N. officials to be made
available to testify before Congress.
The Volcker Commission has been plagued with controversy from the
outset, highlighted by the resignation of Anna Di Lellio, Volcker's
director of communications and a former U.N. employee. Di Lellio
stepped down after it was revealed she had given a 2002 interview
to London's Guardian newspaper, in which she implicitly compared
President George W. Bush to Osama bin Laden: "I see the major
threats coming from ourselves, rather than the east. I find deeply
unsettling both the ascendance of George Bush and his puppeteers to
the U.S. government, and the mix of self-serving hypocrisy and
incompetence prevailing in European governments. I don't like it
that the two nations whose citizenship I hold, Italy and the U.S.,
have leased their institutions to a couple of families. With
defenders like W. and Berlusconi, largely unchecked by a
sycophantic media, who needs bin Laden to destroy culture, personal
freedom, respect for other human beings, integrity, and the rule of
law -- all the things that make our lives worthwhile?"
Di Lellio was forced out, but the episode helped fuel doubt on the
Hill regarding the supposed independence of the Volcker inquiry,
which is completely funded by the U.N. to the tune of $30 million
-- using funds from the Oil for Food program itself. The
commission's operations are shrouded in secrecy, with little
external oversight. For a commission designed to unearth corruption
and malpractice on a huge scale, it is strikingly opaque. There is
increasing suspicion in Washington that the "independent inquiry"
may be no more than a whitewash exercise, controlled by the
secretary general himself.
Annan needs to control the inquiry because he can ill afford
further blows to his reputation. It is inconceivable that he was
unaware of the scale of the fraud being carried out by Saddam
Hussein; this, combined with Annan's record of failure over Iraq,
his lack of commitment to confronting terrorism, and his rapidly
declining credibility as a leader on the world stage, amounts to a
powerful case for his resignation. Indeed, the man who did nothing
to prevent the genocide in Rwanda when he was head of U.N.
peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s has been woefully out of
depth ever since his appointment as secretary general in 1997.
Annan has been a shameless appeaser of dictators, and his only
legacy will be his organization's growing irrelevance.
If Annan were the CEO of a Fortune 500 company, with his
organization facing allegations of serious corruption and
mismanagement and a massive congressional investigation, he would
have been forced to resign months ago. Only in a bloated
bureaucracy such as the U.N., where a culture of arrogance and
unaccountability has reigned for decades, can a leader remain in
power in the face of such turmoil. Fortunately, the great sense of
moral outrage on Capitol Hill over the Oil for Food scandal may
bring this culture to an end. It is only a matter of time before
senior senators and congressmen call for Annan's resignation.
Congress holds the purse strings of U.S. funding for the U.N., and
if it chooses to, it can force changes even in this most hidebound
of institutions.
Future U.S. funding of the United Nations should depend on
substantial, not cosmetic, reform. The outcry over Oil for Food may
ultimately lead to a reformed, streamlined, and transparent U.N.
Annan should get out, well before his term expires at the end of
2006; prospective candidates are already jockeying for position.
The U.N. needs to clean up its act and make a fresh start; Annan's
resignation may not be a cure for the U.N.'s ills, but it would be
a step in the right direction.
Nile Gardiner,
Ph.D., is a fellow in Anglo-American security
policy at The Heritage Foundation.
First appeared in National Review