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163 C January 26, 1982 MRXIST MOZAMBIQUE THE QUSTION OF US. AID INTRODUCTION U.S. relations with Mozambique have been a litmus test for U.S. policy towards the whole of sub-Saharan Africa for at least six years. Critics of Mozambique point out that its government is intransigently Marxist and is closely allied with the Soviet Union foreign minister have made virulent attacks upon U.S. policy in general and that, therefore, the U.S. has nothing to gain from seeking their friendship. Opposing commentators pressure Washing ton to adopt a conciliatory policy towards states such as Mozam bique. They believe that the governments of many radi c al Third World states are Marxist in name only, that their ruling groups do not adhere to a strictly defined ideology and that, therefore a modicum of U.S. assistance would serve to draw them out of the Soviet camp.into the Western fold They argue that bo t h the country's president and its U.S. policy towards countries such as Mozambique is still in flux. At Cancun, President Reagan .laid down the economic para meters within which his Administration will consider aid to less developed countries. However, he took care not to lay down a similar set of political guidelines. Supporters of states such as Mozambique urge the government to adopt apolitical aid policies to ignore the political labels which Third World governments often arrogate to themselves and to g rant assistance to a profusion of developing countries. Their opponents continue to stress that many Marxist Third World governments are, in fact, ideologically committed and that, should the U.S. assist such countries, it would simply be subsidizing its enemies.

This paper will attempt to test the val cases within the context of Mozambique. It policies of the current government since it actions immediately preceding independence idity of the rival will examine both the came to power and its Many clues to the 2 governmentfs character are found in its origins, particularly since it is still led by its founders HI STORY On April 25, 1974, a group of Portuguese army officers led their troops into Lisbon and overthrew the authoritarian 'Icorpo rate" regime of Dr. Marcel0 Caetano in a bloodless coup. Rever- berations of this dramatic act echoed far beyond the Portuguese frontiers.

Disagreement over the future of the country's overseas empire had been a major factor in Portuguese politics for more than fifteen ye ars. While Britain, France, and Holland had been gradually divesting themselves of their overseas possessions both Caetano and his predecessor, Dr. Antonio Salazar, stood firm.

Mozambique were, in fact, provinces of Portugal, geographic factors notwithsta nding. Consequently, they maintained that any discussion of decolonization or of negotiation with pro independence groups was simply ridiculous protracted and costly wars against indigenous independence move ments supported by the Soviet Union and the Peo ple's Republic of China. Many army officers gradually became convinced that these wars could not be won and formed the clandestine "Armed Forces Movement" with the aim of altering Portugese policy, by force if necessary. exit from government.

Immediately following the ousting of Caetano, the officers announced their intention of decolonizing Angola and Mozambique.

The decision, in and of itself, may have been both laudable and unavoidable. However, its implementation was disastrous, plunging great areas of southern Africa into a turmoil from which they have yet to recover They asserted that Portugal's major colonies Angola and This uncompromising stance involved both governments in These were the officers who ultimately forced Caetano's MOZAMBIQUE AND THE S OUTHERN AFRICAN COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM An observer once commented that, lIMozambiquefs economy is an economy of ports and railroads While the statement is somewhat exaggerated, the country does stand at a vital crux in southern Africa's communication syste m.

The key to Mozambiquefs importance as a communication center is its possession of two deep-water harbors in Beira and in Maputo, the capital (formerly known as Laurenco Marques). These ports are connected to a valuable network of railways constructed by rival colonial governments. 4 Cecil Rhodes, the chief proponent of British interests in southern Africa in the late nineteenth century, dreamed of a British railroad stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo. His vision did not come to fruition, but he did leave a railroad network which ran north from Cape Town to Shaba province in present day Zaire and to Mombassa in Kenya the main northern railroad connected Lobito and Benguela in Angola with Dar es Salaam and Beira in modern Tanzania and Mozam biq u e respectively Branch lines from Meanwhile, the Voortrekkers, the original settlers of the disputed areas of southern Africa, were determined to avoid encirclement by Rhodes's expansionist forces. Consequently, they also built a railroad, from the Boer Re p ublics to Delagoa Bay in Mozambique, thus gaining independent access to the sea Two of these railroads are now of vital importance to Mozam- bique 1) The Tete Railroad, connecting landlocked Zambia and Zimbabwe with the Indian Ocean at Beira and landlocke d Malawi with the northern port of Nacala 2) The original Voortrekker railroad, connecting the Johannesburg-Pretoria area with Maputo.

The first railroad trans.forms Beira into the essential outport for Zimbabwean chrome ore, copper, tobacco, and other agricultural produce. It also makes it a natural inport for Zimbabwe's diverse imported needs, particularly petroleum, of which Zimbabwe has no known significant reserves.

The second railroad makes Maputo the outport for the manufac tured produce of the Republic of South Africa's Witwatersrand-Vaal industrial triangle and, like Beira, an inport for its imported needs. South African dependen ce upon access to Maputo will most likely continue, regardless of political developments in either country, until the Republic completes its extension of harbor facilities at Richards Bay and the concomitant improvement of railroad connections with the ar ea.

However, while South Africa and Zimbabwe depend upon the Mozambican transit system, Mozambique depends upon the economies of those countries revenues derive from the customs duties, import-export surcharges and transit fees which it levies upon goods' and materials passed through its territories jobs for many Mozambicans on the railways and the docks.) Prior to independence, income derived from these sources was second in national importance only to the remittances of Mozambican guest workers in Rhodes i a and South Africa. Transit fees and cus'toms duties have since become the most important aspect of national revenue Any disturbance or disruption in the transit system is A substantial portion of Mozambique's national The transport system also provides 5 reflected immediately in the national economy, often with disas- trous resu1ts.l Mozambique's heavy dependence upon its transit system has proved, in some senses, to be unfortunate. The country is large 783,030 square kilometers 293,000 square miles) and it is virtually impossible to protect all the railway lines from sabotage by radical groups who can inflict damage out of all proportion to their numbers.

Portuguese government and its native successors. This has been a continuing problem for both the THE INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE 1974 marked the tenth anniversary of the Portuguese govern- ment's battle with Mozambique's only fighting independence movement the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo An avowedly Marxist movement, Frelimo was directed fr om the Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam, by its leader-in-exile, Samora Moises Machel A graduate of the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow, Machel took command of the movement after its original leader, Dr E. Mondlane was killed by a parcel bomb in 1969.

Frelimo, which was supplied by both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, has achieved some notable, though not major, military successes since Mondlane's death It established bases in the tropical rain forest and wooded savanna of Mozambiq ue's northern provinces, Cab0 Delgado and Niassa, freeing it from its original dependence upon the Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere.

Nyerere had allowed Frelimo guerrillas to base themselves in his country and to use their camps as bases from which to r aid Mozam bique. (Throughout the war, Frelimo's Eastern-supplied arms continued to enter Africa through Dar es Salaam bases were established well away from the wealthier parts of Mozambique, the central and southern provinces which boasted the greatest co n centration of settlers. Their location also tainted Frelimo with an unavoidable tribal cast, since it restricted the group's recruitment to the northern Makonde tribe. Nevertheless Frelimo guerrillas were able to use the northern bases as launch ing pads t o raid the country's vital communications system and thus assured themselves of international attention The northern Portugal was obliged to go to considerable lengths to contain the guerrilla forces, devoting a substantial proportion of the national budg e t to the defense of Mozambique. By the time the war ended in 1974, Lisbon was maintaining 60,000 fighting troops in Mozambique 40,000 native Mozambicans and 20,000 Portuguese drafted into the armed forces. This involvement was not popular in Portugal. The drafting of young men for the Mozambican and See Transport Diplomacy by Dr. J.G.H. Loubser, Southern African Editorial Services, 1980 pp. 21-25. 6 Angolan wars touched most families, while the expenditures necessi- tated by the conflicts drained the count ry of badly needed funds.

These factors reinforced the army officers' mounting conviction that the wars could not be won.

On January 4, 1974, the war entered its decisive phase when Frelimo guerrillas blew up a train travelling on the Salisbury Beira line . The Marxist guerrillas had never before succeeded in operating so far south of their northern bases. Three weeks later, they repeated the attack, again successfully. These events convinced the Portuguese high command that its worst fears were being real i zed that Frelimo now felt strong enough to take the fight into the enemy's own territory, where it could wreak havoc in the communications system, and that, specifically Frelimo could threaten to bisect Mozambique at its narrowest point by advancing eastw ard along the Salisbury-Beira line towards Beira itself.

These Frelimo successes led to riots in Beira as the urban populace demanded that the government in Laurenco Marques take more determined measures to stem the guerrilla offensive. The colonial admini stration responded by raising defense spending to 47 million per annum 10 percent of the national budget the bulk of which continued to be devoted to development aid.3 Nonetheless, Frelimo attacks on the railroad system continued, throwing Beira into econ o mic confusion actually were extended as the guerrillas began to make concerted attacks upon the fortified villages which had been erected to secure rural areas the murder of the village's tribal leaders (Frelimo still refuses to countenance any alternativ e forms of authority within Mozam bique hence it has become the unremitting enemy of the country's tribal structures) and a general slaughter of many of the inhabi- tants. This carnage was by direct orders from the Frelimo high command in Dar es Salaam.4 F r elimo was attempting to terrorize the inhabitants of the fortified villages so that those who had so far escaped the guerrillas' attention would feel compelled to leave Frelimo activities Successful attacks by Frelimo guerrillas usually ended with THE LIS BON COUP In the midst of this military escalation, the Portuguese army took power in Lisbon on April 25, 19

74. The officers who had seized the government announced their intention of ending the colonial wars and of granting independence to both Angola and Mozambique AFRICA, Agence France Presse, No. 2042.

Ibid No. 2247. 2249. 4 -9 Ibid No. 2062; 2046 7 The new Portuguese head of state, General Antonio de Spinola, appointed a new Minister of Inter-Territorial Cooperation, Dr.

Antonio Almeida Santos, who i mmediately proclaimed that a negoti ated peace in Mozambique would constitute his top priority. Henrique Vasco Soares de Melo,.a liberal lawyer from Laurenco Marques, was appointed Governor-General of Mozambique and General Orlando Barbosa was named Comma nder-in-Chief of all government forces in Mozambique. They sought the good offices of Kamuzu Banda, the President of Malawi, to open up communications with Samora Machel so that peace negotiations could begin.5 Dr.

FRELIMO'S CAMPAIGN OF TERROR Apparently, Frelimo now had little left to fight for.

Indeed, the first two weeks after the Lisbon coup did mark a lull in the fighting. However, peace brought its own problems both for Samora Machel and for Frelimo. Though M ozambique's indepen- dence was now assured, there was no guarantee that, in the event of free national elections, the majority of Mozambicans would choose to have Frelimo govern the new state. Frelimo had never established itself firmly in the prosperous c entral and southern provinces and, consequently, could not expect to gain an easy majority in those areas. On the contrary, many of the natives of the southern half of the country would probably prove reluctant to hand themselves over the Machel's norther n Makonde supporters.

Moreover, the Portuguese army apparently was determined to approach the problem even-handedly, dealing with all political parties and groups, rather than simply recognizing Frelimo's self-appointed role as sole representative of the M ozambican people. Faced with these seemingly insuperable problems, Samora Machel issued an order from his refuge in Dar es Salaam on May 11, instructing Frelimo forces to step up the offensive and to extend their operations.6 Clearly, Machel was willing t o raise the stakes indefinitely, regardless of the cost in Mozambican lives, until the Portuguese armed forces gave way to his heavy handed methods and recognized Frelimo as the only political party within Mozambique.

Frelimo began to attack public buses a nd passenger trains heading to and from Beira machine-gunned, the latter were blown up and sometimes subsequent ly strafed. The majority of the victims were, inevitably, natives who were in no way involved in the struggle. An important freight convoy dest ined for the vital new hydro-electric development at Cabora Bassa was also sabotaged as Frelimo put its eastward drive on Beira in motion once more The former were usually ambushed and Ibid No. 2071, 2072, 2070 9 Ibid No. 2068 Ibid No. 2071, 2073, 2075.

Ka muzu Banda, meanwhile, had succeeded in extracting Machel's agreement to meet with a representative of the Portuguese govern ment in Dar es Salaam. Lisbon dispatched its Minister of Inter Territorial Coopertation, Dr. Antonio Almeida Santos. Santos was qu i ckly disappointed by Machel's determination to achieve absolute political power for Frelimo at all costs and the talks broke off abruptly. To underline his determination in the face of Portuguese efforts, Machel made the meeting coincide with the sabotage and demolition of a Mozambican train en route to Malawi.8 On June 7, General Barbosa complained that, despite repeated Portuguese assurances of its intention of decolonizing Mozambique, Frelimo was actually stepping up its campaign of terror. He also note d somewhat ruefully that the guerrillas had ceased to engage the regular Portuguese and Mozambican troops and were instead concentrating upon terrorizing the civilian population, as they had been instructed by broadcast from Dar es Salaam.g Apparently if t h e native population could not be persuaded to support Frelimo voluntarily, it was to be terrorized into doing so Machel was threatened by rival political groups in the south. Five weeks after the Lisbon coup, a new political party, the United Group of Moz a mbique (GUMO was formed in Laurenco Marques and its leadership offered to form a united front with Frelimo in securing an independence agreement. Machel categorical ly refused to have any dealings with the group, alleging that one of its chief members had been a Portuguese informer, an allegation which was never proved.1 May 4, 1974, even though Frelimo refused to allow any other political group to take part or even to be present. The talks were held in Lusaka, Zambia, where Machel received a hero's welcom e from Kenneth Kaunda, one of his most dedicated supporters.

From the onset of the discussion, Machel refused to consider a ceasefire, even while talks were underway. Frelimo continued to sabotage the Trans-Zambezi railroad, cutting off the productive Moat ize coal mines from Beira, thus halting the country's coal exports and threatening the jobs of 1,300 miners and many dock workers. Frelimo also continued its devastating attacks upon fortified villages, destroying property and killing tribal headmen. Mach el evidently was willing to continue until the Portuguese government felt morally obliged to give way, if only to avoid the appalling cost in human life.

Meanwhile, .Mozambique's .labor unions, falsely elated by the prospect of independence, launched a ser ies of major strikes for higher pay The Portugese Foreign Minister reopened talks with Machel on During May and June 1974, the country's coal miners Ibid No. 2071.

Ibid No. 2076 lo Ibid No. 2074. 9 I sugar workers, medical employees and transport workers left their jobs, demanding'huge salary increases. Most of the strikers received raises in excess of 100 percent, settlements which the country could ill afford. The strain which these awards placed upon the national budget, 'coupled with the huge amount o f damage inflicted upon the communications system and the agricultural sector by Frelirno, was pushing Mozambique into a state of crisis.

Within two months of the Lisbon coup the.country was suffering from rampant speculation, fleeing capital, falling gove rnment revenues and 50 percent inflation.ll economic failings of his present government, Samora Machel is quick to point out that he inherited a deteriorating economic situation. However, he consistently neglects to mention that this deterioration was alm o st entirely of his own making When confronted with the The talks in Lusaka had achieved nothing in the face of Machel's obduracy but the Portuguese, despairing of a military solution and facing domestic unrest, persisted, and talks were reopened in Mogadi s hu, Somalia. The Portuguese Foreign Minister did not even bother to raise the issue of a ceasefire and instead concentrated upon extracting Machel's agreement to a one-man one-vote national referendum to decide Mozambique's future govern ment. Once more, M achel and his colleagues refused to take part in or to recognize the results of any such democratic process. They knew full well that many townspeople and inhabitants of the southern and central provinces would not support them both because of their triba l origins and their strict Marxist ideology. multi-ethnic party, the Common Front for Mozambique (Fremco might well have fared much better than Frelimo in an open national run off. Consequently, Machel decided to drag out the war for the ultimate benefit o f his own party.12 A new The first target of Frelimo's next offensive, almost inevit ably, was the Salisbury-Beira railroad. On July 19, 1974, the guerrillas put that economic artery out of action and, five days later, triggered fifty separate explosions o n the line between Beira and the hydro-electric development at Cabora Bassa. Frelimo forces, simultaneously, began to infiltrate southward and westward into the more prosperous areas of Beira province around Inhaminga and into Zambezia province, laying was t e to 'some of the country's best agricultural land. On July 23, the guerrillas took Morrum bala, one of the larger towns in Zambezia, and reached Licauri, thirty miles from the provincial capital, Q~e1imane.l failure of peace negotiations, morale in the P o rtuguese forces plunged to a new nadir. expected the war to end immediately after the Lisbon coup and In the face of Frelimo's military successes and the continual Both Portugese and native troops had l1 Ibid No. 2075, 2078, 2083, 2080, 2081, 2083. l2 Ibi d ' No. 2084. l3 Ibid' No. 2088, 2089. 10 understandably, none of them now wished to die for a cause which seemed to have been deprived of meaning. Soldiers serving in camps along the Tanzanian border began to desert their posts. In June, a company of troop s stationed at Mocassa joined forces with Frelimo. The final blow came on July 19, 1974 when two thousand black and white soldiers refused to leave their barracks at Laurenco Marques to go north against Frelimo.14 The bulk of the army was in a nearly mutin o us condition and the military government was faced with a situation in which it might no longer have troops to fight an enemy which was willing to protract the war almost indefinitely. Consequently, the officers in Lisbon felt compelled to admit defeat st r ation in Lisbon dissolved the civilian government of Mozambique and replaced it with a military junta. This body publicly pledged to grant Mozambique its independence as quickly,as possible implying, correctly, that the equity of the transaction would be sacrificed to speed.15 By the beginning of the third week in August, the military junta had succeeded in secretly negotiating a partial ceasefire with Frelimo to spare the transport system further damage.

However, Machel was angered by the emergence of a n ew five-party coalition which challenged Frelimo's sole right to represent the people of Mozambique. Frelimo spokesman Jorge Rebelo formally refused to cooperate with any other political party in a transi tion government and demanded that the new coalitio n be 11stopped.1116 From Kinshasa, Machel ordered the Portuguese government to hand Mozambique over to Frelimo immediately and unconditionally. As a demonstration of resolve, Frelimo broke the ceasefire. The Tete railroad was put out of commission yet agai n and guerrillas began to move on Beira. Zambezia province as criminals took advantage of the prevailing political dislocation to loot farms and shops.17 pressure of these various events, the Portuguese military junta agreed to further talks in Lusaka On J u ly 21, the military admini Widespread rioting and looting broke out in Under the On September 7, 1974, Frelimo and the Portuguese government finally signed an official independence agreement. Mozambique was to become fully independent on June 25, 1975. th e country was to be administered by a transition government consisting of a Portuguese High Commissioner assisted by nine ministers. Six of these ministers, including the Prime Minister were to be representatives of Frelimo.ls The agreement made no mention of national elections or plebiscites prior to independence and all administrative and executive authority was to be trans ferred directly to Frelimo. The acting Prime Minister, Joaquim In the interim l4 Ibid No. 2089 l5 Ibid' No. 2090, 2091 l6 l7 Ibid No. 2101 l8 Ibid Ibid No. 2098, 2099, 2100. 11 Chissano (Machel remained in Dar es Salaam until official indepen dence warned against any attempt to set up alternative political parties We will allow nobody to hinder the functioning of democracy and democracy does not necessarily mean the creation of political parties.lg Machel emerged victorious, fulfilling all of his political ambi tions the Portuguese government recognized him as the official head of a new one-party state and all of this potential opponents had been legally subverted before he even came to power.

MOZAMBIQUE'S NEW FOREIGN POLICY Samora Machel had never made any attempt to hide his determi nation to pursue an aggressive, Marxist-oriented foreign policy.

Chissano, with an eye to the nation's 2 50,000 Portuguese, attempted to mitigate the effect of Machel's speeches, pledging that Frelimo would follow a policy of strict non-interventionism toward neighbor ing states. Chissano, however, was unable to control Machel, who was determined to dominate foreign policy. The chief aim of that policy, according to Machel, was to be the transformation of Mozambique into 'la revolutionary base against imperialism.1120 On December 15, 1974, Machel announced the signing of a Treaty 0.f Friendship and Cooperatio n with the Bulgarian Communist Party, the most Stalinistic of the East European Communist parties and with Czechoslovakia, the one most closely aligned with the Soviet Union. A similar agreement with the Romanian Communist Party followed in January 19

75. Simultaneously, the Soviet ship Akademik Shimansky docked in Beira with a cargo of arms for Frelimo. Two months later, Machel announced treaties with North Korea and the People's Republic of China, somewhat to the discom fiture of his Soviet allies.21 THE PRELUDE TO THE ONE-PARTY STATE The interim government made some significant alterations to the Mozambican judicial system to facilitate the transition to a one-party Marxist state. On May 18, stiff prison sentences were introduced for all persons found gu i lty of actions "leading to an atmosphere of social and economic insecurity detrimental to the economic activities of the country, or which may contribute to the weakening of the economy.'I provided for in cases of Ilindividuals or firms failing to contri- Government intervention was l9 Ibid No. 2105. 2o Ibid No. 2105. 2113. 21 Ibid No. 2133; 2135, 2136. 12 bute to the economic development of Mozambique and to the satis faction of collective interests as defined by Frelimo. Machel also announced he would te r minate the "shameful agreement whereby 150,000 Mozambicans left their homes each year to work in the Republic of South Africa, despite the fact that migrant workers' remittances provided the country with its main source of foreign currency earnings.22 Dur ing the war, Machel and his colleagues had pledged on several occasions that they would grant freedom of conscience to all. These promises were worthless, for Frelimo participants in the interim government soon began attacking organized religion.

Jehovah's Witnesses were accused of being western spies in the pay of the CIA, entrusted with the task of sabotaging Mozambique's docks. Catholic priests were vilified because they, supposedly, had made the people of Mozambique Ilsubjectsl' of the western powers. 2 Shortly before official independence, Machel finally dropped all pretense of neutralism We support all the liberation movements which fight for their independence some parts of Africa continue to be dominated..24 Mozambique will not be free while Two wee k s later, Chissano publicly elaborated Mozambique is only waiting for the ANC (African National Council) to say what kind of help it needs to come to its assistance. The people of Mozambique are ready to give full support to the fighting peoples of Zimbabw e Namibia, South Africa, and other African peoples still under the yoke of colonial rule.25 THE PORTUGUESE EXODUS In the light of such developments, it is hardly surprising that few Portuguese colonists accepted Samora Machel's assurances of a bright, mult i-ethnic future. The new Marxist judicial system and the possibility of becoming embroiled in foreign wars combined to cause a wave of mass emigration.

Throughout the tenure of the interim government, ships and aircraft destined for Portugal were crowded with colonists return ing home. Mozambique had, in 1973, boasted some 250,000 Portuguese colonists. When Senator Charles Percy visited the country in 22 -9 Ibid No. 2147, 2180 23 Ibid No. 2183 24 Ibid No. 2182 25 -9 Ibid No. 2187. 13 April 1976, less than one year after independence, all but 20,000 had fled. Moreover, most of those remaining were teachers who could be expected to return to Portugal when t h eir contracts expired at the end of the summer. Approximately 4,000 Portuguese now remain in Mozambique.26 The emigrants took with them almost eve.ry skill .necessary to run an urban society, health services and a communications system. After their depart ure, the country was left with only fifteen doctors and one thousand administrators to run the medical services and distribution system of the entire country.

MACHEL'S DOMESTIC REVOLUTION Machel made his official return from exile on June 25 1975 independe nce day. He was promptly invested with the offices of President and Prime Minister. The new head of state immediately announced his plans for the Chinese-style collectivi zation of agriculture (which employs 68 percent of Mozambique's 12 million people). T his fundamental reorganization of Mozambican society was not to be confined to the simple economic level; it was designed to presage a major revolution in the hearts and minds of the Mozambican people. The agricultural revolution would mark only the first step on the road towards the full scale cultural revolution which would create Ita new man" for "Africa's first Marxist state.1128 Detention and forced I1re-education" were freely used to eradicate all vestiges of personal attachment to individualism and t o inculcate absolute loyalty to Frelimo doctrine schools were nationalized, Ifto ensure the political orientation of Frelimo in this vital sector." The cinema and all imported publications were subjected to strict controls to combat "the degradation of va l uesll and !'moral corruption. Foreign reporters and observers in the country were tightly restricted Ilso as not to prejudice the conquests of the Mozambican revolution.1129 Frelirno closed down all private law firms on the grounds that they were Ilincomp atible with a popular system of justice."

Armando Guebuza, a 31-year-old party theoretician, was appointed Minister of Internal Administration, with the task of politi cizing the masses. to train Frelimo party commissars to direct the Ifdynamic groups All He founded the New Party School in the capital 26 The United States and Southern Africa Percy to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate on His Study Mission to Southern Africa Conducted Between April 13 and April 25 1976" (Washington D. C U. S Government Printing Off ice, 1976).

Time, May 3, 1976, pp 25-26 EYork Times, December 20, 1979, p. 9; and Christian Science Monitor June 13, 1975, p. 30.

Ibid AFRICA, Agence France Presse, No. 2193, 2216 A Report by Senator Charles H 27 28 29 14 wh ich the party setting up in every Mozambican institution, be it school, factory, slum or farm. Opposition was silenced by the newly-created National Service of People's Security (SNASP) which was being trained by security agents from the German Democratic Republic.30 The cultural revolution was backed by the full force and apparatus of a centralized Marxist state.

FRELIMO'S AGRICULTURAL POLICIES Upon his return from exile, Machel announced his intention of transforming Mozambique into another Tanzania, a s tatement which certainly reflects his isolation from the mainstream of Tanzanian life, given the disastrous state of that country's economy and finances.

Nonethel.ess, despite the warning example of Tanzania, Machel and Frelimo pressed on the property of the people or, more correctly, the state. The large colonial plantations, which had supported half the popula tion, were transformed into state collectives. All decisions relating to financing, marketing, distribution and even the very planting of agricul t ural produce were placed under central control.31 All cultivated land was declared to be This massive centralization policy, inevitably, proved disastrous It presupposed the existence of a relatively sophis ticated domestic transit and communications syst e m. This presup- position was false. Mozambique's roads and railways had been designed to serve South Africa and Zimbabwe rather than Mozambique itself. All of the main communication arteries ran from west to east rather than from north to south. Moreover, the country possessed only 1,000 trained administrators capable of handling the new, centralized agricultural system and these people were also needed in industry and the armed f0rces.~2 After implementing this series of reforms, Frelimo maintained a tigh t grip upon the dissemination of information relating to the performance of Mozambique's agricultural sector. No production figures have been published but it is known that the country which, even under the transition government, had been a net exporter of agricultural produce, was obliged to import food Agricultural production fell by as much as 75 percent in some areas; bread, rice and milk were all in short supply. Production of major cash crops such as cotton and sisal fell by at least 50 percent.33 30 31 32 33 Ibid ibid No. 2203; Christian Science Monitor, June 13, 1975.

Time, May 3, 1976, pp. 25-26.

Intelligence Digest, August 6, 1976, pp. 3-4.

Time, May 3, 1976, pp. 25-26. 15 In 1975, the Republic of South Africa was supplying Mozambique with 3,000 tons of grain a month. Romania was obliged to offer its new ally a series of shipments adding up to 100,000 tons over the course of the year. However, the Frelimo-sponsored breakdown in the agricultural and communications sectors was so extensive that maj o r assistance was still needed from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and from the World Food Program.34 FA0 technicians based in Mozambique following independence estimated that the country's annual grain harvest had fallen to approxima t ely 50,000 tons, a mere 50 percent of domestic consump- tion. Inevitably, Mozambique's trade deficit soared as food imports climbed to offset the effects of Frelimo's disastrous policies. By 1976, even the Frelimo armed forces were being supplied with can n ed goods from, of all places, the Republic of South Africa.35 Within three years of independence, Mozambique's trade balance had swung from a pre-independence surplus to an annual deficit of $280 million. Machel and Frelimo nevertheless refused to abandon their rigid ideological approach in 1978 the Minister of Agriculture was not only dismissed but was also expelled from the party for refusing to implement strict party dictates relating to the management of the communal farms.36 It was not until 1980 that Machel finally admitted that Frelimo's agricultural policies had proved to be unmitigated failures. As he himself was forced to admit, a huge government bureaucracy had stifled initiative and had spawned a host of intermediary bureaucratic parasites in th e c~untryside Many U.S. commentators heralded Machel's admissions as evidence of a major revolution in Frelimo policy the party supposedly had come to terms with reality and was prepared to adopt a pragmatic approach towards Mozambique's domestic problems. However, Machel's comments did not lead to any form of substantive action. Senior Frelimo figures did announce that the agricultural system was to be decentralized and that the large state farms would become autonomous bodies. However, it soon became clea r that Frelimo intended to provide only the appearance of decentral- ization. None of the new I1autonomous1l farms were allowed to decide which crops they should grow; such decisions continued to be made in Maputo workers or determine their wages. Farmers c ould not order their own equipment and supplies nor could they arrange to finance and market their own produce. When asked what, under these circum They were not allowed to hire or fire farm 34 35 36 37 AFRICA, Agence France Presse, No. 2135, 2141, 2145, 2146, 2152.

The Washington Post, April 19, 1976, p. A10; and The Wall Street Journal December 30, 1980, p. 1.

Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 4, p. 4812 A; ibid Vol. 15 No. 8, p. 4954 C.

The Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1980, p. 1. 16 stances , tlautonomytl meant, a Frelimo spokesman replied, IIEverything else I3 The consequence of Frelimols agricultural polices are apparent today even in Maputo. On March 4, 1981, food rationing had to be introduced, restricting access of the city's 350,000 in h abitants to eleven basic commodities, including flour, rice, corn, sugar oil, margarine and soap. The rations are by no means generous In March, each.adult was scheduled to receive, for the month three kilos of grain 6 lbs 10 oz one-and-a-half kilos of su g ar 3 lbs 5 02 500 grams of oil and 500 grams of soap and cleaning products. Even these meager rations could not be guaran teed, for the rationing order also noted that The quantity distributed to each member of the family will depend on the stock of each e nterprize responsible for the distribution.Il In other words, ration cards would prove to be worthless if the government shops lacked the stock necessary to fulfill even these scant aUowances.39 Past experience strongly suggests that Mozambique cannot reg a in .agricultural self-sufficiency until Machel and his collea gues renounce their unyielding Marxist attitudes toward the countryside, attitudes which even the People's Republic of China and a number of East European countries have begun to abandon in vie w of their deleterious effects upon agricultural production.

Conversely, Machel's determination to stick with his collectiviza- tion policies in the face of falling food production and rising trade deficits is a measure of his ideological commitment to orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

FRELIMO IN AFRICA Samora Machel has never confined his political vision to Mozambique. On the contrary, he plans an exceptionally active role in African affairs, regardless of the economic cost of an aggressive foreign policy. Had Machel been more genuinely solici tous of Mozambique's despa rate domestic situation, he might have hesitated before plunging the country into a war which it certain ly could not afford.

Even before he came to power, Machel made no secret of his determination to draw Mozambique within the political and economic orbits of the Eastern bloc.

Cooperation with countries such as Bulgaria and North Korea even before Frelimo had officially come to power. opportunity to speak out on foreign policy in January 1976, six months after independence, when he was invited to deliver the keynote address at the annual meeting of the Organization for He signed treaties of Friendship and He gained his first 38 Ibid 39 Gia de Informacao de Mocambique: Bulletin No. 57. 17 African Unity in Addis Ababa. Machel took this opportunity to deman d that the organization grant full recognition to the MPLA regime which the Soviet Union and Cuba had recently helped to install in Angola. The key issue in the Angola situation, accord ing to Machel, was the interference of foreign troops in the domestic a ffairs of an African state; hence, a vote for the MPLA was a vote against foreign inter~ention revealed the depths of his ideological bias: at the time of his speech, the only foreign forces in Angola were the Cuban and East German contingents who were pr eserving the MPLA from the more popular FNLA and UNITA forces. The Republic of South Africa had withdrawn its troops and the Clark Amendment prevented the U.S from assisting any Angolan group. The "imperialist enemy" was non-existent aggressors.

O.A.U Mach el went further and took even greater pains to identi fy himself openly with the nations of Eastern bloc Machel's statement Machel's Marxist allies were the only foreign Subsequently, addressing the Liberation Committee of the This is the epoch in which t h e final liquidation of imperialism from our continent has begun. Dutifully taking part in the fight are the socialist countries which constitute the liberated areas of mankind and are the only democratic forces in the world to be prominent ly involved in o ur struggle.41 On March 3, 1975, Machel further demonstrated his formal This grand political Mozambique lost between $57 and $74 million per commitment to 'Ithe great liberation strugglev1 by closing Mozambi que's border with Rhodesia, then under the admi n istration of a white minority regime led by Ian Smith gesture brought economic disaster to Mozambique. Thousands of dock and railroad workers servicing Rhodesian trade were thrown out of work annum in dues and surcharges alone, and $18 to $28 million per a nnum in guest worker remittances. Mozambique was also obliged to find alternative, and more expensive, sources for its imports of goods and energy. It was estimated that losses would total between $110 and $135 million in national revenue for every year t h at the Rhodesian border remained closed. These estimates proved to be largely correct: by the time the Rhodesian conflict ended in December 1979, Mozambique had lost more the $500 million in revenue.42 Combined with the rising cost of food and fuel import s , these losses were more than enough to plunge the country into a severe economic and fiscal crisis 40 41 Ibid p. 3887C. 42 AFRICA, Agence France Presse, No. 2133, 2154; and Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 3883B, 3884C Africi Institute Bullet i n, No. 5 6, 1976, pp. 212-215. 18 The raw economic cost of the de facto border war with Rhodesia placed an intolerable strain upon Ezambique's resources eighteen months of closing the borders, Machel was burdened with the cost of sustaining 32,000 refugee s who had fled from the areas of heaviest conflict along the border. war, this refugee contingent had expanded to some 100,000 people.43 In 1978, Frelimo was obliged to reintroduce compulsory two-year military service for both sexes while raising defense s pending by 90 percent to $110 million per annum, 30 percent of the national budget.

Mozambique's suffering as a result of the war was not solely economic. Machel's connivance at the use of the Mozambican territory by Robert Mugabe's guerrillas exposed the country to a series of retaliatory attacks.by the Rhodesian armed forces. The Rhodesian air force made some 350 damaging strikes against Mozam- bique, most of them.being directed against the already badly mauled.communications system. The demolition of a k ey bridge on the Beira-Moatize line was an exceptionally severe blow since it cut off all of Mozambique's coal exports from access to port facilities at Beira.44 Within By the end of the MACHEL ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE Upon his accession to power, Mache l was equally well-disposed towards the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China both had supplied arms to Frelimo when it had been fighting the Portuguese. Machel had been greatly impressed, however, by the huge amounts of military aid which the So v iet Union had poured into Angola during the civil war in that country when the war with Rhodesia forced him to face up to a deteriorat ing military situation, he began to move closer to the Soviet Union in the hope of receiving increased military assistan ce from the Kremlin. remarked upon Machel's gradual abnegation of even the appearance of non-alignment and his de facto clientage to the Soviet Union.

The newspaper estimated t&t Frelimo had already received approxi- mately $12 million in military aid during the past year.

April 1976, two Soviet ships docked in Beira carrying a cargo of armored cars, 122 mm mobile rocket launchers and SAM-7 shoulder fired missiles destined for the Frelimo armed forces.45 Consequently As early as February 1976, the Kenyan N ATION had In Inevitably, the Soviet Union expected a direct return on its investment in Machel. He commenced repayment of his debt at the 43 44 45 African Research Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 2, p. 4745C.

Washington Post, January 31, 1979 p. A12; and Wall Street Journal December 30, 1980 p. 1.

Africa Research Bulletin Vol. 13, No. 2; and Time, May 3, 1976, pp 25 -26. 19 1978 assembly of the O.A.U. Several member states had tabled a motion criticizing all foreign interference in the domestic affairs of African states Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, asserting that Soviet and Cuban interference in Africa could not be regarded as being on a par with interference from the West. Machel could no longer claim even the formal appearance of non-alignment. He was subse q uently rewarded with a further shipment of 150 Soviet medium tanks and 47 MiG-21 fighters.46 In February 1979, Machel formalized Mozambique's close military relationship with the Eastern bloc by signing a Twenty Year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation w i th Erich Honecker, the German Democratic Republic's head of state and secretary of the East German Communist Party. Clause Five of that treaty specifically provides for close military cooperation between the two countries, the only such clause in any of E ast Germany's various African treaties.47 In October 1980, a military delega tion from Mozambique travelled to East Germany and Defense Minister Chipande met with his East German counterpart, Heinz Hoffmann.

Simultaneously, the political wing of Frelimo fo llowed Machel's lead and signed a five-year party-to-party cooperation treaty with the East German Communist Party.48 Machel obediently came to the aid of FRELIMO'S QUEST FOR WESTERN AID substantial amounts of international aid. This need became all the g r eater by 1979, when Mozambique emerged from its long, expensive war with Rhodesia for Soviet expansionism in Africa, most of Mozambique's financial aid continued to come from the Scandinavian countries, the Nether lands and Great Britain. In 1978, these c o untries were supplying Mozambique with a total of 80.3 million per annum, compared with the entire Eastern bloc's paltry contribution of $2 million. The United States, the European Community and the Republic of South Africa purchased 50.1 percent of Mozam b ique's exports while the Soviet Union and its allies took only 3.8 percent.49 while Cuba and the German Democratic Republic donate technical assistance. The GDR currently is supervising the construction of two new cotton mills but, since the country is su f fering from In 1975, the newly independent state clearly was in ne'ed of Despite Machel's continued support Moscow continues, as usual, to supply arms for a price 46 Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 7, p. 4911B; and Intelligence Digest August 1, 197 9 , pp. 6-7 47 48 Ibid 49 John M; Starrels, East Germany: Marxist Mission in Africa (Washington D.C The Heritage Foundation, 1981 pp. 25-26 Washington Post, August 19, 1979, p. A9. 20 a serious shortage of domestically produced cotton, this activity would s e em to be of little purpose.50 The little aid which Moz'ambique has received from the Soviet Union has commanded a much higher price than the more generous donations of the Western powers fishing rights off the Mozambican coast (other countries must pay de a rly for them). In return, the Soviet fishing fleet Vacuum cleans the coast, gives only 25 percent of the catch to Mozam- bique, and ships the remainder to Soviet ports. COMECON sells trucks and tractors to Mozambique but, in the absence of hard currency, t his equipment is bartered for agricultural produce which is assessed at artificially low prices. COMECON then sells that produce on Western markets at free market prices, receiving all the precious hard currency involved in the transacti~n The Soviet Unio n demanded free Despite these adverse circumstances, Machel and Frelimo have persisted in steering an eastward course. The party has consis- tently refused to join any of the Western-based international economic organizations which might be able to assist M ozambique out of its economic difficulties. Both the World Bank and the European Common Market Community Development Fund have proferred assistance but both have been spurned. When asked to account for these refusals, the vice-governor of the National Ban k of Mozam bique replied, "we are very careful of our freedom.Il However, he then admitted that Frelimo was considering joining COMECON.52 Judging from past performances, Frelimo can expect to receive considerably less aid than it could have obtained from t he World Bank or the European Economic Community. Machells determination to stand by COMECON despite its abyssmal record in Mozambique and the rest of the Third World further demonstrates the depth of his ideological commitment to the Soviet brand of Marx ism.

U.S.-MOZAMBIQUE RELATIONS Considering Machells clear determination to continue support ing aggressive Soviet policies in Africa, it is strange that certain members of the Carter Administration should ever have decided that Mozambique was a country wor thy of U.S. friendship and support.

President Jimmy Carter met with Samora Machel in October 1977 and the two men hailed the dawning of Ita new era in U.S Mozambique relations. In July 1979, the State Department announced that it intended to increase Secu rity Supporting Assistance (SSA) to Mozambique in FY 1980, planning, as a first step, to give $3 million in agricultural assistance.53 50 51 52 53 Ibid.; and Intelligence Report, September 1, 1979, pp. 5-6.

Washington Post, August 19, 1979, p. A9.

Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1980, p. 1.

Washington Post, August 19, 1979, p. A9; and Intelligence Digest, September 1, 1979, .pp. 5-6. 21 In 1979, Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, testified before the Africa Subcommit tee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs It is our view that its (Mozambique's) President Samora Machel, is a pragmatic leader who is interested in the development of his country.54 Moose neglected to account for Machel's militant foreign policy and f or his incendiary, ideological speeches. He also neglected to define his understanding of the term "pragmatic I ly, the subcommittee did not press him on these points In its presentation to Congress for FY 1981, the Agency for International Development al s o succumbed to the prevailing rhetor ical trend when it proposed to increase assistance to Mozambique to $16 million per annum Unfortunate Mozambique's approach to its development problems despite socialist rhetoric is distinctly pragmatic.55 The,proponen t s of the Carter policy had thus placed themselves in an invulnerable position each time Machel contradicted them and asserted that he was, in fact, a diehard Marxist, they could ascribe his outbursts to mere socialist rhetoric. A.I.D. also dispatched a te a m of economic experts to Maputo to consider the provision of large-scale economic stability and balance of payments assistance. Their efforts came to nothing however, because in March 1981, Frelimo arrested several members of the U.S. embassy staff, accus i ng them of being CIA agents they were subsequently deported. Machel's action was probably designed to demonstrate his displeasure with the recent change of administration in Washington. Whatever their motivation, the arrests had the expected result: the A .I.D. team was withdrawn and U.S. assistance to Mozambique has since been restricted to emergency food aid.

FRELIMO AND HUMAN RIGHTS The Carter Administration's emphasis upon human rights might well have caused it to hesitate before it launched a rapprochement with Mozambique.

A State Department report on human rights which was submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 2, 1981, was far from complimentary 54 55 Agency for International Development: Congressional Presentation, Fiscal In telligence Digest, August 1, 1979, pp. 6-7 Year 1981, Annex 1, Africa, p. 496. 22 Mozambique is a one-party state controlled by FRELIMO.

FRELIMO advocates a society based on Marxist-Leninist precepts. The party's membership is a small part of the total po pulation. There is some opportunity for intra-party debate, but opposition political movements are not permitted.56 Frelimo jealously guards the privilege of disseminating information, controlling all reporting within Mozambique and restricting the flow o f foreign journalists into the country.

During the war with Rhodesia, the deteriorating military situation led to further press restrictions, instituted under the guise of a newly-formed National Journalists' Organization. This new body was instructed "to play a more active part in the Mozambican revolution, working under the guidance of Frelimo and serving the interests of the Mozambican working people.Ifs7 In other words, the people, represented by Frelimo, would in the future define the limits of legiti mate journalistic inquiry.

Frelimo's East German-trained secret police has launched a full-scale attack against all rival forms of authority within Mozambique. Unions formed prior to independence have been abo lished. During its early military campaigns, F relimo made concer ted attacks upon the country's tribal structure. More recently the party has even introduced stiff prison sentences for anyone found guilty of lltribalism.ll However, the tribes still act as a major focus of loyalty. The Changane, Ronga , Chope, Inhambane Makonde and Tete tribes are all playing some part in the new active resistance to Frelim Frelimo's concern for its own hegemony has even led it to ban everyday social clubs. In 1976, it dissolved forty-seven associations, which, accordin g to party spokesmen Iencouraged racism, regionalism, divisionism or elitism contrary to the principles of public order as contained in the constitution."

The chief offenders were the African Association of Mozambique the Muslim Recreative Association, the English Club and the Chinese Club. All propert belonging to these organizations was confiscated by the state. 5x Frelimo reintroduced the death penalty in 1979 as punishment for treason, sabotage, espionage and terrorism, a development which was probably indicative of its own poor performance in 56 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate by The Department of State February 2, 1981 (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office 1981), p. 185.

Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 6, p. 4907B.

To the Point, October 3, 1977, p. 27; and Africa Research Bulletin, Vol 16, No. 2, p. 5165C Report Submitted to the 57 58 59 -9 Ibid Vol. 13, No. 13, p. 3964C. 23 border clashes with Rhodesian forces and of the increas ing diffi culty which the military was facing in deal ng with indigenous anti-government rebels. Frelimo's failure to define such crimes as !ltreason!l allows the new law to be invoked very broadly. The statute which introduced these penalties was also wo r ded so as to suggest that sentence for these crimes could be pronounced without actual proof of the defendantls guilt and regardless of whether the defendant was directly involved or was a mere unwitting accomplice to the crime. trial of those offenses to be submitted to military tribunals rather than to state courts.60 Subsequent legislation provided for the One of the most striking aspects of Frelimols attack upon the civil rights of its citizens has been its concerted assault upon freedom of conscience a nd religious assembly. The Catholic Church in Mozambique had traditionally supported Frelimo throughout its battle with the Portuguese armed forces. Several priests had fallen foul of the colonial authorities for having criticized the conduct of the army. Nevertheless, past services were quickly forgotten when Frelimo came to power. Four months after official independence, the party expelled five priests as "anti-revolution aries Shortly thereafter, all foreign priests were instructed to leave the country when their residence permits expired. In February 1977, Frelimo took further measures against the Mozambican church, forbidding the teaching of religious studies to children.

On May Day 1979, Machel launched his latest offensive against the country's 1.5 m illion Catholics. He denounced the Catholic Church as an "agent of imperialism All churches in Gaza province were closed (Maputo is located in Gaza province) and all religious services were banned.61 Apparently, neither Machel nor Frelimo has any intentio n of granting even the most grudging toleration to established religion.

Prior to independence, Frelimo had attempted to persuade Mozambique's Portuguese populace to remain in the country to assist in building a new, dynamic, multi-racial society. Most Por tuguese rejected Frelimo's assurances and .departed for Portugal or South Africa. Those who stayed behind often lived to regret their decision. Trainloads of colonists and natives were shipped to Frelimo's infamous !Ire-education centers forced labor camp s where the prisoners were inculcated with Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

A U.S. businessman and a journalist who were held without charge for several days in a Maputo jail reported encountering 6o 61 Intelligence Digest, September 1, 1979, pp. 5-6; and Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique: Bulletin No. 57.

AFRICA, Agence France Presse, No. 2226; Economist, February 26, 1977, p. 66; Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 5, p. 5269A; and -3 ibid Vol 16, No. 2, p. 5177B.

Time, May 3, 1976, pp. 25-26. 62 24 many Portuguese and Pakistani prisoners who had been transferred there from Machava Prison, the capital's primary detention center.

Before independence, these men had owned taxis, small farms and shops. They had been arrested and detained without charge and, while in Machava, they had been tortured. Frelimo officers had tied th eir.fingers and had then inserted and twisted knives between the tied fingers, tearing the flesh and mutilating the knuckles of the victims. Others had their faces held over spikes while soldiers danced on their shoulders. These tortures had been performe d with the sole object of discovering whether the victims possessed any concealed property. When the ambassador from Islamabad attempted to protest against the treatment of Pakistani nationals, he was denied an interview with Foreign Minister Chissano on ! ! security grounds.1163 SAMORA MACHEL AND MOZAMBIQWI TODAY In March 1981; the Economist of London published a survey of the Mozambican economy, commenting that Seven years of Soviet style economics have left Mozambique with a stagnant economy and chronic Fr e limo has been quick to blame its agricul tural and economic failure upon droughts and floods but this explanation ignores the fact that natural disasters also occurred before independence and that agricultural production is currently half of what it was b e fore the Portuguese departure. Strict food rationing has had to be introduced and large amounts of hard currency have been disbursed in order to purchase food on the international market, much of it coming from the.Republic of South Africa. follow Marxist agricultural policies has gradually made Mozambique increasingly dependent upon its southern neighbor for both techni cal assistance and food imports It is truly ironic that Frelimo's determination to Mozambique's dependence upon South Africa has not, how e ver bred closer relations between the two countries. Machel has continued to support and shelter the guerrillas of the Soviet controlled African National Council, thus exposing Mozambique to various retaliatory attacks by South African ground forces. The success of a South African raid on ANC headquarters in Maputo in January 1981 proved particularly embarrassing for Frelimols armed forces and resulted in the execution of several high ranking army officers.

Machells economic failings have also manifested t hemselves The Mozambican in the growth.of internal resistance movements 63 64 65 Agencia Informacao de Mocambique: Bulletin No. 56, 57 Douglas J. White in The Washington Post, August 14, 1977, p. B2; and Jeffrey Hart in The News American, March 30, 1978.

Economist, March 21, 1981, p. 45. 25 National Resistance Movement first appeared during the border war with Rhodesia, ,possibly at the instigation of the government in Salisbury. In 1979, the movement caused approximately $16 million damage by blowing up f uel storage tanks outside Beira It subse quently demolished two vital railroad bridges on the Beira-Moatize line. A reporter who visited the MNR in July 1979 encountered over 1,000 guerrillas under the command of an ex-Frelimo officer AndrC Matade Matsang a i. Most of the recruits were native Mozambi- cans discontented with Frelimo policies In November 1979 and July 1980, Frelimo armed forces claimed to have located and destroyed the guerrilla headquarters. However, a new wave of attacks .and major clashes i n Manica province suggest that these claims are exaggerated. Even the smallest guerrilla force can have a major impact upon the Mozambican economic system, especial ly since Machel has now made the country more heavily dependent upon its transit revenues. F actors which favored Frelimo when it was a guerrilla organization work against it now that it controls the government.66 Faced with an internal threat to his security and with South African counter-offensives across his borders, Machel has drifted even cl oser to his chief military supplier, the Soviet Union.

Shortly after the South African attack on ANC headquarters in Maputo, Soviet surface ships began to visit Beira and Maputo to demonstrate Soviet support for Machel. Frelimo has also recently received more than 150 Soviet T-62 tanks and 47 MiG-21 fighters.

Mozambique does not possess enough skilled pilots, drivers and mechanics to use and maintain these weapons systems. Moreover Mozambique's western and northern borders are unsuited to tank warfare. Thu s, the Republic of South Africa suspects that the Eastern bloc is using Mozambique as a forward dumping ground to prepare for an assault on South Africa itself.67 CONCLUSION An appeal for aid, albeit an indirect one, denotes poverty rather than pragmatism capital from the U.S. does not necessarily imply that the party has seen the error of its ways, even though those ways have led to the destruction of the Mozambican economy. On the contrary available evidence strongly suggests that Samora Machel is seekin g an infusion of Western capital solely to finance Frelimols disas- trous social and economic policies. Neither the Soviet Union nor the People's Republic of China will supply the 'necessary funds so Machel has now turned his eyes to the West Frelimo's des i re to obtain investment 66 Africa Research Bulletin, Vol. 16, No 3, p. 5198 9 ibid Vol. 16, No. 7 p. 5344B; ibid., Vol. 16 No. p. 5475A; New York Times, July 11, 1980 Washington Post, January 31, 1981; Washington Post, September 29, 1981 and Economist, Ju ne 26, 1981.

Agencia Informacao de Mocambique Bulletin No. 56 and Intelligence Digest August 1, 1979, pp 6-7 67 26 What evidence can advocates of aid to Mozambique offer in support of their position? The core indeed the sum of their case appears to be thei r contention that Machel and Frelimo can somehow be Ifbought,l1 that in return for aid they will abandon their Soviet alliance and their aggressive foreign policies in favor of genuine non-alignment. Machells past conduct suggests that such a view is gros . sly naive. Both his domestic and his foreign policies have already proved to be economically disfunc- tional but this has not altered his course in any way. Machel is an ideologue who will not be swayed by financial factors In short Extension of U.S. aid t o Maputo might well have results markedly deleterious to the interests of Mozambique and of southern Africa as a whole. U.S. aid would enable Machel to expand the Frelimo bureaucracy and thus to press on with his agricultural policies, wreaking further ha v oc in the Mozambican economy. U.S aid would also endow Machel with sufficient resources to expand the scope of his foreign policy left-wing opponents of President Hastings Banda of Malawi. The current flow of refugees from Mozambique into the Mulanje dist r ict of Malawi would facilitate such a course He might choose to assist More likely, Machel would use his new-found wealth to pressure the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, into a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It is known that Machel is dee p ly perturbed by the anti-Soviet trend of Mugabels speeches and policies and that the Soviet Union itself is eager to rob the People's Republic of China of what could prove to be a major diplomatic victory in southern Africa. Machel could easily threaten t o support Mugabe's main rival, Joshua Nkomo, by giving military assistance to the Ndebele of southern Zimbabwe. Mugabe is still in a precarious position and would probably be obliged to give way.

Hence, it is hardly in the interests of the U.S. to put Machel in a position where he can threaten such a course of action. The provision of aid must, at the very least, be made contingent upon Frelimo's withdrawal from the Soviet orbit.

Otherwise, the U.S. government will find itself in the anomalous position of supporting a state which currently seeks to undermine U.S. policy in any way open to it.

Ian Butterfield Policy Analyst