(Archived document, may contain errors)
16 October 1981
THE NEW FACE OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL
INTRODUCTION
In the battle against communism, the Socialist International long stood in the front ranks. Committed to democracy and the West's tradition of individual liberties, for decades it waged an ideological and political battle against Leninism and other totalitarian variants of Marxism. In recent years, however, the Socialist International has begun to waver in its opposition to communism. Whether inadvertently or by design, the policies and proclamations of the organization seem to be converging, to an alarming extent, with those of Moscow on a number of critical matters. By so doing, the Socialist International betrays some of its most fundamental principles.
ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL
Based in London, the Socialist International is a worldwide association of socialist,and social democratic parties with a president, twenty-one vice presidents and a secretary general. The SI currently consists of forty-seven full member parties, fifteen consultative parties, three fraternal organizations and eight associated organizations. The twenty-two West European member parties provide not only the leading personalities and the bulk of the funds available to the organization, but also the historical-ideological bonds of the SI. This stems from the organization's antecedents, dating from the establishment of the International Workers' Association (First International) in London in 1864. The remaining twenty-five member parties are in the Latin America-Caribbean area (eleven, most of which are relatively recent members), the Asian-Pacific area (five, including two in Japan), the Near East (three), Africa (three) and North America (three, including two in the United States -- the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee and the Social Democrats USA).
2 The consultative parties include nine exile socialist and social democratic parties from Eastern Eu.'rope, including the Baltic states. The fraternal organizations are the Socialist International Women, the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY) and the International Falcon Movement/Socialist Educational International. The SI also recognizes associated organizations of a regional or international nature, such as the Confederation of Socialist Parties in the European Community, the Asia-Pacific Socialist organization (APSO), the International Federation of the Socialist and Democratic Press and the International Union of Social Democratic Teachers.
The SI consists of four principal elements:
The Congress, the supreme body, which meets every two years, decides on the admission or expulsion of members, determines the statutes, proclaims the principles of the SI, adopts specific and general resolutions, adopts the reports of special study groups and establishes the tone and content of SI activities.
The Bureau, which is in effect the executive council of the SI, meets two or three times a year and decides actions and policies between Congress meetings, convenes special, expert and regional conferences, decides the composition of study groupq., convenes party leaders' conferences and approves the annual budget.
The Finance and Administration Committee, which consists of seven member parties and fraternal organizations elected by the Bureau, meets two or three times a year and recommends the dues to be levied by the SI, supervises the financial administration of the organization and approves the complement of the Secretariat staff.
The Secretariat, supervised by the Secretary General of the SI, who is elected by the Congress and prepares agendas for SI meetings, is responsible for the archives, prepares initial budget estimates, monitors the activities of member parties, attempts to coordinate these activities, coordinates the drafting of resolutions for Bureau and Congress meetings and frequently participates in SI missions and study groups.
PURPOSE AND NATURE
According to SI statutes, its purpose is "to strengthen relations between the affiliated parties and to coordinate their political attitudes by consent; to this end, the SI will seek to extend the relations between the SI and other socialist-oriehted parties not in membership which desire cooperation." Statutes, however, rarely provide insight into the true purpose or nature of an international association of political parties with divergent national considerations and a diversity of reactions to interna- tional affairs. Probably the most accurate'description of the SI was that provided by Willy Brandt.in his speech to the SI's Thirteenth Postwar Congress in Geneva in November 1976 after his election as president:
This is a working group of sovereign parties based on a number of common fundamental convictions and -- in some cases for many decades -- with a bond of common feeling. It is not instructions or unrealistic majority decisions that determine our cooperation, but ideas and moral impulses and not least the search for common solutions.
The SI does not prescribe the courses its member parties should follow in their own countries. The resolutions adopted and decisions taken on international problems are no more than recommendations and action guidelines for the individual parties. Under the Brandt presidency, however, coordination among member parties in matters of substance has been steadily improved and international actions by the parties have been increasingly based on agreements reached in Bureau meetings. What the SI accomplishes as a result of these agreements depends on the actions of the individual parties and the means available for those actions, just as the agendas for Bureau meetings and the issues on which the SI focuses its attention depend in largest part on what is submitted by the parties.
It would be inaccurate to regard the SI as a fully cohesive organization. West European member parties confront domestic and transnational problems in ways vastly different from those of Latin American or African member parties. The West European parties share an ideology rooted in the international workers' movement and a history of association from the First International through the Second International (1889-1914) to the Socialist International founded in Frankfurt in 1951. Nonetheless, differ- ences in concerns exist and diverse approaches to topics arise in SI meetings. Some member organizations are in NATO countries, others are not; some are in European Community countries, others are not; and some must contend with significant communist parties in their countries, whereas others enjoy clearcut predominance on the left of the national political spectrum.
SI leaders regard the organization as a dialogue partner for "progressive" forces throughout the world and as a bridge-builder for international cooperation. Thus, they believe that they can fulfill their "moral duty" to assist in the relaxation of tensions by supplementing the work of governments, for, as Brandt declared in his address to the SI Congress in Vancouver in November 1978, "International cooperation is far too important to be left to governments alone."
BUDGET AND STAFF
Financially, SI is an organization of relatively limited means. Its 1981 budget (converted here from British pounds to dollars at mid-1981 rates) totals $706,353, of which $325,674, or just over 46 percent, is for staff and office costs of the Secretariat in London; $189,330, or 26.80 percent of the budget, goes for SI meetings and missions, $96,200 for the Socialist International Women, $74,731 for the publication of Socialist Affairs, $7,400 for the International Union of Socialist Youth, and the remaining $13,018 for activities at the United Nations, the consultative exile parties from East Europe and unforeseen expenses.
The SI's income is derived primarily (89.54 percent) from the membership fees paid by full member parties and consultative parties, the fees determined in relation to the finances and membership of the individual parties. Subscriptions to Socialist Affairs raise $55,500 (which fails even to cover the expenses of publication), income from investments provides $7,285 and miscellaneous donations add another $11,100. The total income of $706,353 just matches outlays.
The parties pdying the largest affiliation fees are:
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) $111,000 Swedish Social Democratic Party 75,023 Austrian Socialist Party 66,600 Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 37,000 British Labor Party 30,525 Norwegian Labor Party 25,900 Dutch Labor Party 22,866 French Socialist Party 22,200
Salary and allowances costs for the Secretariat staff, consisting of no more than eight persons, total $175,196, or 24.80 percent of the budget. (In contrast, employees at the London-based Amnesty International Secretariat number about 150.)
In short, allegations 'that the SI as an organization supplied funds and other material support to the Portuguese Socialist Party in 1974-75 or to the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party following the death of Franco or to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or to the National Revolutionary Movement in El Salvador have been greatly exaggerated. Such aid, however, has often been supplied by individual parties and in some cases by their allied trade union organizations or by party foundations on a strictly bilateral basis.
THE FRESH START
For a number of reasons the SI deteriorated steadily during the period 1972-76, to the extent that by 1975 Brandt, Bruno Kreisky of Austria and Olof Palme of Sweden, the three "greats" of the SI with particularly close personal ties, began to despair of ever being able to revitalize the organization. The president of the SI during that period, Bruno Pittermann of Austria, was ailing, and the Secretary General, Hans Janitschek of'Austria, was inefficient. Bureau meetings in those years resulted more in divisiveness than cohesion, as resolutions were churned out breathlessly but practical achievements were correspondingly rare. One of the major reasons for this deterioration was disagreement over the issue of the extent to which social democrats should collaborate with communists on the national and international levels, leading to bitter debate in Bureau meetings on this question of fundamental importance. In practically all respects the SI was then in a desolate condition.
on election as president, Brandt in his acceptance speech called for "a fresh start of our cooperation." He was determined to do away'with divisive issues of principle in Bureau meetings and other SI activities. "Integration," the main characteristic of Brandt's behavior as chairman of the SPD, was the essence of his SI presidency. Ideology, principles and values were relegated to a distant second place in favor of "pragmatism." Brandt declared in the same acceptance speech, "I do not want us to neglect the debate on programmatic fundamentals," but he has gone on to neglect it. With regard to communism, he noted, "it cannot be our objective to blur the dividing lines [between social democracy and communism] or to gloss over dangers," but his allegedly pragmatic and integrationist approach, necessarily resulting in a neglect of traditional SI principles, has in fact led to a blurring of the dividing lines.
To focus the SI on "practical matters" as a basis for the "fresh start" of the organization, Brandt proclaimed three principal concerns or "offensives" which to this day have been the focus of SI activity:
The offensive for a secure peace. His comments on this offensive left no room for doubt that arms control and disarmament were to become the priority of the SI under his presidency and that he directly connected disarmament to aid to the Third World.
The offensive for new relations between North and South. Essentially, according to his comments, "This also means to continue with patience and energy to work out the elements with which a new world economic order is to be built."
The offensive for human rights.
In carrying out this offensive, "Our vision must be unobscured in all directions."
The concerns implicit in this declaration were by no means new in the Socialist International's history. SI declarations and resolutions since 1951 have been replete with expressions of concern for peace, complete disarmament, the underdeveloped countries and human rights.
If there was nothing really new in Brandt's "fresh start" for the SI on the basis of his three "offensives," his approach proved rejuvenating for the SI. it is to the credit of Brandt, SI Secretary General Bernt Carlsson of Sweden and several of the SI vice presidents that in the almost five years of Brandt's presidency the socialist International has not only been pulled out of its doldrums, but has attained a degree of cohesion and consistency of purpose which most party leaders in 1976 thought impossible to achieve.
Nobody in the SI would dispute the contention that there is still much room for improvement, both structurally and functional- ly, but the accomplishments have been notable. Bureau meetings have been reduced in frequency and are now devoted to specific topics on the basis of relatively well-prepared agenda, unlike the directionless discussion which formerly character *ized such meetings. Individual areis of responsibility have been assigned to several vice presidents: human rights to Francois Mitterrand (until his election as president of France), southern Africa to Olof Palme, the Middle East to Bruno Kreisky, who in the period 1974-76 had led several SI fact-finding missions to the Middle East and-.North Africa, and Latin America to Mario Soares of Portugal. Special conferences are held on problems of common concern to the member parties, such as unemployment. Attempts are made to plan activities one to two years in advance. The result of all this has been, if not less talk, at least more targeted talk and specifically targeted action, with the Socialist International's Eurocentralism a thing of the past.
There have been other results of the "fresh start" based on "Practical work" which give rise to serious questions. Does the SI still represent a social democratic bulwark against communism? Are the activities of the organization in the interest of western democracy and do they contribute to the defense of western value systems? Given the Soviet definition of detente a relationship between states to exclude the possibility of war but which "signi- fies neither the preservation of a social or political status quo nor the moderation of the ideological struggle and facilitates the development of the class struggle against imperialism inside individual countries as well as on a world scale" (Kommunist, September 1970) -- has the SI -accepted the Soviet challenge to the social democratic identity implicit in this definition? In "supplementing" the work of governments, has the SI under Brandt's presidency resisted or succumbed to Soviet attempts to reach an identity of interests and create "unity of action" with social democrats in the interest of peace, thus overcoming the breach between social democrats and communists which resulted from the creation of the Communist (Third) International in 1919?
An assessment of what the SI currently represents in the East-West conflict must be based on the answers to these and related questions, and the answers are best derived from an examination of SI principles, the results of the SI's three offensives, and a Soviet offensive'within Moscow's detente concept, which was initiated some years before the Brandt presidency.
PRINCIPLES
The 1951 Frankfurt declaration issued at the founding of the modern-day Socialist International emphasized the socialist aims regarding political, economic and international democracy. It rejected "uncontrolled" or "monopolistic" capitalism but, after noting that "communism has split the international labor movement," stated unequivocally that "international communism is the instru- ment of a new imperialism," and declared "Wherever it has achieved power it has destroyed freedom or the chance of gaining freedom." With regard to peace, the declaration stated: "Democratic social- ists recognize the maintenance of world peace as the supreme task in our time. Peace can be secured only by a system of collective sacurity. This will create the conditions for international disarmament."
The 1962 Oslo declaration of the Socialist International referred to the "evils of capitalism and communism alike," in the particular context of the problems of the emergent nations. Several passages referring to the Soviets are noteworthy because they stand in stark contrast to the'current SI attitude: "They [the Soviets] now claim to base their foreign policy on the principles of peaceful co-existence. In practice, however, this is only a change of tactics, and the struggle against the non- communist world is continued in a different form .... East-West rivalry has largely been imposed upon an unwilling world by the communist leaders. Although the communist countries claim to be peace-loving, the way in which they have used their military power has aggravated tension in the world." With respect to western defense and the value of deterrence, the declaration was strongly positive: "Democratic socialists ... reject the idea that democracies should disarm unilaterally. The power of defense in the event of attack must therefore be preserved as a deterrent to aggression." As for NATO, "The democratic socialist parties in the countries of the Alliance consider this is a powerful bulwark of peace and declare their firm determination to uphold it."
It was not long after the Oslo declaration that a change in the tone and content of the Socialist International's consideration of the possibilities of detente became noticeable. The change was inspired in large part by West Germany's SPD, which in the late fifties, supported by the British Labor Party, had first begun advancing the theme of detente in SI forums. New impetus was given to this theme in 1963 by Brandt, who in writings and speeches began to emphasize coexistence, and by Egon Bahr, the architect of the ostpolitik later implemented by the Brandt government, who in his famous speech in Tutzing, Germany, first used the theme, "change through rapprochement" (Wandel durch Annae- herung).
8 The joint efforts of the SPI) and the British Labor Party to move the Socialist International towards a policy of detente were buttressed by the Finnish Social Democratic Party, which strived to convince other parties to establish contacts with communist parties of the socialist countries in order to open a dialogue between the two main branches of the international labor movement social democracy and communism. Finnish efforts were, by and large, fruitless, as most other parties of the SI were aware of the "special Finnish situation." But the result of the efforts of all three parties was a series of debates in SI meetings with the aim of achieving a uniform concept of detente within the organization. By the time of the Eleventh Postwar Congress of the SI in Eastbourne in June 1969, the groundwork for a softening of the previously unqualified rejection of communism had.been laid. The Eastbourne resolution took note of the totalitarian philosophy of communism and recognized that popular-front overtures from communist parties are aimed at establishing communist hegemony. Then, instead of reaffirming SI's long-standing total rejection of collaboration with communism, it simply warned socialist parties which may collaborate with communists for electoral reasons or in order to form governing coalitions that communist attitudes remain unchanged. With regard to arms control and disarmament, the Eastbourne Congress demanded quick and effective measures., including bilateral negotiations between the United States and the-Soviet Union. The Oslo Declaration's recognition of the fact that the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence meant the continu- ation of "the struggle against the non-communist world in another form" -- the subversion of social democracy and the erosion of social democratic principles -- was omitted at Eastbourne, and the Oslo expression of the will to maintain a military deterrent in the West was replaced at Eastbourne by emphasis on disarmament issues and on human rights.
Two years later, in May 1971, the SI General Council meeting in Helsinki formally endorsed the Ostpolitik of the Brandt govern- ment by formulating its detente concept. Peace was to be made "more secure" by negotiations, without blurring ideological differences. 'How the SI, a non-governmental organization based primarily on ideological concepts, could contribute to a government policy vis-a-vis the East and at the same time face the challenge to Socialist International principles implicit in the Soviet definition of detente without blurring ideological differences was left unexplained.
During the period 1972-76, the SI took hesitant steps toward a new declaration of principles, but not until the era of the Brandt presidency was "action" taken. True to his word in Geneva in November 1976, Brandt concentrated the SI's efforts on the "practical work" of his three offensives with a notable consisten- cy of purpose. False to his word, however, he in fact neglected the "debate on programmatic fundamentals." In February 1978, the task of reformulating the principles of the organization was referred to a committee headed by Felipe Gonzales, Secretary General of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), and composed of Reiulf Steen, chairman of Ithe Norwegian Labor party, and Karel van Miert, chairman of the (Flemish) Socialist Party of Belgium.
If there was a-conscious or subconscious desire on the part of SI leaders to blur the differences between social democracy and communism, the composition of the Working Group on a New Declaration of Principles could scarcely have been more appropri- ate. On his way to Tokyo for an SI party leaders' conference in December 1977, Gonzales stopped in Moscow, where, after discussions with Mikhail Suslov of the CPSU Politburo and Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, he signed a joint communique with the Soviet party expressing agreement on international issues and calling for cooperation between the two parties. In August 1980, a delegation from the Executive Committee of Gonzales' party visited Moscow and, in another joint communique with the CPSU, noted "the coincidence in the positions of the PSOE and the CPSU on issues of the struggle for detente, disarmament, security, cooperation and the strengthen- ing of friendship between peoples.... 11 In July 1981, on the occasion of a visit to the PSOE by a delegation from the CPSU, Gonzales proclaimed "the further broadening of cooperation between the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the CPSU ... in the name of the struggle for peace." Gonzales' earlier formal agreement with the CPSU was not unknown to the SI leadership at the time he was appointed chairman of the working group.
Steen, who gave up the chairmanship of the Norwegian Labor Party in the spring of 1980 and who is distinctly in the left wing of his party, has for several years been maintaining contact with the CPSU to an extent which, ironically, has been disturbing even to Palme's Swedish Social Democratic Party, which itself has had "informal" contact with the CPSU for more than a decade. Steen played a central role earlier this year in forcing the Norwegian government to back down from the Norwdgian-American project of pre-positioning American military equipment in northern Norway. The government now allows the pre-positioning in central Norway only, to the dissatifaction of Norwegian and American military authorities.
Van Miert has distinguished himself as one of the foremost Belgian agitators against the NATO decision to modernize the Theater Nuclear Forces and has frequently and irrevocably commit- ted himself to ensuring that no American medium-range missiles will be deployed on Belgian soil. His contribution to Gonzales' group thus far has consisted of a document which stresses "the kind of economic growth socialism aspires to" and asserts that the 1951 Frankfurt Declaration is attributable to "the cold war and the fear of totalitarian Stalinist expansionism."
In his report on the work of his group to the SI Congress in Madrid in November 1980, almost three years after the appointment of his working group, Gonzales left little room for doubt that the group will proceed at.its snail's pace and that whatever recommendations it finally produces, possibly by the time of the next SI Congress scheduled for March 1983, will focus on interna- tional economic democracy. At no point in his report did he refer to the fundamental question of social democracy versus communism, nor did he treat the question of ideology other than by announcing that "with regard to ideological sources (of the SI), there is a certain reticence to identify with any particular historical-political point of view." This dismissal of fundamental tenets had been presaged by Secretary General Carlsson, when he told the SI Congress in Vancouver in November 1978, without the slightest contradiction by Brandt or any vice president of the organization, "We must tackle the problem of how to move forward from the traditional preoccupations about social democracy towards greater attention to the problems of achieving real economic democracy."
THE SOVIET OFFENSIVE
In 1959, the Central Committee of the CPSU addressed a special letter to the Sixth Postwar Congress of the Socialist International suggesting cooperation by "all detachments of the international workers movement" in "one common historical task:- to prevent a destructive new war and to rebuff the attempts at a reactionary offensive." The letter was coldly ignored by the SI. In an alarming contrast, in his report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981, Leonid Brezhnev noted the links established by the CPSU with the socialist and social democratic parties of Finland, Belgium, Sweden, Japan, Spain and a number of other countries. He said: "Of great importance have been the contacts with the leadership of the Socialist International, our participa- tion in the Socialist International's conference on disarmament, the contacts with the working group created by it on this problem, the reception of its delegations by the CPSU.11 Recognizing that "contemporary social democracy has considerable political weight," Brezhnev then urged it to "do more to defend the vital interests of the peoples and, primarily, to strengthen peace, [and] improve the international situation.... 11
This tribute to the Socialist International by Brezhnev, the first of its kind by a CPSU secretary general, was followed, after Brandt's ill-advised and ill-fated visit to Moscow, by another tribute which, coming from the CPSU, may be described as glowing. In an article entitled "Communists and Peace," which appeared in Pravda on July 23, 1981, Vadim V. Zagladin, first deputy chief of Uie CPSU International Department and one of the key CPSU officials in the Soviet thrust to achieve unity of action with West European socialist and social democratic parties for Soviet foreign policy purposes, wrote:
Today, however, the situation has also changed within the ranks of social democracy. Over the last decade the Socialist International and many parties belonging to it have made a definite swing in their policy and have begun to advocate ensuring world peace and ending the arms race.
It is important that the Socialist International, advocating peace, has removed several obstacles to contacts with communist parties. Thus CPSU representa- tives were invited at the time to the Socialist Interna- tional conference on disarmament. The recent meeting between L. I. Brezhnev and W. Brandt ... was of great political significance (emphasis added).
What happened during the decade to which Zagladin referred is of fundamental importance in understanding the present course of the Socialist International.
The CPSU has not concealed its intentions concerning socialist and social democratic parties; these intentions were announced on many occasions by CPSU luminaries with remarkable straightforward- ness and clarity, leaving no rooom for doubt as to how the Soviets planned to use detente for the intensification of the "ideological struggle." In a watershed speech in Tiflis on May 14, 1971, Brezhnev announced CPSU readiness "to develop cooperation with the social democrats, both in the struggle for peace and democracy and for socialism, without., of course, foregoing its ideology and revolutionary principles." The Brezhnev offer, combined with the fact that the CPSU had ceased referring to social democrats as "social fascists," produced a feeling tantamount to jubilation on the part of some officials in West European parties of the Social- ist International. They saw the dawn of a new era in relations between social democrats and communists in the atmosphere of detente.
In "Topical Problems in the Theory of the World Revolutionary Process," a 1971 article in the CPSU journal Kommunist, Ponomarev noted the importance of "strengthening of the left-wing currents within parties such as the British Labor Party, the German Social Democratic Party and the Swedish Social Democratic Party." He then expressed CPSU purposes in a nutshell:
The struggle against the social democratic ideology and policy remains a major task of the CPSU and the entire communist movement. The communists have always waged this struggle for the sake of unity within the workers' movement and not to divide it even further. Making unity of action the cornerstone of their policy, the communists have initiated ever new suggestions for cooperation.
Our party does not implement random international measures. It would be entirely justified to consider them as the expanded foreign political offensive for the sake of peace and the security of the peoples.
12 The offensive cited by Ponomarev was launched on several fronts. The CPSU courted individual SI parties, urging coope- ration. This was supplemented by similar efforts by the Italian Communist Party in European Community institutions. Meanwhile, some SI parties, notably the Dutch Labor Party, Belgian Socialist Party and Finnish Social Democratic Party began acting as if the cold war were a matter of the distant past and even the 1969 SI qualified rejection of cooperation with communism was no longer relevant.
Just how much views had changed was apparent in April 1972 at a special meeting of the SI Bureau in Amsterdam at which Dutch Labor Party representatives vigorously expre@sed the view that by collaborating with communists, social democrats can educate and change them. The Belgian, French, Finnish, and to some extent, the British representatives shared the Dutch views. The SPD, on the other hand, stoutly supported by the Austrian Socialist Party, defended the view that party-to-party collabora- tion with communists should be rejected in all its forms. The outcome of the debate was a general agreement on a position somewhere between these two views: each member party would make its own decision on relations with the communist party in its country, but collaboration or institutionalized contact with communist parties on the international level was to be avoided. The Amsterdam Bureau meeting marked the last serious attempt by the Socialist International to grapple with the fundamental, but increasingly divisive, issue of social democracy versus communism.
Although the Finnish and Swedish parties had maintained their dialogues with the CPSU for some years, the Finns much more intensively than the Swedes, it fell to the Belgian Socialist Party (PSB) to become the first in the SI to establish a formal cooperative relationship with the CPSU. In November 1972, a PSB delegation, led by the Flemish and Walloon co-presidents of the party, visited Moscow for discussions with the CPSU; their main interlocutor was none other than Boris Ponomarev. As a result of the talks, the PSB and the CPSU issued a joint communique, in which the PSB agreed with the CPSU that the two parties would develop their cooperation "in the interest of peace, international detente and the reinforcement of the friendship of the peoples of Belgium and the USSR." The two delegations reached the conclusion that "concerted actions could be envisaged in the interest of peace, democracy and social progress.,,
This agreement, a milestone in the CPSU effort to erode what remained of cohesion in the socialist International through bilateral agreements with member parties, has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the PSB. (In late 1978, the PSB split into two parties, the Flemish and the Walloon, but they are still counted in the SI as one.) The PSB became the first SI member to forge formal ties with CPSU probably because prominent PSB members Lucien Radoux and Victor Larock had participated in 1970-72 along with the Belgian Communist Party in the formation and activities of a new Soviet front organization, the Brussels-based Internation- al Committee for European Security and Cooperation. Undeterred by criticism of the agreement with the CPSU from some SI parties, the PSB subsequently concluded similar agreements with the Socialist Unity Party (SED) of East Germany, the Polish United Workers Party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, and the Bulgarian Communist Party.
The effect of the CPSU's cultivation of the PSB became evident, for example, when Flemish and Walloon socialist leaders announced their unqualified opposition to the modernization of the Theater Nuclear Forces, much to the distress of Henri Simonet, then the socialist Minister for Foreign Affairs. The occasion for this final decision by the Belgian socialist leaders was a forum on security and disarmament sponsored by the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation that was held in Belgium at the end of October 1979. The forum, proudly touted in Soviet propaganda, was attended by Ponomarev's first deputy, Zagladin. He called on the spirit of seven years of cooperation between the Belgian socialist leaders and the CPSU to manipulate his Belgian hosts on the TNF question. The CPSU achieved its second major breakthrough in the erosion of the SI and in setting the stage for multilateral cooperation with social democracy in April 1975, when a French Socialist Party delegation, led by Francois Mitterrand, visited Moscow for talks with the CPSU. After discussions of international affairs with Brezhnev, Suslov, Ponomarev and others, Mitterrand signed a joint communique in which the French Socialist Party "expressed its appreciation of the.USSR's constructive contribu- tion to the process of international detente" and in which the two parties noted "that the imperialists and reactionaries are still continuing their efforts to revive the spirit of the cold war." Of greater significance to the SI was the following passage: "The two delegations consider that the reinforcement of contacts between communist and socialist parties, irrespective of their ideological differences and their individual traditions, is of the highest importance for the international workers' movement as it would reinforce the movement's cohesion and solidarity and therefore, ultimately, its capacity for victory." In his remarks to the press about his Moscow visit, Mitterrand spoke of the "renaissance" in relations between his party and the CPSU.
Some others in the Socialist International did not share Mitterrand"s apparent delight in the "renaissance." Kreisky, for example, who throughout the 1970s consistently and firmly rejected international cooperation between social democrats and communists, was appalled by the extent of Mitterrand's opening to the CPSU. Equally disturbed were some influential members of the West German SPD, who saw in the Mitterrand-CPSU agreement, far more significant to the SI than the PSB-CPSU agreement had been, a major advance for the CPSU in undermining basic tenets of the SI. Soviet cultivation of individuals and groups in other Social- ist International parties in 1972-76 -- the SPD, the Dutch Labor Party, the British Labor Party, the Norwegian Labor Party -- did not lead to formal written agreements with these parties. It did allow Moscow to exert influence and stimulatecooperation with the CPSU and help undermine the SI's traditional rejection of cooperation with the communists. In the SPD, for example, the Young Socialists (Jusos), which includes all party members younger than age 35, in October 1973 concluded a formal agreement with the Committee of Youth organizations of the USSR, calling for cooperation in international youth policy, the exchange of informa- tion between the two organizations, partnerships on national, regional and district levels, exchange programs, mutual use of the media available to the two organizations and joint work towards the establishment of an all-European youth framework. With the assistance of the SPD Young Socialists and the Interna- tional Union of Socialist Youth of the SI, working hand in glove with the Budapest-based Soviet front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Soviets succeeded in 1980 in establishing the "Fram work for All-European Youth and Student Cooperation."
The 1973 SPD Young Socialist agreement with the Soviet organization violated SPD statutes .and rules, but the SPD lea@er- ship took no disciplinary action then or later when the agreement was revalidated. The reason was that Brandt believes in "integra- tion" rather than conflict. It may be this determination to avoid conflict that has allowed the Young Socialists to play very prominent roles in the so-called peace movements in West Germany. In part, this also may be caused by Brandt's obsession with disarmament.
Although the British Labor Party leaders refrained from emulating the agreements of the Belgian and French party leaders, members of the national executive committee of the British party agreed with the CPSU in 1976 that "despite serious ideological differences an extensive potential exists for the development of cooperation within the international workers movement." The current British Labor Party stance in favor of unilateral nuclear disarmament is one aspect of the realization of this "extensive potential."
The 1977 formal agreement for cooperation, later reaffirmed between the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the CPSU, was followed in 1979 by similar agreements between the CPSU and the Danish Social Democratic Party and Norwegian Labor Party. In October 1980, Olof Palme visited Moscow to "offer" West European social democracy and the Socialist International to Brezhnev as a partner in the search for a "secure peace." Palme's public comments on his return to Stockholm might have given innocents the impression that the CPSU had overlooked the possibility of developing a "partnership for peace" with social democrats!
By 1976, the network of relations developed by the CPSU with West European member parties of the SI had reached a stage which permitted Ponomarev to write, with justifiable pride, in another article in Kommunist: "Under the influence of the changes which have occurred in international life, a 'revision of values' was undertaken within the social democratic movement as well. A number of social democratic party leaders concluded that the time had come to abandon the trenches of the cold war and to adopt more independent and realistic positions." While Ponomarev dispensed compliments to several SI party leaders in his article, he castigated Kreisky: "Of late, Austrian Socialist Party Chairman Kreisky, one of the leaders of the Socialist International, has been evidencing his anti-communism more loudly than anyone else. This enabled parties such as, for example, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the French Socialist Party, the British Labor Party and the Finnish, Belgian and Swedish social democratic parties to make a certain contribution to the process of detente."
The thrust of Ponomarev's article consisted of a summons to socialists and social democrats to cooperate more closely with communists and thereby increase "the political potential of the international workers' movement...in the struggle against the threat of a new world war.... 11 The fact -that Ponomarev's article appeared only a few days before the opening of the Socialist International Congress in Geneva at which Brandt was elected president was certainly not accidental.
At this Congress, SI accepted Brandt's three "offensives" and his consignment of "programmatic fundamentals" to a blurry fate and moved towards the convergence of interests with the CPSU which elicited the 1981 Soviet tributes to the Social@ist Interna- tional cited earlier.
CONVERGENCE
Although the CPSU reacts with abhorrence at the very thought of convergence with social democracy -- this would connote a departure from or compromise of Marxist-Leninist principles -- no corresponding consideration appears to bother most SI leaders. Their "revision of values," as Ponomarev described it, concomitant with the execution of Brandt's three offensives, produced the present stage of convergence of SI and CPSU interests, albeit with different motivations. When Egon Bahr's "change through rapprochement" thesis became a topic of discussion in Socialist International circles, the question who would change was given depressingly little consideration.
The Offensive for a Secure Peace
At the conclusion of an SI party leaders conference in Vienna in February 1980, in which the Soviet invasion of Afghani- stan was the priority topic, Palme stated in an interview: "At the party leaders meeting everybody has spoken about disarmament. Ten years ago it would not have been possible."
As the SI pursued a "secure peace" in its meetings following the November 1976 Congress in Geneva, it quickly became evident that this phrase meant nothing less than disarmament, the SI's "first preoccupation." The crescendo of calls for disarmament in Bureau meetings and party leaders conferences in 1977 led in February 1978, during a Bureau meeting in Hamburg, to detailed consideration of a proposal to establish a special study group on disarmament. It was decided, however, to postpone this step until after the SI's special conference on disarmament that was to be held in Helsinki in April 1978.
The Helsinki conference and its aftermath have received too little attention from those who are puzzled as to what the SI represents today. Brandt, Palme, SI Secretary General Carlsson, Gonzales, van Miert, Dutch Labor Party leader Joop den Uyl, Sorsa and others never tire of referring to the Helsinki conference with the same pride which was so evident in Brandt's statement to the SI Congress in Madrid in November 1980, "We are, above all, the worldwide party of peace." In order to demonstrate balance in its concern with disarmament, the Socialist International invited the United States and the USSR to send representatives to address the conference. Demonstration of balance was only one consideration; another probably was the thought that represefita- tion from the two superpowers would constitute recognition that the SI, a non-governmental organization, was a significant force in the process of detente.
The United States sent Ambassador James Leonard, deputy representative at the U.N. The Soviets, never slow in recognizing an opportunity, sent Boris Ponomarev as head of a delegation which turned out to be the largest at the conference. Leonard's address to the conference revealed a notable, perhaps blissful, unawareness that he was addressing a gathering of socialists and social democrats whose combined efforts were having the effect, whatever their motivation, of moving the Socialist International toward serving the CPSU purpose: undermining the will of the West to maintain a credible military deterrent as a basis for negotiations with the Soviets. After describing Brandt's Ostpoli- tik as a "towering, monumental achievement on the international plane," he encouraged his audience to apply themselves to the struggle for peace: "What bothers me is a passivity, an apparent lack of ferment (sic], an apparent absence of novel ideas and approaches.... Disarmament is not a spectator sport .... There must be mobilization of political will."
Unwittingly, in his call for mobilization of political will with regard to disarmament, Ambassador Leonard eased the way for the accomplishment of Ponomarev's task. The latter's introduction to the conference as alternate member of the CPSU Politburo, a secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet conveniently omitted mention of another position that he held -- chief of the CPSU International Department, making him responsible, among other tasks, for the subversion of West European social democracy and the creation of unity of action between social democrats and the CPSU to serve Soviet foreign policy. purposes. Unlike Leonard, he was acutely aware of the composition of his audience and exploited it.
17 Noting that "both communists and social democrats possess enough influence to do very many things for the maintenance and consolidation of peace," Ponomarev stressed the "tremendous peace potential in uniting the efforts of communists and social democrats.11 After complimenting the Socialist International for speaking out for disarmament in its latest documents, he expressed the CPSU's appreciation for the "contacts established with a number of socialist and social democratic parties in the past few years," contacts which the CPSU "is seeking to strengthen." "Practical deeds are the real test of any, even the best, declara- tions," Ponomarev urged, and for this purpose he then baited the SI:
On the instructions of ... Brezhnev, allow me to invite to Moscow a representative delegation of the Socialist International and its President, Willy Brandt, to discuss to the fullest extent at summit level the problems of ending the arms race and subsequent disarmament it would be useful to examine the question of possible forms of developing and maintaining contacts on a permanent basis between communist and social democratic parties in order to exchange information and to coordinate joint actions on questions of disarmament.
In his summation speech at the end of the conference, Brandt stated, "The Socialist International will move on realistic ground, and it corresponds with our self-interpretation that the International will not be at the disposal of one-sided activities." Subsequent actions belied his words. The CPSU invitation had opened an important perspective which could not be av6ided in future SI deliberations. Ambassador Leonard's ill-advised address was a major contribution to those in the Socialist International who were seeking to rationalize their plans for a positive response to the CPSU. They had, after all, been criticized by the United States representative for being too passive and not innovative enough with respect to disarmament. It required no painful effort on the part of the Socialist International during its Bureau meeting in Dakar in May 1978 to establish a Study Group on Disarmament, headed by Kalevi Sorsa, chairman of the Finnish Social Democratic Party and then Finnish Prime Minister, who for more than a decade had pleaded in SI meetings for greater international cooperation between communists and social democrats. Of the seven West European member parties represented in the Study Group, six had already developed varying degrees of relations with the CPSU.
Those in the SI who denied that the Study Group was being established in response to Ponomarev's invitation were less than candid. During the Dakar Bureau meeting, the group was especially charged with studying proposals made by Ponomarev during the Socialist International Conference on Disarmament. It is true that the SI had contemplated the establishment of such a group prior to the Helsinki conference, but it is equally true that the decision in Dakar was in direct response to the CPSU offers.
After receiving submissions from several Socialist Interna- tional member parties, the Sorsa Group undertook a number of high-level discussions, in which, of course, balance had to be demonstrated. Accordingly, the group visited Washington in May 1979, where it was received by President Carter, who praised its work and encouraged it to proceed to Moscow to explore possibili- ties of general disarmament. This encouragement at the highest level of the U.S. government has been cited frequently since by members of the group, especially Secretary General Carlsson, as partial justification for the behavior of the group in its subse- quent visit to Moscow.
The October 1-4, 1979 visit of the Sorsa Group to Moscow marked the first instance of a direct Socialist International dialogue with the CPSU in the 28-year history of the organization. Pravda did not exaggerate when it commented on November 5, 1979, "The recent visit to the USSR by a Socialist International working group on disarmament and the working group's talks with Comrade L. I. Brezhnev were of great significance... in the struggle for peace and disarmament." After talks with Brezhnev, Ponomarev and other CPSU luminaries, the Sorsa Group issued a joint press release emphasizing the importance of disarmament. However, it was Carlsson who signalled the end of the SI's rejection of collabo- ration with communism, and with the CPSU in particular. Challenged during a press conference in Moscow, he stated that despite "past differences" between social democrats and communists "we must jump over our shadows" in a matter so important as peace. During the SI Bureau meeting in Lisbon at the end of October 1979, there was no criticism of this statement; on the contrary, appreciation was expressed for the work of the Sorsa Group.
The.product of the Sorsa Group's work, its "final report," was adopted unanimously at Madrid during the Socialist Interna- tional's Fifteenth Postwar Congress in November 1980. Brandt, who considered the adoption of the report as the greatest success of the Congress, has since consistently urged SI parties to implement the action program contained in the report, which, incidentally, went virtually unnoticed in western press reports on the Congress. The action program, entitled "The Role of the SI and its Member Parties," embrace:p a variety of activities:
The SI Bureau and party leaders conferences should keep disarmament on their agenda as one of the main items. The SI Bureau will on a continuous basis follow up and enhance the implementation of the recommendations of the Study Group and other decisions of the SI as well as all work for disarmament done by the member parties.
The socialist and social democratic parties will fight against militarism ... and revived tendencies to rely on military potential in pursuit of national interests and goals in international relations.
The military sector of societies must be as a whole subjected to democratic control.
The socialist and social democratic parties work for increased openness in military affairs. One instrument for this end is the publication of a government white paper on defense planning and expenditure.
Member parties should establish their own bodies on disarmament policies. These bodies could, for example, plan and program information, training and educational activities both at party and national levels, and make initiatives for international action.
Member parties should cooperate with appropriate organizations such as the trade unions and fraternal organizations especially in the fields of training and education as well as mobilization of public opinion.
In commenting to the SI Congress in Madrid on the Sorsa report and its action program, Carlsson noted that the report has a special importance "for developing and strengthening the role of the Socialist International as an international force." It could scarcely have escaped the attention of SI leaders that strengthening the role of the SI through implementation of its action program on disarmament, in which "mobilization of public opinion" is the core purpose, would have no effect whatsoever on policymakers in the Warsaw Fact countries, but would greatly affect developments in the western democracies, where public opinion is influential. one might justifiably conclude that in adopting this program, it was the intention of the SI leaders to enhance the disarmament atmosphere in the West, to the detriment of western defense and deterrence and to the advantage of the Soviet "peace and disarmament" campaign in western Europe.
The Sorsa Report remains to this day the cornerstone of the SI international role. "Defense" and "deterrence" have been totally dropped from the vocabulary of SI meetings. Even after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the SI party leaders conference in Vienna in February 1980, while condemning the invasion, urged that "in the interest of peace and in order to safeguard detente" member parties should use "all opportunities for bilateral and multinational dialogue" and "all their possibilities of contacts in order to promote a policy for the continuation of detente." In brief, far from envisaging suspension of contact with the CPSU -- a step which might have made some impression on the CPSU leadership -- the Vienna conference participants deliberately encouraged such contact and emphasized disarmamen't, as Olof Palme noted after the conference. The encouragement of contact with the CPSU was reaffirmed in April 1981 during the SI party leaders conference in Amsterdam and again in mid-July 1981 during the meeting of the SI presidium in Bonn.
20 The so-called "Scandilux" effort which was initiated in January 1981 originally consisted of Norwegian, Danish and Benelux parties. Since joined by the SPD in the person of Egon Bahr and by the British Labor Party, it is an outgrowth of the action program in the Sorsa report and has the long-range purpose, unstated to the press, of influencing the Italian socialist Party and the Italian Social Democratic Party to withdraw their support from the Italian commitment to accept American Euromissiles, in effect negating the December 1979 NATO decision. The initiative for the "Scandilux" effort came from Dutch Labor Party leader Joop den Uyl, an effective spokesman for unilateral nuclear disarmament in NATO. The rapporteur of the group is Flemish Socialist leader Karel van Miert.
Olof Palme's currently very active Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, although it includes non-SI personalities such as' Cyrus Vance, David Owen and Leslie Gelb, is another offshoot of the SI's disarmam nt program and, because of the participation of Georgi Arbatov and one of his deputies, presents the CPSU with another forum for advancing its disarmament (of the West) campaign.
As noted, both the Sorsa group and Palme's commission have been praised on several occasions by the CPSU. In the letters sent by the CPSU Central Committee in May and June 1981 to West European SI party leaders, there was a laudatory reference to the work of the Sorsa group and a clear expression of interest in continuing cooperation with the group. In accordance with Soviet desires, which were also conveyed to Brandt during his early July 1981 visit to Moscow, the SI presidium decided during its meeting in Bonn on July 15-16, 1981 to reactivate the group, known since the November 1980 Congress as the Advisory Group on Arms Control and Disarmament. Still headed by Sorsa and with essentially the same composition, this group plans to visit Washington in late 1981 for talks at the highest level of the U.S. government, hoping to reap the same respectability and importance conferred upon it by Jimmy Carter. The ultimate goal of the group, of course, is to continue the partnership for peace with the CPSU. Recognizing that his standing in Washington may have suffered because of his performance in Moscow in early July, Brandt apparently decided in August that instead of signing the letter requesting the desired appointments for Sorsals group, Sorsa himself would sign it.
The present understandable concern of the U.S. government about the role of the Socialist International in Central America should not blur the fact that disarmament has been and remains the SI's "first preoccupation." As Brandt, Palme and other SI leaders have repeatedly confirmed on a variety of occasions, disarmament is the basis for solutions to the problems of the Third World and is a sine cTua non for the full realization of human rights. As important as front organizations and their subsidiaries are as part of the CPSU offensive to undermine the western will to maintain military deterrence, the SI's member parties thrust on disarmament willbe far more significant and, in the long-term, far more effective. The announcement of Brandt's first offensive in 1976 has since become the basis for the Soviet- desired and Soviet-achieved "unity of action." His other two offensives may be treated more briefly.
offensive for New Relations between North and South
The impression that Brandt's Independent Commission on International Development Issues, which completed its report in January 1980, was an offshoot of the SI, is erroneous. Even though Palme and Carlsson have pointed with pride to the work of the commission, the commission was actually conceived by Robert McNamara, and Brandt was initially reluctant to head the panel.
In expanding the Socialist International's own activity in the Third World, Brandt, supported above all by Palme, has empha- sized that there is linkage between disarmament and the solutions of the problems of hunger and poverty in the lesser.developed countries. He believes that if less money is spent on arms by the industrialized countries, more will be available for aid to the Third World countries. This, however, is not the only thought that has guided the actions of the SI and many of its West European member parties. The pursuit of a so-called new international economic order has been mentioned frequently in SI documents and in speeches by SI leaders, but, because of the SI's historical rejection of colonialism, support for national liberation movements in their "anti-imperialist" struggles has in and of itself been the underlying motivation, as both Palme and Carlsson have contin- uously stressed.
First off 'the mark in implementing Brandt's second offensive was the ubiquitous Palme, who, assisted by Kjeld Olesen of the Danish party, led an SI mission to southern Africa in September 1977. one month later, the SI Bureau adopted the nine-point program of action recommended by the mission. In addition to calling for a halt to all arms exports to South Africa, the prohibition of new investments in South Africa and Namibia, "intensification of solidarity work for the liberation of southern Africa," and increased support to the front line states, the program urged "political support to the liberation movements (ANC of South Africa, Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and SWAPO of Namibia), humanitarian aid and material support for peaceful purposes." The Swedish Social Democratic Party, assisted by its allied' Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), has set the pace among Socialist Internationalist parties in supplying funds to the ANC (African National Congress) and the SWAPO (South-West African People's organization), as it did earlier to the ZAPU and ZANU in Zimbabwe.
It is the current policy of the SI to support ANC and SWAPO, and its representatives are invited to SI Bureau and Congress meetings as observers almost as a matter of routine. The SI attitude was directly reflected in a statement by Secretary General Carlsson to the November 1980 Madrid Congress: "The victory of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe ... heralds a new era for the liberation struggles" in Southern Africa.
The lack of balance in the SI approach to Africa is indica- ted by the fact-that, despite its many statements and resolutions with specific references to African countries, the organization has never condemned the Soviet-Cuban-East German military inter- vent73r-ons. During the Bureau meeting in Lisbon in October 1979, Carl Gershman of the Social Democrats USA was unable to temper a resolution in which the SI again proclaimed "solidarity" with the ANC, SWAPO and the Patriotic Front and condemned "acts of aggres- sion" against Zambia, Mozambique and Angola by Rhodesian and South African troops. Also rejected were Gershman's efforts to balance the resolution by mentioning the presence of Cuban and Warsaw Pact troops in Africa, especially in Angola. The SI was then and remains committed to the support of "liberation movements" in Africa.
In accordance with Brandt's 1975 concept of a closer relation- ship between the SI and Central American parties "which come very close to what we call democratic socialism," the SI's second offensive has been focused and predictably will remain so on that area, although not to the exclusion of South America. The commit- ment of the SI was established beyond doubt when, during the SI party leaders conference in Amsterdam at the end of April 1981, Brandt expressed his conviction that "the events in El Salvador would have far-reaching consequences for large parts of the Third World and could prove to be a criterion for the SI as far as the effectiveness of its actions was concerned." In tone and content the Socialist International's approach to this area has been conditioned in large part by the reports and analyses of the SPD-allied Friedrich Ebert Foundation, which for many years has maintained an office in Costa Rica and which has supplied the Sandinistas.
