Some topics never die at the United Nations. Calls to expand and reform the Security Council is one of those persistent issues. An amendment increasing its size was adopted only once in 1965. But calls for further expansion were raised again only a few years later. Those subsequent pushes stalled for decades. Yet due partly to a cynical assist from the Biden-Harris administration, that may be about to change.

It is understandable why governments—aside from China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, who all have permanent seats—want to increase the size of the Security Council. The Council is the most powerful and prestigious body in the UN system with authority to authorize use of military force, impose economic sanctions, and pass resolutions that the other members are obligated to obey. Because of this authority and prestige, non-permanent member nations expend great effort to secure election to one of the 10 non-permanent seats on it.

Proposals to increase the size of the Council are as old as the organization itself. In fact, they precede the UN, as the size of the Security Council was a key point of contention in negotiations to create the world body in 1945. The tension then and now was to balance two countervailing priorities: having enough members for legitimacy and participation among the UN member states while not having so many members that the Council could not act quickly or decisively.

In 1945, the member states decided on five permanent, veto-wielding members of the Council and six non-permanent members elected to two-year terms factoring in equitable geographic representation. As the UN membership grew, pressure increased to increase the size of the Council and, in 1965, the UN Charter was amended to increase the number of non-permanent members to 10.

As UN membership continued to increase, pressure mounted to further expand the size of the Council on the basis that it no longer reflected the current world order and developing countries and emerging powers deserved larger representation. However, little substantive action occurred, bogged down in part by disagreements among governments over reform proposals.

Specifically, although details differed, most recent reform proposals no longer posit a discrete increase in the number of non-permanent members, but a substantial increase and, in several instances, the creation of new permanent members. In addition, most governments aspiring to permanent member status desire veto power equivalent to the current permanent members. However, many other governments wish to curtail or abolish the veto outright. In addition, there is deep disagreement over which countries should be awarded new permanent member status with more aspirants in each region that there is support for new permanent members.

Then there is the fact that expanding the Council requires amending the UN Charter—a process that requires support from two-thirds of the UN member states and all permanent members of the Security Council. It is widely believed that China, with support from Russia, will oppose permanent seats for regional rivals Japan and India, which the U.S. is on record supporting.

Given these challenges, why is there optimism that reform might be on the horizon?

First, the Secretary-General is including expansion in his overarching Pact for the Future package of reforms for the UN and the international system. It is almost certain to be adopted by consensus, giving rhetorical support to Security Council expansion.

Second, under Biden, the U.S. has voiced support for an indeterminant expansion of Security Council membership, including permanent seats for Japan, Germany, India, and permanent seats for Africa and Latin America. On September 12, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, went further than Biden’s previous comments by declaring U.S. support for two permanent seats for African nations and a non-permanent seat for small island developing states.

Thus, although total numbers are unclear, the U.S. now supports adding six new permanent seats to the Council and an unclear number of non-permanent seats—inching incrementally closer to other proposals that all propose adding at least 10 new permanent and non-permanent seats.

This is a significant break with past U.S. administrations that, while expressing cautious support for some new permanent members and modest expansion, had historically insisted that adding too many seats and creating new veto wielding members would be “injurious to the effectiveness of the Council and it wouldn't be a wise and pragmatic step forward.”

According to Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield, with this announcement, the U.S. hopes to bolster U.S. relations with developing countries, put China and Russia in an awkward position as they oppose expansion, and “move this agenda forward in a way that we can achieve Security Council reform.”

These objectives are not likely to succeed.

First, by making this announcement untied to any specific goal or relationship, the hope that it will result in nebulous goodwill that the U.S. use down the road is wishful thinking. Other nations will pocket the announcement for what it is—a unilateral U.S. concession. In fact, by opposing giving the veto to new permanent members, prospective permanent members may be aggravated at being relegated to second-tier status, undermining the good will that the Biden-Harris administration hopes to reap from the announcement.

Second, authoritarian governments like China and Russia are unlikely to be swayed when they believe their foreign policy and security interests are at stake. Moreover, pragmatic matters trump the theoretical for many developing countries and dissatisfaction over Council reform will likely be mollified by financial and security assistance that China and Russia have been eager to provide.

However, this tactic could rebound on the U.S. negatively should China and Russia unexpectedly consent to expansion. In the case of the U.S., precedent mandates that UN Charter amendments receive Senate advice and consent. Securing support from two-thirds of the Senate is always challenging and may result in the U.S. being the main obstacle to adoption.

Third, Security Council reform has been stuck for decades because of deep—perhaps insurmountable—disagreements between governments, particularly within regions. The most likely way to satisfy all the major complaints is to support significant expansion of permanent seats with veto power and significant number of additional non-permanent seats. This outcome would be a pyrrhic victory for supporters of the UN, as it would seize up the Council on most serious matters of international peace and security—the “injurious” damage to the workings of the Council that concerned past U.S. administration.

In short, the U.S. announcement is a classic example of pursuit of short-term diplomatic goals at cost to long-term interests. The U.S. needs a strategic vision for the UN, not diplomatic games.