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Nullifying DEI at DOD

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

The Congressional Review Act creates a fast-track procedure that Congress can use to nullify an agency rule that it believes is unlawful or unwise.

President Trump can submit to Congress a Biden Administration "rule" creating a DEI policy, and Congress can review and rescind that rule under the CRA.

Using executive orders to revoke rules can be done in the Oval Office, but using the CRA is a wiser, more permanent use of the fleeting power that the act provides.

Introduction

One of President Donald Trump's earliest executive orders prohibited the use of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) preferences in federal government contracting and also instructed the federal government to identify and root out all uses of such factors in the private sector to the maximum extent possible.[1] By issuing that order, Trump did an about-face from the policies of the Biden Administration, which treated such considerations as legitimate uses of race and other features to benefit favored constituencies.[2] But what one President kills off in an executive order a successor can resurrect in the same manner. The possibility exists, therefore, that Trump's DEI executive order won't have much of a half-life if a Democrat occupies the White House after the 2028 election.

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Yet there is a way that Trump can increase the durability of his DEI executive order: He can submit to Congress a "rule" adopted by an agency during the Biden Administration creating a DEI policy, and Congress can review and rescind that rule under the Congressional Review Act (CRA).[3] The CRA can have a powerful effect on federal governance because it fast-tracks congressional review of a new agency rule. Trump should be familiar with the CRA because he used it with alacrity during his first Administration—more frequently than all of his predecessors put together.[4] Given his earlier success with the CRA and his continued belief that the nation is overregulated, there is no reason to believe that he will be reluctant to use the CRA again. This *Legal Memorandum* explains how he can use it.

The Provenance and Operation of the Congressional Review Act

The CRA is a little-known but powerful act of Congress that can be used to nullify agency rules. Adopted during the Clinton Administration as Title II of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,[5] the CRA creates a fast-track procedure that Congress can use to nullify an agency rule that it believes is unlawful or unwise. The CRA was Congress's attempt to come as close to a "legislative veto" as is constitutionally possible under the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States in *INS v. Chadha* that a legislative veto violates Article I of the Constitution.[6]

The CRA is most often used at the outset of a new Administration headed by a different party that shares power with a House of Representatives and Senate in the hands of the same political party. Otherwise, there is little likelihood that anyone will invoke the statute. Remember: The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reviews agency rules before they are published in the *Federal Register* to ensure that (among other things) they are consistent with the Administration's policies. That pre-issuance review enables the OMB Director to decide whether a rule advances the President's policies, to allow the rule to go forward if it does, or to scuttle the rule if it does not. If Congress were to pass a resolution of disapproval of a rule approved by OMB, the President would likely veto the resolution because OMB had previously determined that the rule advances policies that he approves. Party loyalty being what it is, Congress is unlikely to review a rule if it was approved by an OMB Director appointed by the same party that holds a majority on Capitol Hill.

The CRA works as follows: It requires every agency to submit every new rule to the Comptroller General, the House of Representatives, and

the Senate so that Congress has the opportunity, with the advice of the Comptroller General, to review the rule before it can take effect. Second, it creates a so-called fast-track process enabling Congress to vote up or down on a joint resolution of disapproval of every new rule without the delay occasioned by Senate practices, particularly the filibuster. A joint resolution passed by each chamber then goes to the President for his signature or veto. If the President signs it (or it is repassed by a two-thirds vote of each chamber following the President's veto), the statute nullifies the rule and bars an agency from later adopting any "substantially similar" rule absent the passage of a new act of Congress.[7]

The reason why the CRA is a valuable tool for overseeing the regulatory state is that we have left behind the standard civics description of how the federal government works. That theory teaches that Congress makes the laws, the executive branch executes them, and the judicial branch adjudicates disputes between the government and private parties. In fact, the agencies that occupy the so-called fourth branch of government—sometimes called (and not with approval) the "Deep State"—accomplish all three functions. It is responsible for promulgating more pages of regulations each year than Congress adds to the statutes at large in the same period.[8] Agencies also execute most federal programs—the White House may be able to overrule what agencies do, but the federal bureaucracy clearly has what economists call the "first mover advantage"—and agencies also can referee disputes that arise between the federal government and the public. By giving Congress the opportunity to review and rescind an agency rule before it goes into effect, the CRA supplies Congress with the opportunity to save the public the burden and expense of needing to defend itself against a rule that exceeds an agency's authority or is an improvident exercise of federal power.

The three most important aspects of the CRA are these: (1) the meaning of the term "rule," (2) the actions taken by Congress once the act is triggered by the filing of a rule, and (3) the effect of Congress's decision to rescind a rule by passing a joint resolution of approval that the President signs into law.

The Meaning of the Term "Rule." The CRA uses the definition of the term "rule" found in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),[9] which provides that a "rule" is "the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."[10] There is no one format a rule can take, so numerous types of documents qualify as CRA rules. Among them are regulations, guidance documents, manuals, opinions, letters, etc. What matters is

not the format of an agency document, but its content. To be sure, not every agency document or position constitutes a CRA "rule." Nonetheless, numerous parties—including the federal courts, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service, and various scholars—have concluded that the term "rule" should be interpreted broadly to ensure that Congress can review "any generally applicable implementation, interpretation, or prescription of law or policy by unelected agency officials before they can direct others with respect to what federal law prohibits, requires, or allows."[11]

The Operation of the CRA in Congress. The text of the CRA clearly provides that, before an agency "rule" can go "into effect," the agency must submit it to both the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the GAO, to allow the GAO to review the rule and each chamber to review and vote on a bill to rescind it.[12] An unsubmitted rule is not yet effective and should not be used by an agency to require private parties to perform or refrain from performing any otherwise lawful conduct or to threaten an enforcement action if someone disagrees with the agency's position.[13]

Once the agency submits the rule, three clocks start running.[14] The first one gives the GAO 15 days to review the rule and analyze it for Congress. The second clock gives members 60 days (except in cases of adjournment) to submit a joint resolution of disapproval. And the third clock, which defines the effective date of the rule, states that no rule may take effect for 30 days past its submission.[15]

After a rule is submitted, any Member of Congress can introduce a joint resolution of disapproval. That resolution is set for a vote pursuant to a "fast-track" procedure that avoids parliamentary delays, including (particularly) a committee delay or a Senate filibuster.[16] If both chambers pass the resolution, it goes to the President for his signature or veto in the same manner as any other "Bill" passed by Congress.[17] If the President signs the resolution, it becomes a "Law" for Article I purposes.[18]

As noted above, an agency's failure to submit a rule to Congress, even if the rule is published in the *Federal Register*, means that the rule has no effect, and the congressional review clock never begins to run for an unsubmitted rule. A consequence, therefore, is that any rule promulgated after the 1996 effective date of the CRA (even one issued years ago) that was *never* submitted to Congress can still be reviewed and rescinded by Congress even *today*. That has already happened. In 2018, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, a joint resolution disapproving a guidance document[19] adopted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2013.[20] Some commentators have estimated that agencies have failed to

submit to Congress thousands of rules. Any unsubmitted rule is therefore a potential subject of a CRA nullification, regardless of how long ago the rule was issued.

The Effect of a Congressional Rescission of an Agency Rule. The immediate effect of a disapproval resolution is that the rule is rescinded, but that is not the resolution's only effect. To avoid an agency playing games by reissuing a disapproved rule with only a slightly revised content or cosmetic changes, the CRA provides that an agency may not readopt a rescinded rule or a "substantially similar" one unless, in the interim, Congress has passed new legislation authorizing that rule.[21] Put differently, the disapproval effectively adds a codicil to the underlying statute providing that "Statute A does not authorize the agency to issue Rule X or X_1." By prohibiting an agency from adopting a new rule that is "substantially similar" to the now-invalidated rule, Congress has created a buffer zone around the original rule, a buffer that could also include Rule X_2, X_3, X_4, and so forth, depending on the scope of the original rule. Congress certainly was brooking no gamesmanship.

How to Use the CRA to Eliminate DEI

Trump has rightly made DEI a target for elimination. Its three innocuous-sounding words—diversity, equity, and inclusion—hide a toxic ideology that divides Americans based on their skin color and sexuality and explicitly holds that the government should treat some people better and others worse on those bases.[22] The most prominent advocate of this ideology, for example, says that "[t]he only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination. The only remedy to present discrimination is future discrimination."[23] Under DEI's auspices, schools have discriminated on the basis of race in admissions and have segregated dorms and graduation ceremonies, private employers have set racial quotas and admitted to giving race-based and sexuality-based hiring preferences, white and Asian employees have been forced to sit through trainings in which they are accused of being "white supremacists" or "assimilationists," and state and federal governments have doled out benefits on the basis of various identity labels.[24] The result has not been harmony, as DEI's advocates promise, but division, tension, and tribalism.[25] It ought to be eliminated for good.

The question is: How should the Trump Administration use the CRA to do so quickly without running into a Senate filibuster? One step is to direct each agency, perhaps through its general counsel's or regulatory office, to identify every potential rule issued since 1996 that had the effect of adopting

DEI policies for the Biden Administration (or earlier ones). The second step is to determine whether those memoranda, documents, or the like were submitted to Congress as the CRA requires. If they were, the time for CRA review has elapsed, and the statute cannot now be used to rescind the rule. If that period has not elapsed, the Trump Administration can rescind the rule itself, even if the agency must complete the notice-and-comment process that the APA requires, which can be a time-consuming matter.[26] But if the rule was never submitted to Congress, the CRA remains an available option, as noted above.

A problem remains, however, although it is more a matter of archaeology than law: namely, finding the rules that should be rescinded under the CRA. Agencies issue thousands of documents that could be reviewed by Congress, and not all such documents are in fact submitted. But agencies do not file such memoranda under "Rules that I Should Submit to Congress But Won't or Didn't," so it might take some digging to find them. That could be a time-consuming endeavor, and one month into the new Trump Administration, half of the potential 60-day CRA review period has elapsed. The research needs to be done not only thoroughly, but also quickly. Accordingly, the President should direct his Cabinet officers to require their subordinates to find whatever rules each agency issued that required or authorized DEI policies to be used in hiring, in contracting, or in any other way.

The Department of Defense (DOD) might be a good example of an agency that can and should serve as a model. DOD likely has memoranda from the Biden Administration addressing the use of DEI in government decision-making, because the military issues written orders or memoranda directing subordinates how to manage their responsibilities. Besides, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has made it clear that our military should focus on the defense of the nation, not social politics, and has sworn to eliminate DEI from the military's business and lexicon.[27] He would likely be willing to order someone to do the necessary digging to find the documents that could be submitted now for review by Congress and recission under the CRA. Other agencies should do the same. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency should ferret out its environmental justice memoranda and submit them to Congress for review and recission.

The CRA can be invoked today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow for any agency rules that were never submitted to Congress as the CRA demands. But any rule that was already submitted is on a clock that has already expired or that will expire over the next month. Accordingly, the President should act quickly to have the necessary research accomplished.

Conclusion

The CRA offers the Trump Administration an opportunity to work with Congress to permanently rescind prior Administrations' DEI rules by combining to pass and sign into law a joint resolution disapproving whatever rules an earlier Administration had issued that required or authorized DEI practices by the federal government, parties that contract with the federal government, or private parties in general. Trump used the CRA frequently during his first term in office. He can make even greater use of it now if he directs his Cabinet officials to find whatever rules their predecessors (or other agency officials) issued in this regard. But time is fast running out. It might feel powerful to use executive orders to revoke rules that one disagrees with because it can be done quickly and in front of cameras in the Oval Office, but using the CRA to achieve that result is a wiser, more permanent use of the fleeting power that the act provides.

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Appendix

Executive Order 14151 of January 20, 2025, Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:

Section 1. *Purpose and Policy.* The Biden Administration forced illegal and immoral discrimination programs, going by the name "diversity, equity, and inclusion" (DEI), into virtually all aspects of the Federal Government, in areas ranging from airline safety to the military. This was a concerted effort stemming from President Biden's first day in office, when he issued Executive Order 13985, "Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government."

Pursuant to Executive Order 13985 and follow-on orders, nearly every Federal agency and entity submitted "Equity Action Plans" to detail the ways that they have furthered DEI's infiltration of the Federal Government. The public release of these plans demonstrated immense public waste and shameful discrimination. That ends today. Americans deserve a government committed to serving every person with equal dignity and respect, and to expending precious taxpayer resources only on making America great.

Sec. 2. *Implementation.* (a) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), assisted by the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), shall coordinate the termination of all discriminatory programs, including illegal DEI and "diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility" (DEIA) mandates, policies, programs, preferences, and activities in the Federal Government, under whatever name they appear. To carry out this directive, the Director of OPM, with the assistance of the Attorney General as requested, shall review and revise, as appropriate, all existing Federal employment practices, union contracts, and training policies or programs to comply with this order. Federal employment practices, including Federal employee performance reviews, shall reward individual initiative, skills, performance, and hard work and shall not under any circumstances consider DEI or DEIA factors, goals, policies, mandates, or requirements.

(b) Each agency, department, or commission head, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of OMB, and the Director of OPM, as appropriate, shall take the following actions within sixty days of this order:

(i) terminate, to the maximum extent allowed by law, all DEI, DEIA, and "environmental justice" offices and positions (including but not limited to "Chief Diversity Officer" positions); all "equity action plans," "equity" actions, initiatives, or programs, "equity-related" grants or contracts; and

all DEI or DEIA performance requirements for employees, contractors, or grantees.

(ii) provide the Director of the OMB with a list of all:

(A) agency or department DEI, DEIA, or "environmental justice" positions, committees, programs, services, activities, budgets, and expenditures in existence on November 4, 2024, and an assessment of whether these positions, committees, programs, services, activities, budgets, and expenditures have been misleadingly relabeled in an attempt to preserve their pre-November 4, 2024 function;

(B) Federal contractors who have provided DEI training or DEI training materials to agency or department employees; and

(C) Federal grantees who received Federal funding to provide or advance DEI, DEIA, or "environmental justice" programs, services, or activities since January 20, 2021.

(iii) direct the deputy agency or department head to:

(A) assess the operational impact (e.g., the number of new DEI hires) and cost of the prior administration's DEI, DEIA, and "environmental justice" programs and policies; and

(B) recommend actions, such as Congressional notifications under 28 U.S.C. 530D, to align agency or department programs, activities, policies, regulations, guidance, employment practices, enforcement activities, contracts (including set-asides), grants, consent orders, and litigating positions with the policy of equal dignity and respect identified in section 1 of this order. The agency or department head and the Director of OMB shall jointly ensure that the deputy agency or department head has the authority and resources needed to carry out this directive.

(c) To inform and advise the President, so that he may formulate appropriate and effective civil-rights policies for the Executive Branch, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy shall convene a monthly meeting attended by the Director of OMB, the Director of OPM, and each deputy agency or department head to:

(i) hear reports on the prevalence and the economic and social costs of DEI, DEIA, and "environmental justice" in agency or department programs, activities, policies, regulations, guidance, employment practices, enforcement activities, contracts (including set-asides), grants, consent orders, and litigating positions;

(ii) discuss any barriers to measures to comply with this order; and

(iii) monitor and track agency and department progress and identify potential areas for additional Presidential or legislative action to advance the policy of equal dignity and respect.

Sec. 3. *Severability.* If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected.

Sec. 4. *General Provisions.* (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Endnotes

1. Exec. Order No. 14151, 90 Fed. Reg. 8339 (Jan. 20, 2025). For the text of the executive order, see the Appendix, *infra*.
2. *See*, *e.g.*, Exec. Order No. 13985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021) ("Our Nation deserves an ambitious whole-of-government equity agenda…."); Exec. Order No. 13990, 86 Fed. Reg. 7037 (Jan. 20, 2021) (ordering numerous agencies to focus on "environmental justice, and intergenerational equity"); Presidential Memo. of Jan. 27, 2021, 86 Fed. Reg. 8845 (Jan. 27, 2021) (directing the newly created Task Force on Scientific Integrity to push "diversity, equity, and inclusion practices" onto the scientific and engineering workforce); Presidential Proclamation on Black History Month, 2021, 86 Fed. Reg. 8539 (Feb. 3, 2021) (accusing Americans of having "never fully lived up to the founding principles of this Nation" because of the "deep racial inequities and the systemic racism that continue to plague our Nation"); Kyle Morris, *Biden Administration Guidance Prioritizes Race in Administering COVID Drugs*, Fox News, Jan. 8, 2022, https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-administration-guidance-prioritizes-race-administering-covid-drugs (summarizing Biden Administration guidance that urged health care providers to prioritize certain racial groups over others for receiving COVID-19 treatments).
3. For a discussion of the provenance, workings, and effect of the CRA, see Paul J. Larkin, *The Return of the Congressional Review Act*, Heritage Found., Legal Memorandum No. 367 (2024) [hereafter Larkin, *Return of the CRA*]; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., *The Congressional Review Act and Judicial Review*, Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. Inter Alia (July 2, 2021); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., *The Trump Administration and the Congressional Review Act*, 16 Geo. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 505 (2018) [hereafter Larkin, *Trump and the CRA*]; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., *Reawakening the Congressional Review Act*, 41 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 187 (2018) [hereafter Larkin, *Reawakening the CRA*].
4. President Trump signed 16 CRA joint resolutions of disapproval to rescind agency rules adopted during the Obama Administration. Larkin, *Return of the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 3.
5. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 871 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–08 (West 2025)).
6. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
7. Larkin, *Return of the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 4.
8. "Near the close of the New Deal in 1938, the Code of Federal Regulations, the compendium of agency rules, contained 18,000 pages. In 1975, it consisted of 71,224 pages spread over 133 volumes. Today, it is more than 175,000 pages long in 236 volumes, approximately double what it was 45 years ago. If those regulations were laid end to end, they would constitute a 30-mile stretch of federal law. It would take someone who read them as he walked (and did nothing else) more than three years to finish (unless he mercifully committed seppuku somewhere along the way)." Paul J. Larkin, Jr. & GianCarlo Canaparo, *Gunfight at the New Deal Corral*, 19 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 477, 488 (2021) (footnotes omitted).
9. "The [APA] divides agency action into two broad categories, rulemaking and adjudication. Rulemaking is agency process for formulating a 'rule,' 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), which is 'an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy,' id. § 551(4). Adjudication is agency process for formulating an 'order,' id. § 551(7), which is a 'final disposition' in a 'matter other than rule making but including licensing[.]'" Larkin, *Return of the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 11 n.29 (citations omitted).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 801 (West 2025) (incorporating the APA definition of a "rule" at 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (West 2025) ("'[R]ule' means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing….").
11. Larkin, *Return of the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 5 (collecting authorities; footnotes omitted).
12. *Id*. at 6. "The text…provides as follows: 'Before a rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating such rule shall submit to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General a report containing' the following elements: '(i) a copy of the rule; (ii) a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule; and (iii) the proposed effective date of the rule.' In addition, the CRA provides that the congressional review period 'does not commence until "the later of the date on which" the Federal Register publishes the rule or on which "Congress receives the report" required by the Act.' The text of the CRA thus clearly states that the 60-day period for Congress to consider a rule does not commence unless and until an agency submits its report." *Id*. (footnotes omitted).
13. *See* Larkin, *Reawakening the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 205–06, 214–17.
14. Larkin, *Reawakening the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 199–201.
15. "As one scholar has noted, 'There is nothing particularly mysterious or complicated about this mandate' because '[t]he very first sentence' of the CRA 'states that, "Before a rule can take effect, the Federal agency promulgating"' the rule "*shall* submit to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General" a report containing certain specified items. In short, an unsubmitted rule is not yet 'in effect.' Why? Because Congress wanted to ensure that an agency could not deny Congress its ability to nullify a rule by refusing to submit the rule to Congress. The contrary interpretation would nonsensically reward an agency for thumbing its nose at the CRA and Congress." *Id*. at 6 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
16. *Id*. at 6–7 & 15 n.56 ("'Like all fast-track legislative procedures, the CRA is designed to ensure that political minorities are not able to use congressional procedure to hijack policy.' Note, [*The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act*, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2162,] 2176–77 [(2009)]." That includes provisions to prevent a Senate filibuster. 5 U.S.C. § 802(c)(e); Note, *supra*, at 2167–68.

17. *Id*. at 6–7 & 15 n.56.
18. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
19. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Bulletin 2013-02 (Mar. 21, 2013).
20. *See* Larkin, *Trump Administration and the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 510–12 & nn.22–30.
21. Larkin, *Return of the CRA*, *supra* note 3, at 7.
22. *See*, *e.g.*, GianCarlo Canaparo, *The Intellectual Failings of Antiracism*, Heritage Found. Legal Memo. No. 347 (Dec. 8, 2023), https://www.heritage.org/progressivism/report/the-intellectual-failings-antiracism (summarizing this ideology and considering whether its claims stand up to empirical scrutiny).
23. Ibram X. Kendi, How to Be an Antiracist 19 (2019).
24. *See* GianCarlo Canaparo, *Permissions to Hate: Antiracism and Plessy*, 27 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 97 (2022) (collecting myriad examples).
25. *See*, *e.g.*, Nicholas Confessore, *The University of Michigan Doubled Down on D.E.I. What Went Wrong?*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/16/magazine/dei-university-michigan.html (chronicling the many failures of DEI at the University of Michigan).
26. *See* Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (ruling that the rescission or modification of an agency regulation is subject to the same standard of APA review as the original promulgation of the rule).
27. *See*, *e.g.*, Stepheny Price, *Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Says "No More DEI at Department of Defense": "No Exceptions,"* Fox News, Jan. 26, 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vows to shutter DEI at DOD | Fox News ("The Department of Defense (DoD) is the latest agency that is disbanding all diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs following President Donald Trump's executive order terminating all federal DEI programs. [¶] 'The President's guidance (lawful orders) is clear: No more DEI at Dept. of Defense,' Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth wrote in a post on X. [¶] In a handwritten note shared along with the post on X, Hegseth wrote: 'The Pentagon will comply, immediately. No exceptions, name-changes, or delays.'").