• The Issue
• Power Phrases

The African continent is rapidly growing in strategic importance. Its ongoing demographic boom is producing an immense working-age population and potential consumer class. Richly endowed with natural resources, including arable land, important mineral commodities, and abundant fishing stocks, a number of its economies are among the fastest growing in the world. It has a commanding position on maritime chokepoints and abuts two continents, and its countries comprise the world’s largest voting bloc in the United Nations, giving them significant diplomatic influence. Many countries, including American competitors such as China and Russia, are rapidly building influence with African countries. Al-Qaeda and ISIS-aligned terrorist organizations have proliferated on the continent in the last decade, and many are currently strengthening.

Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. policy toward Africa has focused on delivering overseas development assistance and ameliorating the security problems emanating from the continent. This approach is outdated. It does not account for the continent’s many economic opportunities for American companies, or the significant influence America’s geopolitical competitors have built on the continent. Chinese activity especially may threaten American strategic access to Africa, is increasingly creating anticompetitive economic norms on the continent that disadvantage U.S. companies, and is modeling illiberal governance that harms American efforts to promote democracy on the continent.

Under the Trump Administration, U.S. policy is adjusting to account for the realities of today’s Africa. Its under-construction Prosper Africa initiative intends to advance the critical task of facilitating more American private sector activity. The Administration continues important pre-existing initiatives such as PEPFAR and the Millennium Challenge Corporation as well. While rightly recognizing the paramount challenge of nation-state competitors, the Administration is also continuing important counterterrorism activities on the continent.

The U.S. still lacks a strategic messaging campaign for the continent, however—a matter of increasing urgency since a significant part of the competition with China is one of ideology. In addition, the Administration has not had enough engagement with African leaders at the most senior level. Finally, while Prosper Africa has the right focus, its implementation has been too slow thus far.

The U.S. government’s engagement with Africa must protect its core strategic interests in the continent, namely retaining sufficient influence and positioning on the continent to protect American interests there, facilitating regulatory and normative environments that ensure U.S. companies can compete on an even footing in Africa, encouraging the growth of African democracy, and ensuring that terrorists cannot use the continent as a staging ground for attacks against the U.S.

Focus on governments with which the U.S. can reasonably expect to have a mutually beneficial relationship. Countries that are good candidates for a strategic partnership should receive the full suite of U.S. engagements, such as consideration for a free-trade agreement; fully staffed U.S. embassies, including a commercial attaché; U.S. government‐facilitated visits by U.S. business delegations; high-level U.S. official visits and interventions on behalf of U.S. companies; and mobilization of that country’s U.S. diaspora to invest and engage in other constructive ways.

Encourage and assist U.S. private sector activity in Africa. Prosperous American companies strengthen U.S. economic might and contribute to American soft power. More U.S. business involvement in Africa would also help resist the further institutionalization of anti-competitive economic norms on the continent that benefit competitors such as China.

Help African governments achieve greater economic freedom. Doing so would bring greater and more rapid prosperity to their people, and expand investment opportunities for American companies. The U.S. could provide the rationale for and help with the technical expertise to liberalize regulatory environments, privatize state-owned industries, and improve the rule of law.

Foster good governance. The U.S.’s most valuable allies are usually those that share its core values such as democracy, rule of law, and respect for the free market. Good governance also promotes human flourishing and ameliorates instability and terrorism. The U.S. should assist African civil society organizations that hold their governments accountable, focus on helping the fight against corruption, and deepen coordination and cooperation with allies working on the same issues.

Launch a strategic messaging campaign in Africa. All government agencies that engage on Africa should have a unified message that explains the benefits of partnering with the U.S.; touts the value of democracy, individual liberty, and the free market; and highlights the decades of positive U.S. engagement in Africa. The campaign should include messaging about China in Africa that is culturally appropriate, respectful of African states’ sovereign prerogatives, and realistic about some African countries’ need for Chinese engagement.

Increase senior U.S. officials’ engagement with African counterparts. Meetings in the Oval Office with the President are low-cost investments in a relationship that can have an outsized impact. Cabinet members and congressional delegations visiting the continent can also enhance ties with important African countries.

Make the U.S.‐Africa Leaders Summit a biannual event. Many countries, including some U.S. competitors, hold regular summits with African heads of state. The U.S. has only ever held one, in 2014. A summit is a very public way to demonstrate commitment to the U.S.‐Africa relationship, facilitate linkages between U.S. companies and African governments, and remind African governments of the desirability of partnering with the U.S.

• Joshua Meservey, “Looking Forward: U.S.‐Africa Relations,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 26, 2019.
• Joshua Meservey, “Implications of China’s Presence and Investment in Africa,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, December 12, 2018.
• Joshua Meservey, “China’s Propaganda in Africa Hurts U.S. Interests—and the U.S. Must Counter It,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4920, November 19, 2018.
• Joshua Meservey, “Chinese Corruption in Africa Undermines Beijing’s Rhetoric About Friendship with the Continent,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4895, August 8, 2018.
• Joshua Meservey, “The U.S. Should Call China’s ‘Non-Interference’ Policy in Africa What It Is—A Myth,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4878, July 6, 2018.
• Joshua Meservey, “Zambia and Mozambique Illustrate Ballooning African Debt, Growing Chinese Influence, and Challenges to U.S. Interests in Africa,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4845, April 26, 2018.
• Joshua Meservey, “China in Africa: The New Colonialism?” testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 7, 2018.
• Joshua Meservey, “The Saudi‐Qatari Dispute: Why the U.S. Must Prevent Spillover into East Africa,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3268, November 29, 2017.
• Joshua Meservey, “U.S. Must Press Somalia to Deliver Competent Governance,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3252, October 5, 2017.
• Joshua Meservey, “South Sudan’s Conflict and Famine,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, July 26, 2017.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

In thinking about challenges related to China, it is essential to recognize that the American relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) differs greatly from the American relationship with the Soviet Union during the four decades‐long Cold War, which involved a zero-sum, mainly military confrontation with a largely implacable adversary, and ideological and military efforts around the world to counter that adversary.

While the United States and the PRC have major differences—including significant points of politico-military confrontation—the two countries are closely linked economically and therefore have a level of shared interest that had no equivalent in Washington’s relations with Cold War‐era Moscow.

The 2020 COVID-19 crisis has brought out the potential downsides of this economic integration with China.

The two countries’ supply chains are tightly intertwined and connected throughout the region. More than simply a matter of American companies being dependent on Chinese products and vice versa, both sides are mutually joined (relative, of course, to the individual industry and company). In addition, tourism, business, and education bring a significant number of visitors from each country to the other, including thousands of Chinese students who attend American universities and conduct valuable research there in partnership with American counterparts.

This integration must be managed in ways that prevent damage to U.S. security interests and the privacy of its own citizens. Since 2018, the U.S. has done that through comprehensive rewrites of export and foreign investment rules and restrictions on Chinese involvement in the buildout of the U.S. 5G network.

Neither should the advantages the U.S. enjoys for its economic connections be permitted to obscure the other fundamental points of friction between the two countries.

In East Asia, China’s extravagant claims to vast swathes of the region’s littoral waters put it directly at odds with the American view of freedom of the seas. In pursuing its claims, China has gone so far as to build large islands atop submerged features and claim territorial seas based on these artificial islands. These efforts not only jeopardize free transit across the world’s oceans, but also reflect a Chinese effort to expand territorial claims at the expense of neighboring countries, many of which are long-standing American allies.

Additionally, there is the long-standing issue of Taiwan. China insists that it has the right to deal with the “renegade province” in its own way, including the use of force. For the United States, the decision to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was matched with the Taiwan Relations Act, which continued unofficial relations with Taiwan and committed the U.S. to making defensive weapons available to Taiwan.

Similarly, in outer space and cyberspace, China is increasingly seeking to extend its sovereignty over what had previously been international common spaces. It has tested anti-satellite weapons and, with its military-dominated space program, appears to be increasingly intent upon establishing “space dominance.” Concerns about cyber security have highlighted the growing centrality of information technology to the U.S.‐PRC rivalry. Whereas the Soviet Union’s centralized planning system utterly failed to prepare for the microchip revolution, the PRC’s “socialist market” economy is much more flexible and responsive. Its global competitiveness and behavior in areas from communications and data networks to artificial intelligence and the ability to apply “big data” will have direct bearing on U.S. alliances and interests abroad.

Under Xi Jinping, human rights in China have deteriorated substantially. In February 2018, the government instituted new regulations on religious affairs that placed onerous burdens on persons of faith: Hundreds of thousands, possibly over a million, Uighur Muslims are detained in political reeducation facilities today; three major Protestant churches were shuttered between September and December 2018 alone; and Tibetans face continuing restrictions on their freedom of movement and expression.

The direct and indirect influence that the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist party have on all of China’s economic activity has increasingly become of concern. While China liberalized its economic activity significantly after joining the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s, this began to change around 2004. Economic liberalization has largely halted since the 2008 global financial crisis. The private sector in China, thanks to free market practices, has flourished to become the major source of economic growth and job creation in the PRC. However, the state’s role in China’s economic activity is increasing, whether through initiatives directed at developing and obtaining new technologies or state-directed investment, both domestically and abroad.

This is reinforced by apparent economic espionage conducted by the Chinese government, benefiting Chinese companies. While espionage is a fact of life, there is a difference between trying to obtain war plans versus obtaining the intellectual property (IP) behind commercial computer technology, new plastics, or pharmaceuticals. Some theft of intellectual property is conducted through cyber means (there are charges that the Chinese military has conducted such actions), while other espionage has involved physical efforts, such as the attempt by Chinese professors to smuggle seedlings from test beds in Iowa.1

Finally, there is growing unease about the Chinese “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI), which is a major Chinese investment effort that encompasses both a land route to Europe via Central Asia and the Caucasus, and a sea route from China’s East Coast through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, including port construction in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Djibouti. The regions encompassed by this initiative desperately need more infrastructure, but there are concerns that Chinese financing for these projects will lead to debt traps permanently ensnaring these states. Just as important, the BRI effort may lead to Chinese-influenced industrial standards and technological dependencies that would effectively shut American (and other Western) businesses out of these markets. The lack of Chinese transparency only exacerbates many of these concerns.

Engage China economically, but defend American interests at home and abroad. Trade with China has measurably improved the lives of millions of Americans. Not only have American farmers and workers benefited from selling to China, but their ability to access inexpensive, quality goods, from clothes to consumer electronics, means that hard-earned dollars go further. This is no reason to accept Chinese violations of intellectual property and other abuses of the system, however. Chinese IP theft not only denies Americans their fair return, but it also ultimately weakens the United States, as Chinese companies profit from American research and development. The U.S. needs to make clear that it will not tolerate illegal trade practices, even as it welcomes free trade with rules-observing partners.

Uphold the credibility of our alliances. The United States has historically been intent on ensuring that no other nation dominates East Asia—a goal that dates back to the 19th century. Given Asia’s importance as a market for American goods and a source of technology and innovation, as well as the fact that the region includes fellow democracies, there are both realpolitik and principled reasons for upholding American commitments to the region. Unfortunately, while the U.S. has few direct points of friction with China (e.g., there are no outstanding territorial disputes), many of China’s neighbors are also American allies. Consequently, Beijing’s problems with them become an American concern.

Work with our allies and trading partners. The surest way to address the economic challenges China presents to the U.S. and our allies is for the U.S. to work with the international community. Unilaterally attempting to change Chinese practices could ultimately mean American businesses lose while foreign companies benefit from competition between the U.S. and China. The U.S. is China’s largest trading partner but not its only trading partner. The U.S. should build collective action abroad to deal with concerns of intellectual property theft, state subsidies, and foreign investment.

Maintain a strong American presence in the region. Maintaining a strong American presence is not solely a matter of ensuring that the American military commitment remains credible. The U.S. should also maintain a strong diplomatic presence, both in the various countries and at international organizations. Promoting human rights is a long-standing feature of U.S. engagement in Asia. The universal values of respecting human rights should continue to be an important component of U.S. diplomacy in the region. Similarly, America’s businesses are one of the most important means of demonstrating American commitment, presence, and interests to the region. A carrier battlegroup is present for a few days or a few weeks, while a factory employs hundreds or thousands and stays for years.

The COVID-19 crisis has cast U.S.‐China relations in a new harsh light. It is forcing a revaluation of American ties. This is reasonable and, in many ways, long-overdue. In conducting its now recognized global competition with China, however, the U.S. must stay focused on securing U.S. interests. More often than not, that will mean confronting China. Sometimes, it will mean cooperation.

• Daren Bakst, Gabriella Beaumont-Smith, and Riley Walters, “How the U.S.‐China Trade Dispute Affects U.S. Agriculture: What You Should Know,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.3391, February 28, 2019.
• Dean Cheng, “Assessing Beijing’s power: A Blueprint for the U.S. Response to China Over the Next Decades” Heritage Foundation Special Report No 221, February 10, 2020.
• Dean Cheng, “How the U.S. Should Engage the Chinese Military: The Case for Exchanges and Exercises with the PLA,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4867, June 19, 2018.
• Dean Cheng, “Responding to the Chinese Space Challenge,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No.4645, January 6, 2017.
• Klon Kitchen, “The U.S. Must Treat China as a National Security Threat to 5G Networks,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No 4952, April 16, 2019.
• Jeff M. Smith, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Strategic Implications and International Opposition,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3331, August 9, 2018.
• Tori K. Smith, Edmund F. Haislmaier, and Maiya Clark, “The U.S. Should Focus on Targeted and Temporary Tools to Ensure Access to Medical Supply Chains,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5057, April 14, 2020.
• Riley Walters, “Understanding China’s Economic Weaknesses Key to U.S. Policy Development,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3456, December 16, 2019.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

Europe is vitally important to the United States economically, diplomatically, militarily, and politically. The continent has geographical proximity to some of the world’s most dangerous and contested regions, bordering, or in close proximity to, Russia, the Arctic, Iran, Asia Minor, the Caspian Sea, and North Africa. China would clearly like to drive a wedge into the transatlantic relationship, thus weakening the U.S. while continuing to access Europe’s market and technology in service of the aims of the Chinese Communist Party. Russia’s ongoing brutal and unprovoked full-scale war against Ukraine directly affects the security interests of Europe as well as those of the United States. Europe and the U.S. face similar challenges moving forward: an aggressive Russia, the rise of an assertive and bellicose China, Islamist terrorism, and economic and social challenges compounded by decades of reckless spending and divisive social policies pursued by the left.

The U.S. and Europe share a strong commitment to the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and democracy. During the 20th century, millions of Americans fought for a free and secure Europe, and hundreds of thousands died for it. America’s economic ties to the region are likewise important. A stable, secure, and economically viable Europe is in America’s economic interest. For more than 70 years, the U.S. military presence has contributed to regional security and stability, and both Europeans and Americans have benefited economically. The United States and the member states of the European Union account for approximately half of the global economy, and the U.S. and EU member countries are generally each other’s principal trading partners and primary sources of foreign direct investment, all of which benefits both the U.S. economy and, by extension, the American worker.

On January 31, 2020, the United Kingdom left the EU. Brexit has given rise to a host of opportunities for enhancing the U.S.–U.K. Special Relationship, one of which is negotiating and signing a free trade agreement. The U.S. and the U.K. have long championed economic freedom and have the world’s largest and fifth-largest economies, respectively. Their economies are closely intertwined, and each partner is the other’s top foreign direct investor. While an agreement that lowers tariffs would generate some gains, tariffs between the nations are already low; therefore, any agreement must also address non-tariff barriers to trade. Such an agreement would have the important added benefit of renewing the close cooperation between the two nations and reaffirming their shared commitment to economic freedom and national sovereignty. Trade negotiations advanced under the Trump Administration, but have stalled under President Joe Biden purportedly because of U.S. concerns over the fate of the Northern Ireland Protocol and the European Union’s reaction to a potential U.S.–U.K. trade agreement.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the foundation of European security for more than 70 years. Its founding mission was to protect the territorial integrity of its members and, if required, to defeat the Soviet Union. NATO members are no longer worried about the spread of communism, but many—especially given Russia’s unprovoked second invasion of Ukraine—are worried about protecting their territory from Russian expansion. This makes NATO just as crucial to the maintenance of transatlantic security today as it was at the end of the Cold War. The United States benefits from a NATO that can deter aggression and defend the territorial integrity of its members.

As an intergovernmental security alliance, however, NATO is only as strong as its member states. After the end of the Cold War, many European nations cut defense spending, and the inevitable result has been a significant loss of capability. In 2006, NATO set a target for member states to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. At the 2014 Wales Summit, member states recommitted to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and 20 percent of their defense budgets on “major equipment” purchases, a commitment reaffirmed at the Vilnius Summit in 2023. NATO defense spending continues to trend upward with non-U.S. members adding a total of $350 billion to their defense budgets from 2014 to 2022. Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, additional members have pledged and taken action to attain the NATO benchmarks. The three largest economies in the EU—Germany, France, and Italy—however, continue to miss their 2 percent pledge, even during the Ukraine war, which raises questions about their commitment to the Alliance.

In addition to investing in necessary capabilities, NATO should establish a robust permanent force structure in its Eastern European member states to deter potential future Russian aggression against an Alliance member. Members across the Alliance should contribute to this force structure, and U.S. troops are a vital component. A permanent U.S. presence in Europe shows that the United States is willing and able to live up to its NATO treaty obligations, thus making it less likely that Russia will make a miscalculation. In addition, this proximity to global hot spots in the Middle East gives U.S. policymakers more options for responding to incidents in the region.

The ongoing war in Ukraine underscores the need for Europe to move away from its reliance on Russia and China (via, for instance, production of solar panels and wind turbines) for its energy needs. Europe has begun to re-evaluate such long-standing policies as the phaseout of nuclear power and the curtailed use of important sources of domestic fossil fuels due to the need for secure substitute energy supplies. U.S. exports of liquified natural gas (LNG) are an important component of future European energy security. The U.S. should expand its domestic production of LNG and its capacity to export it, just as Europe should expand its ability to import LNG, as rapidly as possible.

It is essential that the U.S. and Europe work together on addressing the challenge of China. The degree to which Europe is aligned with the U.S. on responding to China will go a long way toward determining the success of U.S. efforts. American policymakers would do well to shift Europe’s views of China from an economic lens to one with a clear focus on the security repercussions of dependence. The U.S. will find little success in seeking to browbeat Europe into alignment. Rather, U.S. officials should consistently and resolutely argue that getting closer to China is not in Europe’s long-term self-interest, and that dependence on China would be even more dangerous than dependence on Russia.

The Three Seas Initiative (3SI) launched in 2016 is useful in strengthening trade, infrastructure, energy, and political cooperation among countries bordering the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. It is a force multiplier that bolsters security in Europe and strengthens transatlantic trade ties by marrying private capital with some of Europe’s most dynamic and growing economies while also helping to block Chinese and Russian efforts to make inroads in the region.

In order to help to maintain a secure European theater, the U.S. should:

Negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the United Kingdom. An agreement creating a free trade area would be good for the economies of both the U.S. and the U.K. while serving as an example of the trade liberalization that both nations have long championed.

Remain Committed to America’s NATO Treaty Obligations. NATO has served as the bedrock of transatlantic security for more than 70 years. If the European members meet their stated 2014 and 2023 pledges to invest in collective defense, it should be clear that the United States remains committed to NATO, including Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all.

Ensure that NATO Remains Focused on Its Core Mission: Mutual Defense with the Capabilities Needed to Deter Russian Aggression Against a Member State. NATO does not have to be everywhere doing everything, but it does have to be capable of defending its members’ territorial integrity. Everything else it does is secondary.

Push for NATO to Enable Deterrence by Denial in the Region. Russian atrocities in Ukraine underscore the necessity of moving NATO from a posture of deterrence by punishment to one of deterrence by denial. This change would mean that the Alliance has the capabilities, logistics, and plans in place to stop Russia from seizing territory in any NATO member state, thus deterring Russia from any future attempts to do so.

Focus on Developing Strong Bilateral Relationships with Individual European Countries Instead of Reflexively Supporting the European Union. The EU is a supranational, undemocratic organization that infringes on the national sovereignty of its members, wastes taxpayer money, distorts European immigration policies, and champions a radical leftist energy and social agenda. The U.S. should re-examine its unthinking support for the EU and focus instead on building and sustaining closer relations with individual European governments.

Refuse to Back Further European Union Defense Integration. Nothing would strain the transatlantic bond more—and undermine NATO faster—than EU defense integration. EU strategic autonomy in defense is a chimera, not a panacea. A robust U.S.-led NATO remains the only guarantor of transatlantic security. The U.S. should continue to focus on advancing a “NATO first” agenda that ensures American engagement and influence in European defense issues. NATO has been the cornerstone of transatlantic security for almost seven decades. It affords the U.S. a level of influence in the region that is commensurate with the number of troops, equipment, and funding the U.S. commits to Europe.

Keep the U.S. Pledge of $1 Billion for the Three Seas Investment Fund. The U.S. under President Donald Trump pledged to match contributions to the Three Seas Investment Fund up to $1 billion. The Biden Administration has slow-walked the initial U.S. contribution of $300 million, with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and the fund only announcing a terms sheet in June 2022. The fund, which operates on a commercial basis, is a worthwhile investment for U.S. taxpayers as well as a positive, concrete example of U.S. determination to build linkages to the region, while simultaneously sending clear signals to private investors that the 3SI is worth considering.

Speak with a United Voice on Chinese and Russian Abuses. The U.S. and Europe must be clear, consistent, and timely in highlighting Chinese and Russian violations of human rights, including Russia’s indiscriminate brutality and targeting of civilians in Ukraine. The West’s moral standing rests on maintaining this unequivocal consistency rather than, for example, making exceptions to or watering down criticism to ease business dealings or—in the case of China—securing never-to-be-realized promises of climate change mitigation.

Enhance Investment Screening Mechanisms in Europe. Acquisitions by adversarial powers in European nations will affect the U.S. Examples abound, such as the acquisition of ports or airfields that are needed to reinforce European defense in the event of a major conflict; acquisitions of companies working on advanced technologies that would allow China to acquire valuable intellectual property instantly (leapfrogging) rather than producing it from scratch domestically; or simply the accumulation of acquisitions that give China greater political clout in a European country. The U.S. should encourage allies to adopt more stringent national investment screening mechanisms.

Encourage Allies to Leave China’s 14+1. While largely defunct, some European allies remain part of China’s 14+1 engagement format. The 14+1 initiative is an attempt by China to expand its business and investment opportunities in Eastern and Central European nations. For economic, political, and security reasons, some countries, such as the Baltic states, have already withdrawn, and most others have downgraded their participation. Remaining participants should follow suit and abandon the initiative, thus signaling to China that its predatory lending practices and pernicious political influence are not welcome in their nations.

• Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023).
• Daniel Kochis, China Is Determined to Push Its Way Into the Arctic, Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 11, 2023.
• Ted R. Bromund and Daniel Kochis, Ahead of 2023 NATO Summit, U.S. Policy in Europe Must Advance Prosperity and Security, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5323, July 7, 2023.
• Daniel Kochis and Brent Sadler, Why a New Black Sea Strategy Is in the U.S. Interest, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5318, June 28, 2023.
• Ted R. Bromund, President Biden’s Visits to United Kingdom and Ireland Must Serve Prosperity and Peace, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5311, April 6, 2023.
• Ted R. Bromund and Daniel Kochis, The Top Five U.S. Priorities for European Policy After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5258, April 7, 2022.
• Daniel Kochis, Thomas W. Spoehr, Luke Coffey, and Patty-Jane Geller, The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time, Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5252, March 14, 2022.
• Daniel Kochis, The Three Seas Initiative Is a Strategic Investment that Deserves the Biden Administration’s Support, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 6051, February 18, 2021.
• Ted R. Bromund, Why the U.K. Is an Ideal Free Trade Partner for the U.S., Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6035, December 11, 2020.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

“Foreign Aid” is a catch-all moniker that encompasses a wide variety of projects and programs that are funded and implemented by U.S. government agencies in countries around the world. The total spent every year for U.S. foreign aid and international diplomatic operations (e.g., American embassies) has traditionally been a little less than 1 percent of the federal budget.

Often, but not always, foreign aid is tied to the achievement of a foreign policy objective. U.S. security and foreign policy interests motivate assistance to nations deemed vital to advancing or defending those interests, such as U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt under the Camp David Accords. Aid to these countries, which are often in unstable areas of the world, requires cooperation with less than ideal governmental partners.

Development assistance is intended to reduce poverty and encourage economic growth in recipient countries by funding programs dedicated to improving agriculture, education, health, and democracy and advancing other initiatives. Higher standards of living in poor nations support U.S. interests: Wealthier nations are more stable, more democratic, and more likely to become economic partners with America. Unfortunately, the record of development assistance in promoting economic growth and improved living standards is not robust.

Although aid has had some success (notably health programs and natural disaster response efforts), the trillions of dollars of official development assistance (ODA) given by the United States (and other Western donors) since 1960 have largely failed to produce the results promised. Specifically, foreign aid has not reliably improved living standards through economic growth and integration into the global economy, which in turn would allow developing countries to “graduate” from the need for further aid. Worse, aid can reinforce the same problems that contribute to a lack of development because it involves government-to-government transfers that tend to promote statist approaches, and encourage dependency, creating opportunities for corruption.

Some of this substandard impact can be attributed to the dramatic differences today from the time when many U.S. foreign aid programs were established. America’s foreign and security challenges today are vastly different from what they were during the Cold War, but many assistance programs remain bound by the structures, instructions, and restrictions adopted in that era. In addition, private capital, which flows from all sources, now dwarfs ODA by a factor of about 20 to one. That means that developing countries have far greater access to investment capital and global markets than they did 60 years ago. As a result of these very positive global economic developments, U.S. assistance does not have the market share and influence it once did. The need to support America’s goals and policies, however, remains undiminished.

To take advantage of the opportunity to attract private capital, developing countries must implement policies that open their markets. Various trade and investment-friendly policies are examined each year in The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. To get ahead based on sheer merit and hard work, citizens of any country need their government to remove obstacles to the free flow of capital, goods, services, and ideas and to strengthen those institutions of the state that will maintain non-discriminatory markets, allocate resources impartially, maintain the rule of law, protect property rights, and reward individual effort and success. That is the proven recipe for economic freedom and real human progress.

The trend towards ever-greater reliance on private capital for development justifies the Trump Administration’s proposals since taking office to reform foreign aid. The Administration understands that developing countries’ problems cannot be solved simply by increasing ODA and other forms of foreign aid. The solution is to use U.S. foreign aid more effectively to promote U.S. interests and provide support to developing countries until they reach the point at which they can be helped by private capital.

America’s current aid programs are too numerous, fragmented, and micromanaged to support U.S. foreign policy objectives efficiently. It is no longer feasible merely to propose patches and workarounds to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which was itself a restructuring of awkward, haphazard, and ineffective post-war programs from the 1950s that had become increasingly bogged down by bureaucratic fragmentation and infighting. As stewards of American taxpayer dollars, Congress and the Administration have a responsibility to ensure that foreign aid dollars are used effectively to advance the nation’s interests. The next Administration and Congress should work together to reform America’s foreign assistance agencies and bureaucracies with the goal of eliminating duplication, improving coordination, and freeing foreign assistance programs from unnecessary legislative instructions.

Properly designed and directed, U.S foreign aid can support U.S. national interests. It can address humanitarian crises, promote policy changes necessary for private sector‐led economic growth (the most reliable and sustainable path to development), and advance our diplomatic and security priorities through targeted support. Although some reforms have been enacted in recent years, the underlying problems remain. Fundamental reform does not lie solely within the authority of the executive branch: Legislation to amend or replace existing laws is required. The next Administration should consult with Congress to take congressional concerns and priorities into account and work jointly to reform, consolidate, and refocus U.S. foreign assistance programs to maximize their effectiveness for the future.

To that end, USAID should be replaced with a new agency, the United States Health and Humanitarian Assistance Agency (USHHAA), to manage all health and humanitarian assistance programs. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established in 1961 by the Kennedy Administration. As discussed above, the global environment for foreign aid and development assistance in 2020 bears little resemblance to the situation 60 years ago, when the world was still recovering from World War II, the process of decolonization was underway, and the American economy was much more dominant globally than it is today. Over the past six decades, USAID has lost much of its effectiveness due to its expanding remit and ongoing funding of many programs that are no longer fit for the purpose but are defended by special interests. More often than not, this inefficient management model has resulted in USAID establishing far too many low-budget programs in too many countries that are far too small to make a sustainable long-term difference. The first step in addressing this problem is eliminating current U.S. assistance programs and consolidating U.S. assistance by focus and purpose.

Humanitarian assistance addresses sudden major natural disasters, tragedies, or ongoing suffering. Although annual appropriations are made for humanitarian assistance, distribution can be irregular, unpredictable, and of relatively short duration. Humanitarian assistance is not intended to advance other foreign policy objectives, but it can serve to bolster America’s reputation and increase international goodwill. Consolidating humanitarian and health assistance under one umbrella institution, including U.S. food and disaster assistance, would streamline operations and focus it on a clear, consistent mission. The USHHAA should be placed within the U.S. State Department and USAID’s Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) tasked with overseeing this assistance should be placed into a new “Assistance Cone” at the State Department.

The amount appropriated to the State Department’s Economic Support Fund (ESF) should be increased, and the account should be renamed the “Policy Goal Implementation Fund” with the express purpose of generating goodwill and supporting U.S. foreign policy and security objectives (bilaterally and at the United Nations). Other developed countries—such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Canada—are way ahead of the U.S. in updating their foreign assistance strategies and have already merged their foreign aid and diplomatic agencies. The result is a more coherent process for linking assistance to foreign policy. By the same logic, ambassadors appointed by the President should have greater authority over foreign aid expenditures in the country to which he or she is accredited. Using the savings from cuts elsewhere in the foreign aid budget, increasing the State Department’s Economic Support Fund account would encourage more resilient, democratic, prosperous, and secure societies around the world.

Improve the coordination of military and security assistance under the joint authority of the Departments of Defense and State. The purpose of the military and security assistance account should be made explicit: to support U.S. allies with training and equipment to bolster their military capabilities and address emerging, current, receding crises or conflicts that represent a threat to the U.S., its allies, or international or regional peace and security. Military and security assistance programs, regardless of whether appropriated through the International Affairs budget or in the Defense budget, should be the joint responsibility of the Departments of Defense and State. Programs under this category include International Military Education and Training (IMET); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR); and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). In addition, funding aimed at assisting and stabilizing fragile and post-conflict states as well as crisis prevention should be appropriated within this category. Congress should reverse the proliferation of assistance programs by consolidating these accounts where appropriate.

Eliminate duplicative foreign aid programs, improve coordination of remaining programs, end congressional “earmarks,” and terminate programs that do not work. Tracking and assessing the vast array of U.S. foreign aid programs (through more than 25 federal agencies and programs) is no simple task. Since many of these programs are antiquated or are no longer fit for the purpose, efforts have been made over the years to improve the transparency and accountability of U.S. foreign assistance programs. Two of the larger programs and agencies that should be eliminated are the Export‐Import Bank of the United States (EXIM Bank) and the United States Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). There is no shortage of private capital to finance exports, but governments have increased the practice of subsidizing financing in an effort to increase exports. This practice is a harmful distortion of domestic and international economies. The U.S. should set an example for developed and developing countries alike, showing that such practices are anti-market and anti-development, by eliminating the EXIM Bank. The USTDA and similar work by the U.S. Commercial Service—the trade promotion arm of the Department of Commerce—might have been of value when they were established decades ago, but, in a world awash with hundreds of billions of dollars circulating in highly developed global capital markets, they are simply no longer necessary. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), established in 2018 to replace the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), should lend only to the relatively few unstable states or least-developed countries that truly lack access to private capital markets, or to counter threats to U.S. interests posed by foreign financial influence, such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Even in these cases, however, the goal should be to promote policies and development through the MCC to the point where private options are available. Congress should also minimize the “earmarking” of foreign aid. The level of micromanagement of foreign assistance undermines its effectiveness by spreading it too thinly among recipients and purposes. Congress and the Administration should consult and agree on the broad instructions and goals of America’s foreign assistance within overarching priorities. Earmarks and more directed instructions should be applied only in extraordinary circumstances and should always have an explicit expiration to ensure that they continue only as circumstances merit.

Move all development assistance to an expanded and re-organized U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent agency that stresses the primary importance of the rule of law, effective governance, and recipient country accountability. Transfer USAID’s Development Assistance account to the MCC and add the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Assistance to the MCC Board of Directors to better coordinate all U.S. foreign assistance.

• James M. Roberts and Brett D. Schaefer, “An Overhaul of America’s Foreign Assistance Programs Is Long Overdue,” Heritage Foundation Report No. 3247, September 19, 2017.
• James M. Roberts and Brett D. Schaefer, “The BUILD Act’s Proposed U.S. Development Finance Corporation Would Supersize OPIC, But Not Improve It,” Heritage Foundation Report No. 3312, May 2, 2018.
• James M. Roberts, “Why the BUILD Act Can’t and Won’t Achieve UN’s Sustainable Development Goals,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 13, 2018.
• Brett D. Schaefer and James M. Roberts, “Government’s Track Record Suggests BUILD Act Wouldn’t ‘Pour Money’ Into Africa,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 7, 2018.
• James M. Roberts and Brett D. Schaefer, “House and Senate Revisions Have Not Improved the BUILD Act Enough to Warrant Conservative Support,” Heritage Foundation Report No. 4890, July 24, 2018.
• Brett D. Schaefer and Anthony B. Kim, “The U.S. Should Employ Foreign Aid in Support of U.S. Policy at the U.N.,” Heritage Foundation Report No. 3356, October 5, 2018.
• Brett D. Schaefer, “Reforming U.S. Food Aid Can Feed Millions More at the Same Cost,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 17, 2018.
• James M. Roberts, “The U.S. Needs a New Foreign Aid Model,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 7, 2017.
• James M. Roberts, “Not All Foreign Aid Is Equal,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2523, March 1, 2011.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

The freedom to buy and sell throughout the world without government intervention is an essential component of a free society. The Heritage Foundation’s annual Index of Economic Freedom has found year after year that increases in trade freedom around the world correlate strongly with greater levels of prosperity. Here at home, policies that eliminate tariffs and other barriers to trade help American families and businesses to make decisions based on their individual needs. Access to imported products allows American businesses to specialize in what they do best, thereby using resources more effectively, increasing competition, and encouraging innovation. Americans also achieve greater purchasing power through free trade so that each dollar buys more than it otherwise would. The freedom to export goods around the world helps American business to grow and reach new customers and is made easier when foreign barriers to trade are lower. The U.S. economy derives significant benefit from imports and exports, and the ability of Americans to invest freely abroad and for foreign companies to invest in the U.S. also supports hundreds of thousands of American jobs.

For decades, America has been committed to promoting free trade at home and around the world, recognizing its overall benefits. The U.S. was a principal architect of the World Trade Organization and established one of the world’s most prosperous free trade areas with the North American Free Trade Agreement. In recent years, however, commitment to advancing free trade has waned, and some have begun to doubt its benefits. Citing trade deficits, national security, and negotiating tactics, the U.S. has imposed tariffs on hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of imports from nearly every country in recent years. Imposing or threatening new tariffs may have been seen as a useful negotiating tactic, but these policies have also led to severe economic costs for Americans. Although there may be some justification for restricting trade to support defense programs, any moves to restrict the freedom of Americans to trade should be targeted and implemented in consultation with Congress. The Biden Administration has largely left these tariffs in place or traded them in for other managed trade schemes when removing tariffs could help to reduce the pressure of rising prices on Americans.

Unfortunately, this approach misdiagnoses the negative issues that are sometimes assigned to free trade. The American economy does not suffer because of its exposure to global competition; it is unable to optimize the benefits of global commerce because of excessive regulation and stifling taxation. Instead of denying American families and businesses access to foreign markets, policymakers should work to make the American economy more competitive.

The direction of trade policy today largely reflects decades of action by Congress, which has delegated significant unchecked authority to the executive branch. The power to regulate trade is a congressional power under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, but Congress today has only a small role in setting trade policy. Given the increased use of tariff and non-tariff barriers that restrict Americans’ economic freedom, it is time for trade authority to be rebalanced and for Congress to exercise greater influence in the trade policy process. Americans should have the freedom to buy and sell as they wish, but that freedom is in peril if taxes, through trade restrictions, continue to be levied on imports.

Reform trade laws to rebalance trade authority. A host of trade laws have put too much power in the hands of bureaucrats to raise taxes on Americans through new tariffs. These include Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, and U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws. Another law, Trade Promotion Authority, that helps to implement trade agreements is not structured to ensure that these agreements lower barriers to Americans’ freedom to buy and sell. The use of these laws to apply tariffs on goods from U.S. allies and diminish the freedom to trade for Americans has highlighted their severe weaknesses in the areas of process and oversight. Congress should reform trade laws that delegate tariff powers to ensure that they are narrower in scope and that Congress has proper oversight when these laws are used.

Permanently eliminate tariffs on all intermediate goods. More than two-thirds of all U.S. imports are intermediate goods, such as parts for automobile manufacturers, specialized steel pipe for pipeline manufacturers, and sugar for candymakers. Access to competitively priced parts and machinery from around the world allows U.S. industries to produce high-quality goods at affordable prices. Specifically, a Heritage Foundation trade model has estimated that eliminating tariffs on manufactured goods (which are 1.1 percent on average) would increase U.S. exports in all sectors, reduce prices paid by consumers, increase U.S. gross domestic product, and create more and better-paying jobs.

Reverse all “Buy American” product mandates. Buy American (domestic content) laws limit competition in government procurement, and this can increase costs for taxpayers. Except in cases of legitimate national defense concerns, the government should purchase the best-quality product at the most competitive price, no matter where it is produced. Congress and the Administration should expand competition in government procurement by eliminating these costly mandates.

• The Heritage Foundation, “Heritage Explains: The Importance of Trade.”
• Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• The Heritage Foundation, “2022 Index of Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom Declining Worldwide,” Factsheet No. 229, February 14, 2022.
• Tori K. Smith, “Trade Promotion Authority: A Road Map for Congress,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3621, May 27, 2021.
• Tori K. Smith, “Biden Administration’s Approach to ‘Buy American’ Will Harm Taxpayers,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6048, February 25, 2021.
• Tori K. Smith and Anthony B. Kim, “Three Trade Policy Priorities for Washington in 2021,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6050, February 18, 2021.
• Gabriella Beaumont-Smith and Tori K. Smith, “Eliminating Tariffs on Manufactured Goods Is a Pro-Growth Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3551, November 10, 2020.
• Tori K. Smith, “A Free Trade Guide for the Next Administration and the 117th Congress,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6024, November 2, 2020.
• Tori K. Whiting and Riley Walters, “Fixing America’s Broken Trade Laws: Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3411, May 22, 2019.
• Riley Walters, “Enforcement: How the U.S. Should Hold China Accountable in the 301 Negotiations,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4948, April 5, 2019.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

Iran’s radical Islamist regime poses the greatest long-term Middle Eastern threat to the United States and its allies. Although Iran’s conventional military forces pose only a limited military threat, the regime has compensated for this by developing a network of terrorist proxy groups to attack U.S. military forces and allies in the Middle East. Iran also has built up the region’s largest ballistic missile force, an investment that ultimately makes sense only if Tehran plans to arm the missiles with nuclear warheads.

The Obama Administration’s 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), made a bad situation worse by giving Iran sanctions relief that seriously outweighed its limited and easily reversible nuclear concessions. The JCPOA legitimized Iran’s covertly built uranium enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow, allowing them to remain with operating limitations that eventually would expire. In addition to weakening the long-standing U.S. non-proliferation goal of restricting access to sensitive nuclear technologies, the JCPOA did too little for too short a period to curb Iran’s nuclear program. Key restrictions on uranium enrichment would expire after 10 to 15 years, leaving Tehran free to increase enrichment to an industrial scale and position itself for a nuclear breakout. The JCPOA also ignored such other threatening activities as Iran’s support for terrorism, regional interventions, and ballistic missile development.

President Donald Trump, who had criticized the nuclear deal during his 2016 election campaign, pushed for renegotiation of the flawed and risky agreement. After Iran and other signatories balked, President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, restored nuclear sanctions lifted by the deal, and imposed new sanctions. His Administration launched a “maximum pressure” strategy to force Iran to return to the negotiating table and agree to a more restrictive deal. In his May 8, 2018, remarks on the JCPOA, President Trump acknowledged that Tehran opposed new negotiations but added that “they are going to want to make a new and lasting deal…that benefits all of Iran and the Iranian people. When they do, I am ready, willing, and able.”

Rather than focusing narrowly on the nuclear issue as the Obama Administration did, the Trump Administration laid down markers on the entire range of Tehran’s activities to deter and penalize the regime’s aggressive regional interventions in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, as well as to hold the regime accountable for its export of subversion and terrorism. For its part, Tehran, adopting a policy of “strategic patience,” never officially withdrew from the deal. Understanding that the agreement only delays Iran’s nuclear ambitions until the regime opts to discard its nuclear commitments as it has done repeatedly in the past, Tehran sought to outlast the Trump Administration in the hope that a new President would be open to unconditional renewal of the 2015 deal.

On May 8, 2019, the first anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani warned that Iran would also abandon the agreement unless the other parties to the deal—China, Russia, Britain, France, and Germany—are able to protect Iran from U.S. sanctions. Rouhani threatened to resume enriching uranium to higher levels prohibited by the accord if a 60-day deadline to receive much greater sanctions relief was not met. He also announced that Iran would stop exporting excess enriched uranium and heavy water from its nuclear program, as stipulated by the nuclear deal, and threatened to expand Iran’s violations of the JCPOA incrementally every 60 days unless the remaining parties to the deal—especially Britain, France, and Germany—found a way to protect Iran from U.S. oil and bank sanctions.

In July 2019, Iran began to enrich its uranium to 4.5 percent, exceeding the 3.67 percent limit set by the JCPOA. In September, it violated restrictions on research and development and began to install prohibited advanced centrifuges. In November, it began uranium enrichment operations at the Fordow enrichment facility, a fortified underground site designed to produce enough enriched uranium for one to two nuclear weapons annually according to Iranian nuclear documents stolen by Israel and revealed in 2018. On January 5, 2020, Tehran announced that it would no longer be bound by any restrictions on its nuclear program. This should have been the last straw for Britain, France, and Germany, which had remained in the deal despite Iran’s escalating violations. On January 14, they announced that they would hold Iran accountable for its violations of the deal and initiated a dispute mechanism built into the agreement that could lead to U.N. sanctions against Iran after a process that could last for as long as 65 days. However, they failed to press the matter and announced in early February 2020 that they would “continuously postpone” referring Iran’s JCPOA violations to the U.N. Security Council as long as Iran allowed international inspectors to monitor its nuclear program.

Iran’s dictatorship also mounted a veiled campaign of intimidation to raise the costs of the Trump Administration’s campaign of maximum pressure. Iran was behind mine attacks on tankers transporting Arab oil on May 12 and June 13, 2019, and the shooting down of a U.S. Navy drone on June 20. After a pause, Tehran launched a bold attack on September 14, 2019, targeting Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure in Abqaiq and Khurais with seven cruise missiles and 18 drones. Although almost half of their oil exports were temporarily disrupted, the Saudis quickly repaired the damage and declined to retaliate.

The United States deployed additional warships, bombers, stealth fighters, missile defense units, and more than 14,000 troops to deter and defend against Iranian aggression between May and December 2019. Iran, however, continued to orchestrate rocket attacks by Iraqi militias on U.S. troops stationed at Iraqi military bases in a direct challenge to President Trump’s red line against killing Americans. After 11 rocket attacks in two months failed to spill American blood, the Iran-backed Kataib Hezbollah militia launched a rocket attack on December 27 that killed an American citizen. On December 29, the U.S. retaliated with air strikes against five Kataib Hezbollah bases and weapon storage sites in Iraq and Syria. Kataib Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias responded on December 30–31 by mobilizing a mob that besieged the U.S embassy in Baghdad and tried to set it on fire.

As the crisis escalated, President Trump ordered a drone strike that killed the leader of Kataib Hezbollah and Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds (Jerusalem) Force—the elite special operations branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Under Soleimani, the Quds Force had founded surrogate militias and terrorist groups such as Kataib Hezbollah and the original Lebanon-based Hezbollah and had directed them to attack Iran’s enemies as part of Tehran’s shadow war. When Soleimani arrived at Baghdad’s airport on January 3, 2020, undoubtedly planning to orchestrate more attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, President Trump ordered the preventive strike that stopped Soleimani from killing more Americans and enhanced deterrence of Iran’s aggressive regime by driving up the perceived costs and risks of further proxy attacks on Americans.

Iran responded with a January 8, 2020, ballistic missile attack on two Iraqi bases where U.S. troops were stationed, but it failed to kill any Americans. Later that day, however, Iranian missiles accidentally downed a Ukrainian airliner, killing 176 people, most of whom were Iranians. That tragedy boosted anti-government protests inside Iran that had been percolating since 2017 because of Iran’s growing economic problems, international isolation, abuses of human rights, and repressive policies.

Iran temporarily deescalated its confrontation with the United States, perhaps fearing that the Trump Administration would launch another devastating retaliatory attack. Following the November 2020 election of Joe Biden as President of the United States, however, Tehran resumed its nuclear brinkmanship by escalating its uranium enrichment to 20 percent and curbing international inspectors’ access to its nuclear facilities. In April 2021, Iran began to enrich its uranium to 60 percent and deployed advanced IR-9 centrifuges that were prohibited until 2025 under the JCPOA.

President Biden entered office committed to reviving the JCPOA and addressing its weaknesses in a follow-on agreement. His Administration conducted seven rounds of negotiations with Iran in Vienna, Austria, that were hosted by the European Union, but so far, the two sides have failed to reach an agreement. Tehran demanded that Washington lift all sanctions imposed by the Trump Administration, not just nuclear sanctions, and insisted that sanctions must be lifted before Iran resumed compliance with the JCPOA. Iran also demanded that Washington must guarantee not to withdraw from the agreement again—something that no President could do.

After the June 2021 election of ultra-hardliner Ebrahim Raisi as Iran’s president, negotiations were suspended, and Iran further escalated its violations of the JCPOA. By mid-September, Iran had accumulated enough enriched uranium to produce one nuclear weapon in one month in a worst-case scenario—and two more weapons within five months, according to the Institute for Science and International Security. After dragging its feet for many months, Iran agreed to resume negotiations in late November, and by late March, negotiations appeared to be close to the finish line. The final obstacles to reviving the 2015 nuclear agreement appear to be Iran’s insistence that it be given a guarantee that a future Administration would not withdraw from an agreement and that Washington should remove its designation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. That demand, if granted, would give Tehran even more benefits than it received under the original nuclear deal, which only lifted nuclear sanctions.

Meanwhile, Iran has directed its proxy militias in Iraq and Syria to continue their attacks on U.S. troops who are deployed there to support continued operations against ISIS terrorists. Iran-backed Iraqi militias launched a drone strike on November 7, 2021, in a failed effort to assassinate Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Iran also launched a missile strike against a Kurdish businessman’s house near the U.S. consulate in northern Iraq on March 20, 2022. Tehran asserted that the businessman had ties to Israeli intelligence and claimed that the attack was a retaliation for previous Israeli attacks. Iran’s shadow war against Israel and the U.S. could explode into open warfare in a future crisis.

Intensify sanctions on Iran until the regime agrees to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions permanently. Rather than return to the flawed JCPOA, Washington should seek a new nuclear agreement that permanently bars Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a minimum, this would require banning Iran from uranium enrichment activities; dismantling substantial portions of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure; imposing robust inspections on an “anytime, anywhere” basis and real-time monitoring of Iranian nuclear facilities; linking sanctions relief to Iranian compliance; ensuring that Iran comes fully discloses its past weaponization efforts; and establishing a clear and rapid process for reimposing all sanctions if Iran is caught cheating. To attain a new and more restrictive agreement with Iran, the Biden Administration should return to President Trump’s policy of maximum pressure, stop turning a blind eye to Chinese imports of Iranian oil, and impose sanctions on the Chinese and other companies that are involved in that trade.

Deploy strong U.S. military forces in the region to bolster deterrence against terrorism and an Iranian nuclear breakout. Ultimately, no piece of paper will block an Iranian nuclear breakout. The chief deterrent against Iran’s attaining a nuclear capability is the prospect of a possible U.S. preventive military attack. It is no coincidence that Iran halted many aspects of its nuclear weapons program in 2003 after the U.S. invasion and overthrow of hostile regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. To strengthen deterrence against an Iranian nuclear breakout, the U.S. needs to rebuild its military strength in the region.

Work with allies to contain and roll back Iranian influence. The Trump Administration embraced America’s traditional role of backing its allies in the Middle East and defending their vital interests against Iran even if that means hurting Europe’s marginal commercial interests in trading with Iran. Preventing a single power from dominating Persian Gulf oil resources has been a prime goal of U.S. Middle East policy since the Truman Administration. The U.S. must maintain a favorable balance of power in the region to deter and contain Iran. Washington should strengthen security ties with Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that are threatened by Tehran. Washington also should urge European allies to recognize that the JCPOA has effectively collapsed and reimpose nuclear sanctions on Iran. To encourage the regime to change course, the U.S. should lead an international campaign to impose clear and mounting costs on Iran for its hostile policies.

Put a high priority on missile defense. Iran’s ballistic missile force is the largest in the Middle East and poses a growing threat to Tehran’s neighbors. Washington should help Israel to strengthen its missile defenses and help the GCC countries to build an integrated and layered missile defense architecture to blunt the Iranian missile threat. The U.S. should also field missile defense interceptors in space that can intercept Iranian missiles in the boost phase, which would add a valuable additional layer to missile defenses.

Support human rights in Iran. The Obama Administration made a grave error in muting its criticism of Iran’s 2009 crackdown on the opposition Green Movement and Iran’s chronic abuses of human rights. In the long run, a free Iran is the best hope for peace and security in the volatile Middle East. Congress should make it clear that the U.S. stands with the Iranian people, not with the repressive regime of the ayatollahs. It should hold hearings to publicize and condemn Tehran’s violations of human rights, expose the corruption of regime officials, publicize the activities of opposition groups, and help those groups to communicate with the Iranian people.

• Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• James Phillips, “Dangerous Ramifications of Reshuffled Iran Nuclear Deal,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 28, 2022.
• James Phillips, “Iran Escalates Shadow War With U.S., Israel in Latest Missile Attack,” Heritage Foundation, Commentary, March 22, 2022.
• Peter Brookes and James Phillips, “4 Reasons Why Returning to Iran Nuclear Deal Is Bad Idea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 22, 2022.
• James Phillips, “Why Joe Biden’s Nuclear Talks With Iran Look Like a Disaster,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 15, 2022.
• James Phillips, “Iranian Drones Cast Intimidating Shadow Over Iraq,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 10, 2021.
• James Phillips and Peter Brookes, “Iran’s Nuclear Humpty Dumpty: The JCPOA Should Not Be Put Back Together Again,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3661, October 13, 2021.
• Peter Brookes, “Atomic Ayatollahs Up the Ante on Biden Administration,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 20, 2021.
• Peter Brookes and Walker Venable, “What Iran’s Failed Satellite Launch Likely Signals,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 2, 2021.
• Peter Brookes and James Phillips, “The Growing Danger of Iran’s Missile Programs,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3605, April 13, 2021.
• Nicole Robinson and Stephen LaRussa, “Congress Failed Once to Use Its Power on Iran Nuclear Agreement. It Shouldn’t Fail Again,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 30, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Biden Must Stand Up to Iran’s Proxy Extortion Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 8, 2021.
• The Heritage Foundation, “Why Returning to the JCPOA Is a Dangerous Mistake,” Factsheet No. 203, February 25, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Don’t Rush to Failure on Iran Nuclear Negotiations,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6036, January 11, 2021.
• James Phillips, “United States Should Derail Prospects for an Iran‐China Alliance,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3541, October 6, 2020.
• James Phillips, “Trump Applies More ‘Maximum Pressure’ on Iran,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 11, 2020.
• James Jay Carafano, “Trump Tells Iran the Endgame Remains the Same While Offering a Chance to Renegotiate,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 9, 2020.
• James Phillips, “How U.S. Strike Against Iranian General Changes the Rules of the Game in Iraq, Region,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 5, 2020.
• James Jay Carafano, “U.S. Airstrikes in Mideast—Sending This Clear Message to Friends and Foes Alike,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 2, 2020.
• James Phillips, “U.S. Should Boost Deterrence Against Iran,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5023, December 30, 2019.
• James Phillips, “How Protests Undermine Iran and Its Proxies in Iraq and Lebanon,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 4, 2019.
• James Phillips, “Sanctioning Revolutionary Guard as Terrorist Group Will Hit Iran Hard. Here’s Why,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 8, 2019.
• James Phillips, “Trump Pulls the Plug on Defective Iran Nuclear Deal,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 14, 2018.
• James Phillips, “Iran’s Intensifying War with Israel,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 22, 2018.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

Israel, the only genuine democracy in the Middle East, shares important values and interests with the United States. It faces significant security threats from Iran as well as from Arab states and extremist movements that refuse to accept its right to exist. Iran’s ballistic missiles can already reach Israel. Tehran also has provided increasingly sophisticated arms to proxy forces such as Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as well as such allies as Hamas and other Palestinian radical movements, for use against Israel. Iran has taken advantage of the civil war in Syria to entrench itself there and deploy Hezbollah and Shiite militia fighters from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to target Israel with ballistic missiles, rockets, drones, and terrorist attacks.

Although Israel reached peace treaties with Egypt in 1979, Jordan in 1994, and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in 2020, Jerusalem has failed to reach a peace treaty with Palestinians despite extensive and prolonged diplomatic efforts. The 1993 Oslo peace accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) created the Palestinian Authority and gave it limited governing responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza over a five-year period, which was to be followed by talks on the permanent status issues of borders, refugees, settlements, and Jerusalem. The Oslo negotiating framework broke down primarily because of Palestinian terrorist attacks that undermined Israeli willingness to make increasingly risky concessions in exchange for Palestinian promises that often were not kept. Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat failed to halt Palestinian terrorist attacks first from Hamas, the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, and later from other Palestinian groups including factions of his own PLO.

The principal barriers to peace between Israel and the Palestinian Authority are Palestinian terrorist attacks, not Israeli settlements. Many Israeli settlements are located in areas that eventually could be folded into Israel in exchange for equal amounts of Israeli territory transferred to Palestinian control in a final settlement. Yet when the Obama Administration sought in 2009 to revive the comatose peace process, which had been on American-supplied life support since the collapse of the 2000 Camp David summit, it made a freeze on building new settlements the centerpiece of its strategy.

The Obama Administration’s focus on settlements guaranteed friction with the Israeli government and hardened the Palestinian negotiating position because Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas could not be seen as less opposed to settlements than the U.S. Even though the Palestinians had negotiated for many years without gaining a settlement freeze, Abbas made it a condition for resuming talks. The Palestinians then sat back and let Washington attempt to wring major concessions from Israel without feeling any need to reciprocate with concessions of their own. To make matters worse, Abbas also pushed for U.N. endorsement of unilateral Palestinian statehood rather than relying on negotiations with Israel, which would be the only genuine path to peace.

President Trump proclaimed his interest in reaching the “ultimate deal,” a peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. He did not endorse a “two state solution” as envisioned in the Oslo accords; instead, he indicated that he could accept any solution on which the two sides might be able to agree. His Administration muted U.S. criticism of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and cut U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority to pressure it to take a stronger stand against terrorism. Meanwhile, the Administration pursued an “outside-in” strategy, eventually brokering the 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

President Trump established himself as perhaps the most pro-Israeli American President ever to hold office. Under his leadership, the United States recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, closed the office of the General Delegation of the PLO in Washington, and demonstrated much stronger support for Israeli security concerns than his predecessor had exhibited.

The Biden Administration reversed many of the Trump Administration’s policies on Arab‐Israeli issues. It pledged to improve relations with the Palestinian Authority and reopen the consulate in Jerusalem that was closed in 2019 after serving as the U.S. diplomatic mission to the Palestinian Authority for 25 years. Following through on this pledge—a course that Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett strongly opposes—would undermine Israel’s sovereignty over its own capital and ignite a crisis in bilateral relations. It also would be a violation of the intent of the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act, which recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and stipulated that the capital should remain undivided.

Do not open a consulate for Palestinian affairs in Jerusalem. Establishing a consulate in Jerusalem would infringe on Israel’s sovereign rights and send a dangerous signal that the Biden Administration would support a divided Jerusalem. Any consulate that is opened should be located in Ramallah, the city that hosts the headquarters of the Palestinian Authority. No other country in the world has both a consulate general and a U.S. embassy in the same city.

Strengthen U.S.‐Israeli strategic cooperation. The political instability that has plagued the Middle East in recent years underscores the fact that Israel is America’s most reliable, stable, and effective ally in the region. Congress should support all efforts to enhance strategic cooperation with Israel, particularly in intelligence sharing, missile defense, cyber defense, and counter terrorism efforts.

Push for incremental steps in Israeli‐Palestinian peace negotiations instead of rushing to failure on a comprehensive settlement. A final settlement cannot be brokered as long as the Palestinian Authority is unwilling and unable to make the deep compromises that a realistic peace requires. Even if it was willing and able, Hamas and other Iran-backed Palestinian terrorist groups could destroy any agreement with another round of rocket terrorism. Incremental progress on security arrangements, confidence-building measures, and efforts to improve the welfare of Palestinians in the West Bank would help to reinforce support for the Palestinian Authority at the expense of Hamas, which has transformed Gaza into a base for terrorism. Washington also should insist that the Palestinian Authority end its incitement of terrorist attacks and halt the annual subsidies of more than $330 million that it pays to jailed terrorists and the families of “martyrs” killed in confrontations with Israelis. A government that incentivizes terrorism is not an acceptable partner for peace negotiations.

Penalize Palestinian terrorism and encourage moderation. Congress should support efforts to hold Hamas accountable for its terrorist atrocities, violations of human rights, and acceptance of illegal Iranian arms shipments. The United States should veto any Palestinian efforts to attain unilateral statehood through the United Nations and should withdraw U.S. financial support for any U.N. agency that facilitates such efforts. It also should work to encourage the development of a practical working relationship between Israel and Sunni Arab states that face threats from Iran.

Expand the Abraham Accords to include other Arab States. The Biden Administration should work to expand the 2020 Abraham peace accords that normalized Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan to include other Arab states. Saudi Arabia and Oman are prime candidates. Those Arab states could also help to weaken and isolate Hamas, subsidize Palestinian economic development, and encourage the emergence of a moderate Palestinian leadership that is willing and able to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.

Support Israel’s efforts to deter and defend against Iranian threats, particularly from inside Syria and Lebanon. Israel has avoided intervening in Syria’s complex, multisided civil war, but it has been drawn into a deepening confrontation with Iran and its Hezbollah surrogates, which have exploited the Syrian war to open a new front with Israel and boost the flow of sophisticated weaponry to expand Hezbollah’s military threat to Israel. Israel has launched more than two thousand air strikes to destroy Iranian-supplied ballistic missiles and other arms inside Syria before they could be transferred to the Lebanon-based terrorist group.

Hezbollah has committed about one-third of its almost 30,000 fighters as part of an Iranian-controlled Shia foreign legion deployed in Syria to prop up the Assad regime. The terrorist group is thought to have amassed an arsenal of about 150,000 rockets, which it has dispersed amid civilian buildings and underground bunkers covertly built in Lebanon. Iran has provided the bulk of these weapons, including increasingly accurate longer-range missiles capable of targeting most of Israel. Perhaps motivated by steady losses of arms and equipment due to Israeli air strikes, Iran is building weapons factories in Lebanon to assemble advanced missiles, anti-tank weapons, and drones. Israel is likely to target these facilities in future rounds of fighting with Iran and Hezbollah.

Washington should supply Israel with advanced “bunker-buster” precision guided munitions to enable Israel to destroy fortified underground military facilities established by Hezbollah and Iran in Lebanon and Syria. Such munitions also could enhance Israel’s military options for destroying Iran’s nuclear infrastructure if diplomacy fails to halt Iran’s accelerating nuclear program. The U.S. also should warn Russia and Iran that the United States will respond forcefully to future threats in Syria, particularly the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime. (See the section on the Middle East.) Washington should strongly support Israeli military efforts to blunt threats emanating from Syria and Lebanon. If Moscow is not willing or able to restrain Iran in Syria, it must share the responsibility—and risk the consequences of possible collateral damage to the Assad regime—for Iran’s destabilizing actions in Syria.

Help to strengthen Israeli missile defense capabilities. Israel faces a growing threat from ballistic missiles launched from Iran, Syria, or Lebanon and shorter-range rockets and drones launched by Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, or Iraqi Shia militias. During the 11-day war that broke out in May 2021, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad launched about 4,400 rockets and missiles against Israel, killing 12 Israelis. Israel responded with hundreds of air strikes that killed over 240 Palestinians, at least 200 of whom were militants according to Israel. The death toll on both sides could have been much higher, but Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system destroyed 90 percent of Palestinian rockets that would have fallen on populated areas and reduced pressure on Israel to invade Gaza to stop the rocket terrorism.

Washington should strengthen its support for Israeli missile defense, particularly the rapid replacement of the Tamir interceptors expended by the Iron Dome defense system. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2022 includes $500 million for Israeli missile defense and $3.3 billion for other security assistance. In future years, more of the $38 billion in military aid that the U.S. promised Israel over 10 years in a 2016 agreement should be allocated to missile defense, and Washington should accelerate the delivery of missile defense equipment.

• Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Nicole Robinson, “Abraham Accords: Sowing Seeds of Peace, Harvesting Fruits of Prosperity,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 28, 2022.
• Patty-Jane Geller, “Congress Overdue to Help Fund Israel’s Iron Dome,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 17, 2022.
• Nicole Robinson and Eric Feely, “Abraham Accords Pave Way for Previously Unthinkable Arab‐Israeli Defense Cooperation,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 11, 2022.
• Adam Milstein and James Jay Carafano, “The Israel Test of the Democratic Party,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 29, 2021.
• James Jay Carafano and Adam Milstein, “What Is Behind the Left’s Opposition to Funding Israel’s Iron Dome?” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 18, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Iran Looms Large over Biden’s Talks with Israeli Prime Minister Bennett,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 25, 2021.
• James Jay Carafano and Adam Milstein, “Resurgence of Palestinian Violence Direct Assault on Arab‐Israeli Normalization,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 21, 2021.
• Virginia Allen and James Phillips, “Israel and Hamas Are at War Again. Here’s What U.S. Should Do About It,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 20, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Hamas Exploits Palestinian Unrest to Launch Rocket War Against Israel,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 12, 2021.
• James Jay Carafano and Adam Milstein, “What Is the Future of Our Policy Toward Israel Under Joe Biden?” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 10, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Why Israel Needs Bunker-Buster Bombs,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 30, 2020.
• James Jay Carafano and Adam Milstein, “Arab-Israeli Normalization Is the Way to Peace with Palestinians,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 22, 2020.
• James Phillips, “How the Israel‐Bahrain Peace Deal Will Reshape the Middle East,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 17, 2020.
• James Jay Carafano, “Israel‐UAE Agreement Shows Trump’s Middle East Policy Succeeding,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 17, 2020.
• James Phillips, “What’s Next After Trump Administration Brokers Israel‐UAE Peace Pact,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 16, 2020.
• Nicole Robinson, “Israel’s Aid to Lebanon ‘Transcends Conflict’,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 16, 2020.
• James Phillips, “Palestinians Miss Opportunity by Rejecting Trump Peace Plan,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 31, 2020.
• James Jay Carafano, “Why Trump Says Give Middle East Peace a Chance,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 20, 2020.
• James Phillips, “Netanyahu Scored a Historic Win. Here’s What to Expect Next,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 12, 2019.
• Brett D. Schaefer, “Palestinian Push Hurts the Palestinian People and the UN Organizations They Join,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 28, 2018.
• James Phillips, “Hamas Hides Behind Smoke and Mirrors to Attack Israel,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 17, 2018.
• James Jay Carafano, “Israel Has a Right to Prevent Its Obliteration,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 6, 2018.
• James Phillips, “Iran’s Intensifying War with Israel,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 22, 2018.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

The United States has a strategic interest in Latin America and the Caribbean that stems from geographic proximity, deep economic relations, a lengthy history of diplomatic connections, and persistently growing demographic and cultural ties. The U.S. is the top trading partner for more than two-thirds of the countries in the Western Hemisphere, including Canada, and the region is the primary source of energy for the U.S.

At the same time, regional prosperity and security face significant challenges. Transnational crime and illicit trafficking exist throughout the hemisphere. U.S. policy is focused particularly on the major crime networks in Central America, the Caribbean, Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. Two decades of criminal state capture and socialist mismanagement have left Venezuela in ruin, and its eventual post-tyranny reconstruction will remain a key priority for U.S. hemispheric policy. Central America’s Northern Triangle—a subregion comprising the crime-ridden and poverty-stricken countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—is the fastest-growing source of U.S.-bound illegal immigrants. Like the Caribbean, the Northern Triangle is also a key transit zone for narcotics bound for the U.S. and Europe. U.S. efforts to address these challenges have been undermined by local government corruption and weak Latin American state institutions. Illicit trafficking and high levels of violence remain key challenges in the fight against Mexico’s booming narcotics trade, which has seen a spike in the production of heroin and the transit of synthetic opioids from China.

Many countries in the region have democratic political systems, which more often than not results in close ties to the U.S., but there are some challenging outliers. Leftist authoritarian regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela work to undermine U.S. interests and collaborate with such like-minded rivals as Russia. There are similar concerns with respect to recently elected leftist governments in Peru, Bolivia, and Honduras. China’s growing engagement in the hemisphere has become a strategic challenge both for the U.S. and for the future of the hemisphere. Though China could theoretically play a role in catalyzing economic development, its predatory economic practices trap countries in unsustainable debt and dependence, and its corrupt practices undermine the rule of law. China, Russia, and Iran have demonstrated a strategic interest in extracting natural resources from resource-rich countries like Venezuela that are currently not subject to U.S. influence.

U.S. policy toward the Western Hemisphere should focus with greater intensity on such destabilizing regional challenges as transnational crime, illicit trafficking networks, corruption that fosters criminality, and the growing influence of external geostrategic adversaries. The U.S. should seek to remove trade barriers and promote prosperity and private investment with our market economy-oriented counterparts. U.S. policymakers should also urge international partners to maintain and increase their opposition to regional authoritarians and the international actors that enable them.

Assess the efficacy of the Central American development package, the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, and the Root Causes Strategy. In July 2021, the Biden Administration released its Root Causes Strategy and a Collaborative Migration Management Strategy to address the “root causes” of illegal migration from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In 2014, prompted by the unaccompanied minor crisis, the Obama Administration had launched a development package that was also intended to address the causes of migration from the region. Addressing the regional drivers of illegal immigration should be an integral part of the Administration’s immigration policy, and foreign assistance works when used wisely. Congress should request impact reports from implementing agencies that gauge whether these programs are meeting their intended objectives. Congress should also ask how much these security and economic indicators are (or are not) affected by these investments.

Improve regional border security. Uncontrolled borders in the Northern Triangle have long been a problem. Regional insecurity allows criminality to proliferate and enables the mass movements of people across state lines. The U.S. and Mexican governments should work with their regional counterparts to improve their border security policies and programs. They should support El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama in expanding border patrols to ungoverned areas, modernizing border crossings, and encouraging the creation of joint border patrols. The U.S. should also tailor its security assistance to Colombia and Mexico to improve their border enforcement capacities. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security should host an annual high-level border-control working group to share best practices with the region.

Align levels of U.S. assistance to Mexico with U.S. national security interests. A safer and more prosperous Mexico would reduce the security threats to the U.S., alleviate the drivers of illegal immigration, and allow both countries to focus on productive matters in the bilateral relationship. Yet U.S. assistance to Mexico in the form of the Merida Initiative has decreased from the all-time high of $639.2 million in fiscal year (FY) 2010 to $130.9 million in FY 2017. The U.S. and Mexican governments have announced that the Merida Initiative will be replaced by a new security deal that they claim will focus on intelligence and targeting the root causes of migration. While the Merida initiative should be revised to see what works and what can be improved, the U.S. should expand security assistance funding, not dilute it by directing it toward other priorities.

Develop a new strategy against Mexican cartels but avoid designating them as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Mexican cartels are the most serious criminal threat to the U.S. and Mexico. These criminal organizations are motivated by profits, not religion or ideology. The cartels’ political activities are meant to further their criminal objectives. Thus, an FTO designation has no legal basis. Aside from being legally unsound, an FTO designation would unnecessarily complicate the U.S.‐Mexico relationship and jeopardize efforts to combat the cartels. Instead, the U.S. and Mexico need to develop new anti-cartel policies and create a new framework to target cartel networks and modernize security assistance programs.

Engage Latin American countries in a robust trade agenda to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains and state-owned firms. The U.S. should coordinate with our partners in the region at the highest levels of government to enhance trade cooperation, reduce barriers that prevent small and medium-size enterprises from accessing markets, and identify strategic sectors in which regional supply chains can be strengthened. Everywhere from Uruguay to Ecuador to Guatemala, our democratic partners are asking for trade deals and would prefer to engage with the U.S. rather than China when given the choice. Failing to offer that choice will only strengthen China’s growing influence and dilute our strategic partnerships and ability to incentivize economic freedom.

Focus the response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on strategic investments focused on security and economic growth and expand the private sector’s role in any potential strategy. Any response to China’s BRI, such as the Biden Administration’s Build Back Better World initiative, should focus investments on strategic competition with China and strengthening the security and economic growth of our partners. This means giving considerable attention to strategic infrastructure, energy, and technology projects where long-term dependence on China may be in play. A successful strategy also requires the U.S. to enlist partners in Western Europe and around the world, particularly in sectors such as 5G spectrum auctions where competition requires multilateral cooperation. The U.S. should coordinate with national and local governments in the region and with private-sector leaders in the U.S. and Western Europe to identify projects for which the private sector can present investment alternatives to China.

Encourage Latin American countries to adopt better practices when concluding agreements with China and Chinese firms. The U.S. needs to emphasize that Chinese state enterprises far too often engage in predatory practices to the detriment of regional and U.S. interests. As part of this emphasis, the U.S. should urge regional counterparts to enforce international standards. An important first step would be to ensure that any agreement with Chinese state-owned enterprises or Chinese private-sector companies incorporates several principles: high standards of transparency, consultative infrastructure, responsible lending and debt financing, the rule of law, and respect for sovereignty. Regional counterparts also should take account of national security concerns with respect to such strategic industries as energy and telecommunications. Countries in the region need to have a clear-eyed view of the potential costs and consequences of irresponsible engagement with China.

Maintain and strengthen the U.S. embargo on Cuba. Cuba is the Western Hemisphere’s oldest military dictatorship, and the military controls nearly 90 percent of the country’s economy. Economic engagement with Havana would mean directly enriching the regime, which in turn would provide additional support for repression. Cuba’s direct role in propagating the crisis in Venezuela must be met with meaningful steps to hold Havana accountable. Deterring economic engagement with the military dictatorship also involves enlisting regional and global partners. U.S. partners like the European Union, Israel, and market-friendly democracies in Latin America all have economic ties with Havana. Democracies in Africa and Latin America also embrace Havana’s modern-day slave labor scheme of forcibly exporting Cuban doctors. These countries should not be investing in Cuba’s state-owned enterprises. The U.S. should rally its partners and pro-democracy actors around a common agenda.

Maintain and broaden cooperation with like-minded hemispheric counterparts to address the crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua. The U.S. can and should lead the attempt to address the crises in Venezuela and Nicaragua, but it should do so by working with other countries in the region, both to negate the basis for criticism of U.S. unilateralism and to maintain regional cohesion and address long-term reconstruction efforts. The U.S. should emphasize that the regime of Nicolás Maduro is not simply authoritarian, but a criminal enterprise with global reach. Enhanced law enforcement cooperation should target drug trafficking and smuggling, illicit mining, illicit finance and money laundering, and cooperation with terrorist groups like Hezbollah, the ELN, and FARC-dissidents. To target illicit financing, the U.S. should enlist the cooperation of regional counterparts including Panama and nations in the Caribbean.

Reject plans for a military solution to solve the Venezuela crisis. At this juncture, the U.S. should not conduct a military intervention in Venezuela. The threats posed by the illegitimate Maduro regime do not threaten vital U.S. interests, and the Venezuelan military should not be destroyed or disbanded, as they are necessary for the reconstruction process. However, the U.S. and regional partners should signal to Maduro that all potential tools of leverage are on the table, particularly as his regime consolidates and expands its illicit network.

Urge a tougher domestic and international response to actors that are propping up illegitimate regimes and destabilizing the region’s democracies. The U.S. should strongly urge other countries to address the destabilizing role of actors like Russia, China, and Iran as well as Cuba, which is both a beneficiary of external support and a destabilizing actor in the region. In addition to enabling the Maduro regime in Venezuela and the Ortega regime in Nicaragua, these countries have used espionage and disinformation to foment instability in the region’s democracies. The U.S. and its partners should expand sanctions against Russian state enterprises that support Maduro and Ortega with security assistance. The U.S. should also prioritize countering the roles of Russia, China, and Iran in helping Maduro to circumvent U.S. oil and gold sanctions. Across the region, democratic partners should develop a coordinated strategy to respond to misinformation tactics and strengthen intelligence cooperation.

Reduce the Caribbean’s dependence on Venezuelan oil. Maduro’s capacity to project power in the region stems largely his use of “petro-diplomacy.” In 2018, the Department of Energy finalized a rule to expedite small-scale exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG). These exports are particularly beneficial for Caribbean, Central American, and South American countries. Increased access to American LNG exports will provide more choice and energy diversity for Caribbean countries.

Assist regional partners impacted by crises in Venezuela and Haiti. Latin American countries are so overwhelmed by the exodus of Venezuelan and Haitian migrants and refugees that they are unable to contend with their own domestic challenges. These migrant crises also present a security problem at the U.S.‐Mexico border that urgently requires increased efforts and resources. The U.S. should work with international donors to assess the needs of our partners, balance those needs with our own interests, and support efforts to offset their burden when appropriate. The U.S. should also promote regional efforts to strengthen institutional and trade cooperation between the countries of the region to mitigate the costs of irregular migration flows.

Work with regional counterparts to implement a security plan for Haiti. The security crisis in Haiti and the state’s failure to combat the outsized power of gangs require consistent U.S. attention. The U.S. should prioritize cooperation with Haitian security forces to address both immediate challenges and long-term buildup, but it should avoid the false paradigm between military intervention and a U.N.-backed option like the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in order to strengthen Haiti’s security and reduce the likelihood of another crisis like the one seen in 2021. The U.S. should continue to work with regional counterparts and Haitian officials and offer joint resources, training, and personnel support to restore the Haitian state’s authority over its territory.

Commission studies to identify the causes of the U.S.’s pervasive demand for narcotics and address them. As it does with any other commodity, the demand for illicit narcotics drives the supply. The U.S.’s counterdrug strategy has been unsuccessful partly because the U.S. has been unable to stem the domestic drug demand. The U.S. rightfully declared the opioid crisis to be a nationwide public health emergency in October 2017. As the U.S. develops a counter-narcotics policy, it should also assess the factors that drive domestic consumption and work with state and local governments to address them.

• Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Mateo Haydar and Colin Agostisi, “How China Spies on Nations Throughout Western Hemisphere,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 8, 2022.
• James M. Roberts, Mateo Haydar, Celina B. Realuyo, and Joseph M. Humire, “America’s Longtime Friend, Colombia, Needs U.S. Help,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3679, December 15, 2021.
• Kiron B. Skinner and James Jay Carafano, “Biden Must Not Return to Obama-Era Cuba Policies,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 21, 2021.
• Mateo Haydar and James M. Roberts, “Biden Talks Tough on Nicaragua, but Caves to Vicious Regime,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 27, 2021.
• James M. Roberts and Lora Ries, “The Best U.S. Response to the Root Causes of Poverty in Central America,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3642, August 11, 2021.
• Mark Morgan and Ana Rosa Quintana, “How Amnesty Causes Human Misery, Endangers Public Health,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 10, 2021.
• Ana Rosa Quintana, “Latin American Countries Must Not Allow Huawei to Develop Their 5G Networks,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 6041, January 25, 2021.
• Ana Rosa Quintana, “Mexico’s Nationalism Threatens North American Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 6, 2021.
• Ana Rosa Quintana, “Prospects for Freedom in Venezuela Are High Under Trump,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, June 23, 2020.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

The Middle East, the world’s most volatile and conflict-ridden region, continues to generate some of the most dangerous threats to U.S. security. The Trump Administration inherited many problems from the Obama Administration, which failed to formulate effective policies to address the challenges posed by the rise of ISIS; the meltdown of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen; and the growing threat from Islamist extremists throughout the region. The Trump Administration effectively mitigated the threat of ISIS and supported Saudi Arabia’s efforts in Yemen; the Biden Administration’s policies threaten this progress. (See sections on Iran and Israel.)

The Obama Administration’s premature withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011 weakened Iraqi counterterrorism, intelligence gathering, and special-operations capabilities, thereby enabling a decimated al-Qaeda to revive and resurge as ISIS. The Obama White House underestimated the threat posed by ISIS and reacted slowly and reluctantly with a series of half measures. It never effectively matched ends and means: It initially barred combat operations by American ground troops; delayed deploying military advisers and, when it did deploy them, restricted them from being deployed with front-line Iraqi forces; and put tight restrictions on the use of air strikes to avoid civilian casualties.

The Trump Administration eased many of the political restrictions that hampered the military efforts against ISIS and delivered much more robust military support to help the Iraqi government and Kurdish militias to dismantle the so-called caliphate. ISIS has been forced to return to its underground roots in Iraq and Syria but continues to pose a terrorist threat to the U.S. and its allies. ISIS also has established affiliates in Egypt, Yemen, and in multiple countries in Asia and Africa.

In January 2021, the Biden Administration began to review U.S. policies across the Middle East, including its policies on Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In Iraq, the Administration indicated that it would conclude the combat mission of U.S. military forces in Iraq by the end of 2021, but troop levels remained the same at 2,500. A joint U.S.‐Iraq statement specified that the bilateral security relationship will be focused on training, advising, and intelligence-sharing to mitigate the threat from the remnants of ISIS. However, the principal threat to U.S. forces is the Iran-backed Iraqi Shia militias that continue to launch rocket attacks against Iraqi bases that host U.S. troops.

A rocket attack on February 15, 2021, killed a Filipino contractor at a military base at Irbil in northern Iraq. In response, President Joe Biden ordered a February 25 air strike against military facilities in Syria controlled by Iraqi militias backed by Iran, including Kataib Hezbollah, one of Iran’s most dangerous Iraqi surrogate groups. An American contractor died of a heart attack during a rocket attack attributed to Kataib Hezbollah in March, but the Biden Administration did not retaliate overtly until June 28, when it targeted the infrastructure used by Iran-backed Iraqi militias in Syria and Iraq while minimizing the hostile militias’ casualties. By contrast, the Trump Administration held Iran responsible for the attacks of its proxy militias in Iraq by killing General Qassem Soleimani, who directed the operations of Iraqi militias as leader of Iran’s Quds Force, in a drone strike in Baghdad in January 2020.

In June 2021, despite the continuing attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria, the Biden Administration began the withdrawal of eight Patriot air defense batteries and a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. This signal of U.S. complacency undoubtedly emboldened Iran to continue its proxy attacks and stiffen its demands at the nuclear talks. (See section on Iran.) Iran-backed Iraqi militias, undeterred by symbolic military reprisals, escalated their aggressive attacks by launching a drone strike at the residence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on November 7, 2021. On March 13, 2022, Iran launched ballistic missiles that targeted a house near the U.S. consulate in northern Iraq. The house belonged to a Kurdish businessman that Iran claimed was cooperating with Israeli intelligence.

U.S. policy in Syria is even less clear. U.S. partners in the Middle East started to normalize relations with the Syrian regime in 2021 even though President Bashar al-Assad is still in power. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has stated that the U.S. has no plans to “normalize or upgrade” diplomatic relations with Syria, and the Administration has continued the deployment of 600–900 U.S. military personnel in northeastern Syria without specifying the conditions that would enable them to be withdrawn. Meanwhile, Lebanon is on the brink of collapse after years of sectarian squabbling, corruption, and mismanagement by its political elites. Hezbollah, Iran’s strongest proxy militia, continues to dominate Lebanese politics, drain state resources, and stockpile Iran-supplied arms for another war against Israel.

In Yemen, the Biden Administration reversed the Trump Administration’s hard-line policies, rescinded President Donald Trump’s designation of the Houthi rebels as a terrorist organization, halted support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis on behalf of Yemen’s internationally recognized government, and distanced itself from Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Biden Administration’s threat to cut off U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia, if implemented, would severely weaken the kingdom’s ability to counterbalance Iran and its proxies, potentially tilting the balance of power in Iran’s favor and pushing Saudi Arabia into the arms of China or Russia for arms sales. It also would embolden Iran-backed proxies to continue their efforts to destabilize Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, and parts of the West Bank.

The U.S. has strategic interests in containing Iran and fighting terrorism in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The challenge for policymakers is to formulate a policy that advances these interests without a risky and costly mission creep toward the overly ambitious goal of nation-building. President Trump was correct when he said in December 2018 that U.S. forces should come home from Syria. Ultimately, they must come home, but this must be carried out in phases, taking into consideration regional dynamics and the situation on the ground. Washington should not make the same mistake it made in Iraq in 2014 by leaving a vacuum that Islamist terrorists or Iran can exploit. Instead, U.S. policy must take account of the deteriorating political, economic, and security conditions in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.

Prevent ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups from creating sanctuaries in Syria. The permanent defeat of ISIS remains a top U.S. priority in Syria and Iraq. While ISIS has been ousted from its so-called caliphate, it remains a lethal force and could make a comeback as it did in Iraq in 2014. The Biden Administration should not ignore Syria and Iraq. The drawdown of U.S. forces in both countries should be gradual and linked to security conditions on the ground, not governed by a rigid timetable. An abrupt U.S. departure would be a strategic error that would benefit Iran, the Assad regime, Russia, Hezbollah, and ISIS.

The U.S. should lead an international effort to prevent an ISIS resurgence, primarily providing air support, intelligence, counterterrorism assistance, training, and logistical support, while gradually withdrawing U.S. ground troops from Syria. The U.S. should also work with Jordan, Iraq, and allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to coordinate more robust Arab efforts to defeat ISIS that include assuming a greater responsibility for stabilizing eastern Syria with troops and economic support and stepping up aid for Syrian refugees to prevent them from being radicalized by ISIS.

Help Iraq’s government withstand the challenges posed by ISIS. Inside Iraq, the U.S. should work with the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil to help resettle Iraqis displaced by the war with ISIS and protect them from an ISIS resurgence. Washington should continue to train and arm Iraqi army and counterterrorism forces to help them permanently defeat ISIS and provide a counterweight to the growing power of pro-Iran Shia militias. Ultimately, the appeal of ISIS will be weakened only if Baghdad’s Shia-dominated government reaches out to Sunni tribal and moderate political leaders to give them a stake in Iraq’s future and undermine the appeal of ISIS and other Islamist extremists.

Contain and mitigate the destabilizing spillover effects of Syria’s civil war. Washington should focus on strengthening border security to prevent fighting from spilling across Syria’s borders and threatening U.S. allies, particularly Israel and Jordan, and limiting the outflow of refugees by helping to care for them closer to their homes. The U.S. also should work with allies to stop foreign fighters from returning to their home countries and encourage foreign countries to extradite their citizens from prisons in Syria and Iraq. Washington should offer more humanitarian aid to support refugees inside Syria and in surrounding countries but should not become a party to the conflict by deploying U.S. forces inside Syria to maintain safe zones. The U.S. can best help to protect Syrian refugees by focusing on mitigating the threat of ISIS and supporting a political settlement that ends the fighting, allows displaced Syrians to return home, and limits the influence of Islamist extremists, including Iran and Hezbollah.

Deter the use of illegal chemical weapons by the Assad regime. President Trump restored U.S. credibility after President Barack Obama’s failure to enforce his own 2013 red line prohibiting the Assad regime from using illegal chemical weapons against its own people. In April 2017 and April 2018, President Trump ordered cruise missile strikes against Syrian forces that were involved in chemical weapons attacks. These forceful actions have deterred major attacks, but the regime could be tempted to resort to smaller covert attacks. The Biden Administration must therefore continue to lead an international effort against the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

Help Iraqis to build a secure and stable government. Washington should encourage Iraq’s predominantly Shia leaders to build an inclusive government that welcomes participation by Iraq’s Kurdish, Sunni, Christian, and other minority groups. Reaching out to moderate Sunni Arab leaders is particularly vital to undermining the appeal of ISIS and other Sunni Islamist militants. The U.S. and its allies should continue efforts to professionalize and reform internal security forces to prevent abuses, nepotism, and corruption. Washington should also continue to train the Iraqi army to preserve it as a counterweight to pro-Iran militias that have come under the government’s security umbrella.

Iran expanded its influence as ISIS receded and is pushing for a greater political role for the radical Shia militias that it controls. The danger is that these proxies could exploit such an enhanced role to subvert Iraqi sovereignty in the same way that Hezbollah, another Iran-backed group, subverted Lebanon’s sovereignty. Washington should encourage Baghdad to contain and marginalize the political influence of the pro-Iran militias and promote better relations between Baghdad and the Sunni Arab states to provide a counterweight to Iran’s influence. Washington also should promote better relations between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government and broker a bilateral agreement on the equitable sharing of oil revenues.

Strengthen U.S. strategic partnerships, especially with Israel. The 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran had a corrosive effect on bilateral relationships with important U.S. partners in the Middle East, particularly countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain that are most threatened by Iran. The Trump Administration strengthened ties with Arab partners after pulling out of the Iran nuclear deal and imposing sanctions on Iran in 2018. The Biden Administration, however, is rushing to embrace Iran as the Obama Administration did, which is disastrous for U.S. interests as well as the interests of Israel and Arab partners. Instead, the Biden Administration should give priority to safeguarding the vital security interests of the U.S. and its partners by maintaining a favorable regional balance of power to deter and contain Iran and fight terrorism. The U.S. and its European allies also should strengthen military, intelligence, and security cooperation with Israel and Arab states threatened by Iran.

Support Egypt’s fight against terrorism. Egypt is a key ally against Islamist extremism and a crucial supporter of Arab‐Israeli peace efforts. ISIS has spearheaded an insurgency in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula since the 2013 coup that removed President Mohamed Morsi’s Islamist government from power and remains a potent terrorist threat to Egypt and to Israel. Washington should help Egypt’s army and security forces to replace Cairo’s narrowly focused and militarized counterterrorism efforts with a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign against ISIS and its supporters that includes enhanced political outreach to disaffected Bedouin tribes in the Sinai. Washington should also provide technical assistance in finding and destroying tunnels under the Egypt‐Gaza border that Hamas and other Islamist terrorist groups use to smuggle arms, terrorists, and contraband into and out of Gaza. President Abdelfattah el-Sisi’s government, although increasingly authoritarian, has a better chance of laying the groundwork for a stable democracy than Morsi’s regime had. The U.S. should leverage aid to Egypt to ensure that Cairo adheres to the terms of its peace treaty with Israel and respects the freedom and human rights of its own citizens.

Prevent Yemen from becoming a terrorist sanctuary or Iranian ally. Arab Spring protests enabled Houthi rebels aligned with Iran to overthrow the Yemeni government in a bloody 2015 coup that violated a U.N.-brokered cease-fire. An Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily to support Yemen’s internationally recognized government. High levels of civilian casualties and growing food shortages have put millions of Yemenis on the brink of starvation. Iran has sought to transform the Houthi Ansar Allah movement into the “Hezbollah of Yemen”—a permanent threat to regional stability and security that directly conflicts with U.S. interests—and has illegally transferred sophisticated ballistic missiles, drones, and remote-controlled boat bombs to the Houthis, who have used them against cities, airports, oil pipelines, and other civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Biden Administration should end its pro-Houthi tilt and support efforts to roll back the Houthi coup and reach a political settlement that stops the fighting, averts widespread starvation, limits Iran’s influence, and allows a greater focus on defeating ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, two terrorist groups that have flourished amid the chaos of Yemen’s civil war.

• Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• James Phillips, “Iran Escalates Shadow War with U.S., Israel in Latest Missile Attack,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 21, 2022.
• James Phillips and Nicole Robinson, “Iran-Backed Militias Escalate Attacks on U.S., Arab Emirates,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 28, 2022.
• James Phillips, “Iranian Drones Cast Intimidating Shadow over Iraq,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 10, 2021.
• Nicole Robinson, “How the United States Should Approach Normalization Efforts with Syria,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5236, November 9, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Biden’s Afghanistan Exit Ignores Lessons from Iraq,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 20, 2021.
• Nicole Robinson, “Hariri Quits While Lebanon Crumbles,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 4, 2021.
• James Phillips, “Biden Must Stand Up to Iran’s Proxy Extortion Strategy,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 8, 2021.
• James Phillips, “How the Israel‐Bahrain Peace Deal Will Reshape the Middle East,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 17, 2020.
• James Jay Carafano, “Israel‐UAE Agreement Shows Trump’s Middle East Policy Succeeding,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 17, 2020.
• James Phillips, “What’s Next After Trump Administration Brokers Israel‐UAE Peace Pact,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 16, 2020.
• James Phillips, “Beirut Explosion Accelerates Lebanon’s Descent into a Failed State,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 14, 2020.
• Luke Coffey, James Phillips, Anthony B. Kim, Joshua Meservey, and Nicole Robinson, “The U.S. Should Expand Economic Its Cooperation with the Middle East and North Africa,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3497, June 1, 2020.
• James Phillips and Nicole Robinson, “How COVID-19 Exacerbates Lebanon’s Mounting Economic, Political Woes,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 16, 2020.
• Luke Coffey and James Phillips, “The Middle East Strategic Alliance: An Uphill Struggle,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 5056, April 7, 2020.
• Peter Brookes, “Mullahs Moving More Menacing Munitions to Yemen,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 26, 2020.
• James Phillips, “How U.S. Strike Against Iranian General Changes the Rules of the Game in Iraq, Region,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 5, 2020.
• James Phillips, “How Protests Undermine Iran and Its Proxies in Iraq and Lebanon,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 4, 2019.
• James Phillips and Nicole Robinson, “A Way Forward in Yemen,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4999, August 27, 2019.
• Madyson Hutchinson Posey and James Phillips, “Ending U.S. Military Support for Saudi Arabia in Yemen Would Trigger Dangerous Consequences,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 6, 2018.
• James Phillips, “This Little-Known Terror Group Poses a Greater Threat Than ISIS in Syria,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, December 3, 2018.
• James Phillips, “U.S. Must Be Wary of Doomed Peace Accord in Syria,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4915, November 2, 2018.
• James Phillips and Luke Coffey, “Next Steps for U.S. Policy in Syria and Iraq,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4846, April 26, 2018.
• James Phillips, “Trump’s Second Missile Strike Against Syria’s Chemical Weapons Both Appropriate and Necessary,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, April 17, 2018.
• James Jay Carafano, “Chaos Will Erupt in the Middle East If U.S. Leaves Yemen,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 7, 2018.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

North Korea poses one of the world’s most dangerous threats to U.S. national security interests. Pyongyang presents a multifaceted military threat to peace and stability in Asia as well as a global proliferation risk.

In January 2021, Kim Jong-un “set a goal of attaining an advanced capability for making a preemptive and retaliatory nuclear strike by [improving] the rate of precision good enough to strike and annihilate any strategic targets within a range of 15,000 kilometers with pinpoint accuracy.” Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests, including the test of a powerful hydrogen bomb 10 times the size of the atomic weapons used at the end of World War II. Leaked U.S. intelligence estimates indicate that the regime had between 30 and 60 nuclear weapons in 2017 with a capability to produce from seven through 12 more of these weapons annually.

The regime has successfully tested road-mobile ICBMs, including a variant that could reach the entire continental United States. In October 2020, Pyongyang paraded the world’s largest road-mobile ICBM. The regime subsequently announced that the missile would have multiple warheads. Combined with its recent ability to produce mobile ICBM launchers indigenously, this raises the possibility that North Korea might be able to overwhelm America’s missile defenses.

Despite three U.S.‐North Korea leader meetings, there has been no decrease in North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal or production capabilities. The U.S. Intelligence Community has assessed that Pyongyang has increased its production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and satellite imagery has revealed upgrades to missile, reentry vehicle, missile launcher, and nuclear weapon production facilities. The Intelligence Community continues to assess that North Korea is not likely to give up all of its WMD stockpiles, delivery systems, and production capabilities.

North Korea’s conventional forces also threaten U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam. Pyongyang has deployed hundreds of short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range missiles that can threated all of Japan and South Korea as well as U.S. bases on Okinawa and Guam. Since 2019, North Korea has tested 14 new missile systems that can target South Korea and U.S. forces stationed there more effectively.

North Korea has approximately 1 million people in its military and several million more in its reserves. Pyongyang has forward deployed 70 percent of its ground forces within 90 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), making it possible to attack with little or no warning. This is of particular concern because South Korea’s capital, Seoul, is only 30 miles south of the DMZ. North Korea’s armed forces, with their forward-deployed, offensively oriented disposition, and the regime’s history of making threats and initiating hostilities pose the greatest danger of armed conflict. In addition, confidence-building measures that have been implemented to date have not reduced the North Korean tactical or strategic conventional military threat to South Korea, nor do they represent progress in denuclearization.

Impose conditionality on future summit meetings. Initial U.S.‐North Korean summits occurred without suitable preparation or requirements for progress toward an agreement. Despite fanfare and claims of success, the three meetings provided only the illusion of success. Subsequent summits should be reserved for formalizing an agreement worked out by diplomats or in-depth leader negotiations based on meticulous and well-planned policy positions.

Maintain the focus on denuclearization. The primary U.S. objective for the summit must be North Korea’s complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear dismantlement as required by U.N. resolutions. Washington should not go down the rabbit hole of offering economic concessions to prove lack of U.S. hostility or induce North Korea to return to the negotiating table. It is not the U.S. and South Korea that have repeatedly violated U.N. resolutions, conducted deadly military attacks, and habitually threatened the governments and populations of rival nations.

Push for a comprehensive road map to denuclearization. With U.S.‐North Korean negotiations in abeyance, the Biden Administration should resist entreaties to lower the bar to achieve progress. Any agreement must include a complete North Korean data declaration of its nuclear and missile programs as well as an unambiguous and public North Korean commitment to the U.N. requirement to abandon its nuclear and missile production capabilities and existing arsenals in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner.

Insist on robust verification measures. U.S. negotiators must emulate the robust and intrusive verification regime of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. Pyongyang should pledge compliance with U.N. resolutions, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Verification provisions must include a data declaration of all production, fabrication, test, and storage facilities; the stockpile of fissile material, nuclear weapons, and missiles; on-site inspections of declared facilities; and short-notice challenge inspections of non-declared facilities. Any new agreement with North Korea that lacks such critically important protocols is a bad deal.

Condition a peace agreement on reducing the conventional force threat. The U.S. and South Korea should not sign a peace treaty until the North Korean nuclear threat is eliminated and the conventional threat is reduced. Conventional forces should be capped and then weaned away from the forward area using measures similar to those in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the accompanying Vienna Document of Confidence and Security Building Measures. Signing a simplistic peace declaration would provide a false perception of peace while creating societal and legislative momentum for reducing or removing U.S. forces before reducing the North Korean threat that necessitated American involvement in the first place.

Fully enforce U.S. laws. Sanctions are a critical component of U.S. foreign policy. They uphold America’s laws and defend its financial system—but only if they are implemented. The U.S. should sanction the 300 North Korean entities that are violating U.S. laws and against which it has deferred action, penalize Chinese banks that are engaged in money laundering and other crimes by identifying them as primary money-laundering concerns or imposing significant fines, impose sanctions against Chinese shipping companies that are flouting U.N. restrictions on North Korean oil, and impose secondary sanctions against ports that are aiding North Korea’s smuggling of goods that are prohibited by U.N. sanctions.

End unilateral U.S. disarmament by resuming military exercises. The 2018 U.S. decision to cancel U.S.‐South Korean military exercises was a major unilateral concession for which the United States received nothing in return. Pyongyang neither codified its missile and nuclear test moratorium in the Singapore communiqué nor announced reciprocal constraints on its own military exercises. The continued lack of a full schedule of exercises is degrading U.S. and South Korean deterrence and defense capabilities. The exercises are necessary to ensure both the interoperability and integration of allied military operations and the readiness to respond to North Korean attacks. Washington and Seoul should announce a return to the previous level of exercises.

Uphold human rights principles by enforcing the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act. The U.S. should make human rights an integral component of U.S. policy. Downplaying North Korean human rights violations to gain diplomatic progress is antithetical to U.S. values, undermines the diplomatic isolation of North Korea, and sets a poor precedent for negotiations.

• Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Bruce Klingner, “North Korea in 2022: What a Former CIA Expert Thinks Kim Jong-un Will Do Next,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 6, 2022.
• Bruce Klingner, “North Korea’s Nuclear Doctrine: Trusted Shield and Treasured Sword,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3665, October 18, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “North and South Korea Just Test-Fired Missiles. Here’s What You Need to Know,” The Daily Signal, September 16, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “North Korean Cyberattacks: A Dangerous and Evolving Threat,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 247, September 2, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “North Korea Ramps Up Nuclear Weapons Production,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 31, 2021.
• Olivia Enos, “Critical Signs to Watch for Famine in North Korea,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 1, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “Biden Administration Gives Indication of North Korea Policy, but Questions Remain,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, May 3, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “Debating North Korea Policy,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 16, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “Biden Administration Must Address Daunting North Korea Challenge,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3579, January 26, 2021.
• Bruce Klingner, “North Korea: Not Another Summit Until Progress at Working-Level Talks,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3536, September 21, 2020.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

Russia is a 21st-century country with 19th-century ambitions. As long as Vladimir Putin is in power, Russia will remain a geopolitical adversary and competitor for NATO and the United States. Since coming to power in 1999, Putin has tried to undermine the U.S. and its allies at every turn. No matter how distant the Russian military threat might seem to Americans, it poses a legitimate threat to countries in Eastern Europe, many of which the U.S. is required by treaty obligation to defend.

Russia has shown a willingness to use military force to advance national interests. Since March 2014, it has illegally occupied Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula and sustained a war in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and now occupies 20 percent of that country’s internationally recognized territory. Each year, Russia constructs barriers and fences, taking more of Georgia’s territory through what has been called a “creeping annexation.”

In addition to its use of military force, Russia continues to undermine U.S. and European interests. Moscow’s election meddling in the U.S. and Europe is well documented. In March 2018, Moscow used a nerve agent in an assassination attempt on a former Russian spy and his daughter in Britain. In November 2018, Russia illegally captured in international waters 24 Ukrainian sailors under the dubious and provocative pretense that they had strayed into Russian waters.

Russia’s threat and meddling extend to other regions as well, including the Middle East and Latin America. Russia’s support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has detrimentally allowed the civil war and killing to continue. Russia’s close relationship with Iran has also proven problematic, particularly for the United States, since Russia provides diplomatic cover to Iran on international statutes at, for example, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), sells arms to Iran, and enables Iran’s rogue behavior in Syria. In Venezuela, Russia backs former Socialist dictator Nicolás Maduro in clear opposition to the United States’ support of new interim president Juan Guaidó.

Continuously state America’s commitment to Europe. President Trump should never miss an opportunity to reiterate that it is in America’s best interest to remain actively engaged in NATO. Future Presidents should follow this message. A peaceful, stable Europe has led to economic, political, and military dividends that have had an immeasurable positive effect on the U.S.

Take a realistic approach to Russia. So far, the Trump Administration’s policies have been the toughest on Russia in a generation. Today, Russia is a 21st-century power with 19th-century imperial ambitions. Given the threat that Russia poses to Europe’s stability, NATO is as important now as it was in 1949.

Work with allies in Europe to maintain solidarity on sanctions. The U.S. should strongly encourage allies in Europe to keep sanctions in place against Russia for its actions in Ukraine. The U.S. should work with its European allies to ensure that these sanctions remain in place as long as Russia continues its aggression.

Focus on Ukraine’s achievements in fighting corruption and not on unrealistic expectations. Social, economic, and political reforms in Ukraine will take time. Reform is a process, not a single event. Over the past few years, Ukraine has made some progress. It has accomplished government finance reform, pension reform, and energy sector reform, among others. It still, however, needs to reform its judicial system, strengthen the rule of law, and curb corruption. Western policymakers need to support Ukraine on the path to reform, even if change takes a whole generation.

Continue to assist in Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Georgia is a staunch ally of the U.S. and NATO. It has suffered more per capita loss than any other country in the war in Afghanistan, where it is the largest non-NATO troop contributor. Georgia has been on a journey to democracy since regaining independence in 1991, and it is in America’s interest that Georgia remain on this path for the sake of regional stability. Georgia is firmly committed to the transatlantic community, and represents the idea in Europe that each country has the sovereign ability to determine its own path. The U.S. needs to remember this and support Georgia in its Western aspirations.

Push for Russia to end its support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and demonstrate a genuine willingness to work with the international community to bring a political end to the Syrian civil war. When it appeared that Assad was on the ropes in 2016, Russia intervened militarily and has since propped up the Syrian dictator. This has prolonged the killing, which has left more than 600,000 people dead, and has turned Syria into a breeding ground for Islamic extremism. The sooner this civil war ends, the better for everyone.

Offer political support for the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline and the Southern Gas Corridor project. As Europe seeks alternatives to Russian gas, the Southern Gas Corridor and completion of a Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline will play important roles. This is because they will both link Caspian region energy markets with Europe, bypassing Russia and Iran. Furthermore, the construction of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline will help to ease regional tensions between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

Push back against Nord Stream II. The Nord Stream II pipeline project that would connect Germany with Russia is neither economically necessary nor geopolitically prudent. Rather, it is a political project to greatly increase European dependence on Russian gas, magnify Russia’s ability to use its European energy dominance as a political trump card, and specifically undermine U.S. allies in Eastern and Central Europe. Each year until no longer necessary, the U.S. should use the NATO summit, a key forum with European allies, to specifically address Nord Stream II, expressing U.S. opposition, and linking the pipeline to NATO collective defense, which it would greatly undermine. A U.S. focus on stopping Nord Stream II at NATO summits may give other member states concerned about the project political cover to express their own concerns and opposition.

Commit unconditionally to America’s NATO treaty obligations. As long as the U.S. remains a member of the Alliance, it must be made clear to any adversary that an attack on one NATO member will, without question, be considered an attack on all. Any deviation from this commitment would only invite aggression.

Continue to press NATO allies on defense spending. While the U.S. should acknowledge the consistent recent increases in defense spending by its NATO allies, far too few allies are living up to their defense spending commitments. America’s leadership role in NATO means continuing to encourage allies to have a plan to live up to their defense spending commitments, and to maintain and increase the progress of recent years.

Establish a permanent military presence in the Baltic region. The deployment of four rotational battalions to the region is a good start, but more should be done. The threat from Russia will remain for the foreseeable future. The U.S. and NATO need to show an enduring commitment to the region by permanently stationing armed forces in the Baltics.

Continue to participate in training exercises in the Arctic region. Exercises above the Arctic Circle are vital to ensuring that the NATO Alliance is prepared to meet potential threats to Arctic security. The U.S. should also consider hosting NATO exercises in Alaska.

Keep NATO enlargement on the agenda. NATO’s open-door policy has been a crucial driver of modernization and reform in candidate countries, has promoted stability and peace in Europe, and has made it easier for the Alliance to coalesce around collective defense. The U.S. should continue to promote this important NATO policy and make it clear that Russia does not have an indirect veto over the process.

• Dakota L. Wood, 2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 2019).
• Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “The Trump Administration and the 115th Congress Should Support Ukraine,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3200, April 11, 2017.
• Luke Coffey, “NATO Membership for Georgia: In U.S. and European Interest,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 199, January 29, 2018.
• Luke Coffey, “Russia’s Occupation of Georgia and the Erosion of the International Order,” testimony before The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission), July 17, 2018 (accessed May 16, 2019).
• Luke Coffey, “The Trump‐Putin Summit: The U.S. President Must Be Strong, Clear, and Consistent,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4886, July 12, 2018.
• Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek, “Eight Things Russia Must Do Before Being Allowed Back in the G7,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4874, June 27, 2018.
• Luke Coffey and Alexis Mrachek, “Improving Ukraine’s Maritime Capability: Next Steps for the U.S.,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4926, November 28, 2018.
• Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “Brussels NATO Summit 2018: Time to Get Serious About the Arctic,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4875, June 27, 2018.
• Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, “Addressing the Threat from Russia Must Be Front and Center at the 2018 NATO Summit,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 4876, June 29, 2018.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

Taiwan is a critical U.S. partner in the Indo–Pacific. It is a de facto independent country with an unsettled de jure status. Though the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has never governed Taiwan, the CCP claims that Taiwan is a part of the People’s Republic of China and has intensified military coercion aimed at compelling Taiwan to accept CCP rule.

An armed conflict over Taiwan would be distinct from any war that generations of Americans have experienced. It would inflict economic harm on every American household. If the United States intervened, it would likely result in significant loss of life and treasure, even without nuclear escalation. On the other hand, if China took control of Taiwan, that would be a major step forward in the CCP’s efforts to achieve hegemony throughout the Indo–Pacific, with dire implications for Americas’ security, freedom, and prosperity. It would also pose a direct threat to key U.S. allies Japan and South Korea. Deterring CCP aggression toward Taiwan must therefore be an apex priority for U.S. foreign policy.

The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) forms the statutory basis of U.S. policy toward Taiwan and heavily influences which options are available to the United States to strengthen deterrence against a Chinese invasion. In 1979, when the Carter Administration ended formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan in favor of opening relations with China, Congress stepped in to provide the basis for continuing strong relations with Taiwan through the TRA. The TRA authorizes “the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between” the U.S. and Taiwan, which U.S. Administrations have generally referred to as an “unofficial” relationship.

The TRA has a diplomatic component and prohibits the U.S. from “supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.” Taiwan maintains diplomatic relations with 13 countries and belongs to 37 international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Although the United Nations resolution admitting the People’s Republic of China to the U.N. did not address Taiwan’s status, the CCP has subsequently sought to exclude Taiwan from many other U.N.-related organizations, such as the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the U.N.’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). The United States has long supported Taiwan’s “meaningful participation” in more international organizations, including U.N. agencies. Since 2016, the CCP has reversed the moderate policy it maintained during Taiwan’s previous administration and aggressively sought to punish the island’s ruling party by inducing Taiwan’s diplomatic allies to sever relations with Taiwan and shutting it out from both the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the World Health Assembly (WHA)—an organization to which it had previously been granted observer status with Beijing’s support.

The TRA codifies a U.S. interest in Taiwan’s security and makes certain commitments toward Taiwan’s defense. While these TRA provisions are short of a mutual defense treaty, they are uniquely strong, underlying a U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” concerning whether the U.S. would intervene in Taiwan’s defense. The TRA declares “that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern” and emphasizes that the use of anything “other than peaceful means” constitutes “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and [is] of grave concern to the United States.” The TRA further states that it is U.S. policy to “maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.” The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act specified further that, “consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act…it shall be the policy of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.”

At the same time, the TRA makes it a matter of policy that the U.S. “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Since the TRA’s enactment, U.S. military support to Taiwan has consisted almost exclusively of foreign military sales, sales of U.S. military hardware that Taiwan pays for from its defense budget. However, the eroding security balance in the Taiwan Strait has exposed both the limitations of this narrow defense relationship and opportunities for the United States to use security assistance to strengthen Taiwan’s defenses and bolster deterrence against China.

The urgency of such efforts is only growing. In recent years, the CCP has dramatically increased military coercion toward Taiwan, including live-fire military exercises, provocative missile testing, and unprecedented encroachments into Taiwan’s airspace and waters. Since 2022, CCP belligerence has breached historic records, including ballistic missile launches over Taiwan’s main island and multiple mock blockades of Taiwan. At the same time, U.S. military sales to Taiwan have been significantly delayed due to existing constraints in the U.S. industrial base, compounded by the U.S. shouldering a disproportionate share of the security assistance burden for Ukraine. The backlog in arms sales for Taiwan grew to more than $19 billion in 2023, with delivery timelines for key weapons systems stretching beyond 2027, a year in which many in Washington believe that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could field the capabilities to launch a successful invasion.

In late 2023, Congress passed the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA), which, if fully implemented, could help to mitigate the acute threat to Taiwan’s security. The TERA authorized for the first time the use of U.S. security assistance authorities for Taiwan, including foreign military financing assistance to supplement and shape Taiwan’s defense acquisitions and presidential drawdown authority to allow the transfer of weapons from U.S. stocks.

In order to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. should:

Arm Taiwan. Congress and the Administration should fund and implement the foreign military financing provision and the presidential drawdown authority provision of the TERA to harden Taiwan’s defenses as quickly as possible. Particular attention should be given to accelerating Taiwan’s fielding of “asymmetric defense capabilities,” such as relatively affordable coastal, air, and missile defenses, that are optimized for use against a Chinese invasion force and can be fielded in large numbers. At the same time, the United States should increase production of the weapons and other capabilities required by U.S., Taiwanese, and other allied and partner forces for a Taiwan contingency.

Restore conventional deterrence in the Indo–Pacific. The United States should urgently resource a strategy of denial against China. This is imperative to convince Beijing not only that an invasion of Taiwan would prove costly, but also—and more important—that it would fail. Given constraints on U.S. defense spending, however, funding this strategy will require disciplined prioritization, emphasizing improvements to U.S. forces in the Indo–Pacific over secondary priorities in other theaters. The Administration’s forthcoming budget requests should reflect that prioritization, as should congressional defense authorizations and appropriations.

Actively support Taiwan’s international space and participation in international organizations. Taiwan has critical expertise to share with international organizations. More broadly, Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations would integrate its security policy into its broader relationship with global partners and deter China from coercing it into unification. The Administration should encourage Taiwan’s membership, observer status, or other meaningful participation in INTERPOL, the WHO, and the ICAO. Critical to this effort is a re-evaluation of the grounds under which Taiwan ceded its U.N. seat to China in 1971. Beijing has gone beyond the intent of the documents approving that change to shut Taiwan out of international organizations. Polls consistently show that the vast majority of Taiwanese prefer the status quo of Taiwan’s diplomatic status, with only 4.5 percent supporting a push for independence as soon as possible.

• James J. Carafano, Michael Pillsbury, Jeff M. Smith, and Andrew J. Harding, eds., Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China, Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 270, March 28, 2023.
• Elbridge A. Colby and Kevin Roberts, The Correct Conservative Approach to Ukraine Shifts the Focus to China, Time, March 21, 2023.
• Alex Velez-Green, Prioritizing Ukraine Aid Threatens Deterrence by Denial in the Pacific, 19FortyFive, July 24, 2023.
• Bryan Burack, Biden Administration Must Stop Breaking Congress’s New Taiwan Defense Law, Washington Examiner, May 23, 2023.
• Michael Cunningham, If Washington Wants to Support Taiwan, Here’s the First Thing It Should Do, The Daily Signal, March 21, 2023.
• Dakota L. Wood, ed., 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Terry Miller, Anthony B. Kim, and James M. Roberts, 2022 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2022).
• Anthony B. Kim, Taiwan’s Free and Vibrant Economy Is a “Democratic Success Story,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, February 17, 2022.
• Anthony B. Kim, A Democratic Ally, Taiwan Merits Greater Trade with U.S., Europe, Heritage Foundation Commentary, November 22, 2021.
• Walter Lohman, Back to Basics on Taiwan’s Participation in International Organizations, Heritage Foundation Commentary, October 5, 2021.
• Anthony B. Kim, Why Taiwan Matters to the World, Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 20, 2021.
• Anthony B. Kim, Why U.S.–Taiwan Relations Are Partnership for Freedom, Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 8, 2021.
• Walter Lohman, Headed in the Right Direction on Taiwan, Heritage Foundation Commentary, January 20, 2021.
• Edwin J. Feulner, Forty Years of Taiwan–U.S. Relations: A Partnership for Freedom, Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 1308, March 27, 2019 (delivered January 31, 2019).
• Riley Walters, A Neglected Partner in Asia: The U.S. Should Strengthen Economic Cooperation with Taiwan, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3365, November 13, 2018.

• The Issue
• Power Phrases

The preeminent responsibility of the United States government is to defend and protect the American people and advance their interests and welfare domestically and abroad. Fulfilling this responsibility requires the U.S. to engage in a broad spectrum of bilateral and multilateral relationships, international organizations, and legal agreements and treaties. However, it is imperative that the U.S. understand that these relations are not an end but merely a means for securing the safety, prosperity, and opportunities of the American people.

Successfully defending America’s interests by engaging in these relationships can be challenging. International organizations frequently have member states whose interests are at odds, so action and decision in these organizations is often gridlocked or subject to a process that appeals to the lowest common denominator. Worse, countries opposed to U.S. policies and leadership use the UN and other international organizations, in which they are on a more equal footing with the U.S., to assert their influence and counterbalance U.S. leadership and constrain U.S. action. As noted by the 2017 National Security Strategy,

Authoritarian actors have long recognized the power of multilateral bodies and have used them to advance their interests and limit the freedom of their own citizens. If the United States cedes leadership of these bodies to adversaries, opportunities to shape developments that are positive for the United States will be lost. All institutions are not equal, however. The United States will prioritize its efforts in those organizations that serve American interests, to ensure that they are strengthened and supportive of the United States, our allies, and our partners. Where existing institutions and rules need modernizing, the United States will lead to update them. At the same time, it should be clear that the United States will not cede sovereignty to those that claim authority over American citizens and are in conflict with our constitutional framework.1

This is a sound guiding principle, but following through is difficult. The U.S. currently is a member of or financially contributes to nearly 200 international organizations, funds, treaty bodies, councils, groups, bureaus, centers, commissions, and peacekeeping operations. According to the most recent report, the U.S. provides over $12 billion to those organizations each year.2 The benefits of membership in these entities to U.S. interests varies considerably.

Some of these organizations, such as NATO, clearly enhance American interests by strengthening our security cooperation with allied nations. Other organizations, such as the United Nations, are often ineffective and flawed, but U.S. membership is critical to oppose actions and resolutions contrary to our interests, particularly in the UN Security Council where the U.S. has a veto. However, the UN is not a monolith, and UN membership does not require U.S. participation in all of its affiliated organizations. The U.S. should therefore leave those whose costs outweigh the benefits of membership. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), for instance, provided so little value that the Clinton Administration withdrew the U.S. from membership in 1996.3 Other organizations become politicized to the point that their value is outweighed by the damage done to American interests. In 2011, the U.S. suspended its contributions to one such organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and withdrew in 2018.4

The spectrum of international agreements and treaties is similarly complex. As acknowledged in the National Security Strategy, when the U.S. ratifies a treaty, the U.S. is bound to observe the terms of the agreement. In some cases, the benefits of the agreement can justify accepting these constraints. For instance, in addition to the NATO treaty, a number of agreements improve the mutual security of the U.S. and its allies. Similarly, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequent modifications, including the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995, established rules for trade that have contributed to enormous increases in per capita income in the U.S. and around the world. Human rights instruments, such as the Geneva Conventions and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, codify important rights, principles, and behaviors that benefit all humanity.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, however, are treaties that would impose significant economic costs or threaten fundamental freedoms. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which the U.S. signed in 1977 but has not ratified, would elevate entitlements and policy decisions on health care and education to the level of rights, which serves to debase the notion of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Paris Agreement on climate change, for instance, imposes significant costs on the U.S., but would do little to address climate change. Likewise, the Arms Trade Treaty would impose significant constraints on the ability of the U.S. to support the defense of its allies, while doing nothing to constrain arms sales by dictatorships. President Trump was correct to end U.S. support for these deeply flawed agreements.

Reconciling U.S. interests with the varying efficacy of international organizations and treaties does not lend itself to a bumper sticker policy. The United States must be flexible in its approach. If the United States and other nations operate only multilaterally, they hand the spoilers the means to frustrate their efforts. Multilateralism is a tool, not an end in itself. America should be willing to work through international organizations and ratify international agreements to address genuinely shared concerns, but it must not be held hostage by an irrational adherence to these approaches, nor should it be shy about using the tools available to it—including withholding financial support—to bolster its efforts to reform these organizations and advance U.S. interests.

Conduct an analysis of, and publicly report on, how U.S. participation in each international organization advances specific U.S. interests. Multilateralism is a tool, not an end in itself. The United States should be open to working through the UN and other international organizations to address shared concerns, but if a UN body has proven irrelevant, hopelessly flawed, or antithetical to U.S. interests, the United States should not reward its poor performance with U.S. financial support or participation, which lends it unwarranted prestige and credibility. The Trump Administration has wisely severed U.S. ties with the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO for these reasons. The U.S. would benefit from a regular and systematic evaluation of the costs and benefits of membership in international organizations.

Maintain and enforce U.S. law prohibiting funding of UN organizations that admit Palestine as a member state. The Palestinians have sought full membership in international organizations for years as a means of achieving recognition of their statehood absent a negotiated peace with Israel. In response, the U.S. enacted legislation in the 1990s to withhold funding from international organizations that accord “the Palestine Liberation Organization the same standing as member states” or grant “full membership as a state to any organization or group that does not have the internationally recognized attributes of statehood.” The U.S. did this because the Palestinian effort undermines prospects for a negotiated peace with Israel. To discourage international organizations from granting membership to the Palestinians before a mutually agreed peace agreement with Israel is concluded, Congress and the Trump Administration should enforce U.S. law.

Be willing to withhold funding to reform international organizations. Many nations provide negligible funding to international organizations and, therefore, have little concern if their funds are misused. Failure to demand that international organizations operate effectively and efficiently does a disservice to the mission of those organizations and fails to respect the American people, whose tax dollars often comprise a major share of their budgets. The U.S. needs to ensure that every agency and body in the UN system is operating in a transparent, accountable, and well-managed manner. Although the U.S. is an influential nation, most international organizations operate on a one-nation, one-vote process, and the U.S. often fails in its efforts to pass reform measures. As such, it must be prepared to use its considerable financial leverage to advance critical reforms when normal diplomatic efforts fall short.

Enforce the 25 percent cap on America’s United Nations peacekeeping assessment. Since the first scale of assessments was adopted in 1946, the U.S. has objected to the UN’s excessive reliance on a single member state for the budget, and has argued for a maximum assessment level and, subsequently, for lowering that maximum. Two decades ago, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke testified to the Senate that he had secured a deal to lower the U.S. peacekeeping assessment to 25 percent as required under U.S. law and as a condition for payment of U.S. arrears under the Helms‐Biden agreement. By 2009, the U.S. share had fallen to less than 26 percent. Starting in 2010, however, the U.S. assessment began to rise again. In 2019, it was 27.8912 percent. Failure to lower the U.S. assessment to 25 percent has cost U.S. taxpayers billions of dollars because Congress has in the past approved payments over 25 percent in continuing resolutions and omnibus appropriations bills. The U.S. should withhold the difference between our peacekeeping assessment and the 25 percent cap until the UN implements a maximum peacekeeping assessment of 25 percent.

Engage with Congress to clarify the treaty process. Which international agreements constitute treaties requiring Senate advice and consent in accordance with Article II of the Constitution is often subject to dispute. This is demonstrated by the debates over whether the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iran nuclear program constituted treaties. The uncertainty persists despite internal regulations adopted by the State Department, known as the Circular 175 procedure, which lay out eight factors for determining whether an international agreement should be negotiated as a treaty, which is subject to Senate advice and consent, or as an “international agreement other than a treaty.” The Senate should also adopt a practice of returning treaties to the executive branch if they fail to secure Senate advice and consent or are not voted on for extended periods.

Make UN voting a mandatory consideration in aid allocation. While the U.S. uses its foreign assistance to advance a number of goals, advancing U.S. interests in the UN must rank highly. Failure to include this goal among the hundreds of legislative directives on aid allocation is extremely imprudent, considering the serious matters discussed, debated, and decided in the UN. This consideration has increased urgency now that China is using its bilateral assistance to reward support in the UN. Not every UN vote is equally important to the United States, but some affect important U.S. interests. Congress should make support for U.S. positions in the UN a mandatory consideration in aid allocation. The Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN should meet regularly to identify important votes and adjust U.S. assistance to reward or punish countries for their support or opposition to U.S. policy in these important votes.

• Brett D. Schaefer, “Challenges and Opportunities for Advancing U.S. Interests in the United Nations System,” testimony before the Subcommittee on Multilateral International Development, Multilateral Institutions, and International Economic, Energy, and Environmental Policy, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, November 20, 2019.
• Brett D. Schaefer, “The U.S. Must Increase Diplomatic Pressure to Change the United Nations Scale of Assessments,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3397, March 19, 2019.
• Brett D. Schaefer, “The U.S. Must Improve Tracking of Its Contributions to the U.N. and Other International Organizations,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3394, March 11, 2019.
• Brett D. Schaefer and Anthony B. Kim, “The U.S. Should Employ Foreign Aid in Support of U.S. Policy at the U.N.,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3356, October 5, 2018.
• Nicolas D. Loris and Brett D. Schaefer, “Withdraw from Paris by Withdrawing from the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3220, May 25, 2017.
• Brett D. Schaefer, “United Nations Peacekeeping Flaws and Abuses: The U.S. Must Demand Reform,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3131, August 2, 2016.