The Iraqi people desperately need to have their oil flowing again to the global market. Restarting the flow of Iraqi oil would be a win-win proposition, as not only the Iraqis, but also consumers around the world would benefit from bringing the Iraqi oil supply back on line.

The main impediment to increasing Iraqi oil production at this point is lack of security--terrorist sabotage and looting. The recent attacks on pipelines and power stations are disrupting the flow of Iraqi oil and are clearly aimed at further impoverishing the Iraqis and even further disrupting their lives.

Since the end of major hostilities, saboteurs have bombed Iraqi pipelines more than eight times, causing $7 million per day in lost revenue.1 The culprits, including the remnants of Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party and Islamic radicals, are following the old Leninist adage, "the worse, the better." They are betting on an upsurge in resistance to the U.S. presence in Iraq if they can severely disrupt the country's gasoline, electricity, and cooking gas supply. Saddam loyalists, local Islamist militants, and foreign jihadis who come to Iraq to fight the "infidels" believe that by escalating Iraq's suffering they can drive the Americans back across the ocean.

It is also true that the lack of security, the scarcity of gasoline and other fuels, and the intermittent supply of electricity are impeding the post-war reconstruction. Today, Iraq is producing less than half as much oil as it pumped before the war.

Saving Iraqi Oil Production

The attacks on the oil infrastructure are part of a premeditated campaign by the remnants of Saddam's regime and radical Islamist mujahideen organizations to stop the flow of Iraqi oil, harm the people of Iraq, and disrupt global oil markets. A secret memo dated January 23, 2003, reportedly issued by Saddam's security services, found in Iraq after the war, and published in the London-based Saudi daily Al-Hayat, directs pro-regime elements to destroy power generating stations and the water supply.2 It is likely that Saddam supporters and other terrorists are applying the same tactics to the oil industry.

Iraq is pumping 900,000 barrels per day--considerably less than the pre-war production level of 2.2 million-2.4 million barrels per day. The target of achieving pre-war production by the end of 2003 is in jeopardy, with further increases also in question. While Halliburton subsidiary Kellog, Brown and Root (KBR) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers are rehabilitating the Iraqi oil infrastructure, their mandate does not include providing pipeline security.3

The Iraqi oil ministry has begun paying tribal leaders in the south to keep saboteurs and thieves away from the pipelines.4 However, in at least one case, Sheikh Hatem Al Obeidi, an influential tribal leader who was on the government payroll to prevent attacks, instead abetted sabotage and was arrested by U.S. troops.5 Without security, neither the U.S. nor the Iraqis can repair the damage caused to Iraq's oil industry by the war or rehabilitate Iraq's infrastructure, which had fallen into a state of grave disrepair under Saddam.6

Meanwhile, the continued attacks are hurting both the Iraqi and Western economies. The West is still suffering from relatively high oil prices, as the economic recovery remains tenuous, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has cut production by 900,000 barrels a day.7 As a result of the drop in Iraqi oil production and the Iraqi fiscal shortfall, U.S. taxpayers will need to subsidize 50 percent of the $6 billion Iraqi budget for fiscal year (FY) 2004.

On September 7, President Bush announced that he would request $87 billion for assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan for FY 2004, with the lion's share going to Iraq.8 A boost in oil production would remedy the Iraqi economic crisis, give the Iraqi people hope, and decrease levels of needed U.S. assistance funding.

Sabotage and Looting
The key impediments to reconstructing the Iraqi oil industry and raising its oil revenues are attacks on the 4,350-mile-long pipeline system and the 11,184-mile-long electric grid.9 The northern pipeline, which runs from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, was attacked twice in June,10 twice in August, and twice again in September. After an attack on August 16, the pipeline burned for more than 48 hours. The pipeline from the giant Rumeila field in the south has also been bombed twice.

Security analysts divide these attacks into two distinct categories. The first is looting and plunder of the oil infrastructure, including fields, pumping stations, pipelines, and refineries. Organized crime is also raising its head, as demonstrated by the recent interception of a barge with 1,000 tons of stolen Iraqi oil.11 Smugglers usually ship oil to Iran, which reflags and re-exports it.

A much more serious threat, however, comes from groups opposing the U.S. and coalition presence, U.N. involvement, and the elements of Iraqi society participating in the Governing Council.

Thus far, senior U.S. officials, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and the the U.S. military have not publicly identified the main culprits in the pipeline attacks, which suggests that intelligence is insufficient.12 The ferocious terrorist bombings against personnel and the infrastructure continue.

The main threat comes from three types of groups:

• Networks of the old regime operating underground, such as Ba'ath party officials, Iraqi intelligence officers, and Fedayeen Saddam militia.
• Radical Sunni groups, such as the predominantly Kurdish Ansar al-Islam; Vanguard of Muhammad's Army; and others whom President Bush has characterized as "Al-Qaeda type fighters" and who are part of the international jihad movement.13 In his September 7 address to the nation, President Bush called Iraq "the central front of the war against terrorism."14 Anti-Western fighters are crossing into Iraq from Syria and the adjacent Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia.15 Funding for their movements comes from rich individuals and foundations in these same Gulf states and from the global radical Islamic community.
• Extremist Shi'a groups, affiliated with Mullah Muqtada Sadr, suspected of attacks on leading Shi'a clerics.16 As the result of the assassinations, a militia called the Badr Brigade--the armed wing of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq--was allowed to operate after attempts to ban it by the coalition. Elements of the Lebanon-based Hizballah, an organization on the U.S. terrorism list, and other radical pro-Iranian groups and agents are also present in Iraq.

Key Iraqi pipelines have been paralyzed repeatedly by terrorism. On August 13, the day Iraq started pumping oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan, terrorists attacked the Northern Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline. The same pipeline was attacked again on August 30.17 The pipeline, with a throughput capacity of 1 million barrels of crude per day, was attacked four times between May and September.18 Attacks occurred near the towns of Haditha and Hawja, which are close to the largest Iraqi oil refinery at Bayji.

Iraqi oil production is also suffering from years of centralized, state-run management of the oil sector, long-term lack of investment, and inadequate technical maintenance of the oil fields under Saddam. The absence of hard currency reserves to repair and restart the oil industry is slowing production. However, no investment and expansion are possible unless the physical security of the vast Iraqi oil infrastructure can be assured.

Pipeline Security: Planning and Execution
The military component of seizing Iraq's oil infrastructure during the war was brilliantly planned and executed. Unlike during the Gulf War, when Saddam succeeded in setting hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells on fire, fewer than 10 wells were ignited in Iraq. U.S. and British troops seized and secured the oil fields, refineries, and pipeline infrastructure with minimal casualties and material damage. The final draft of an internal post-war report for the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave high marks for pre-war gaming and combined operations during the time of combat.

However, the post-war planning received the lowest grade, with "capabilities that fell short of expectations or needs, and need to be readdressed through new initiatives."19 CPA Administrator Paul Bremer has admitted that the U.S. forces are "stretched thin."20 Securing the oil infrastructure was an important part of post-war objectives, but the plans for post-war occupation of Iraq were not ready when the war started, and the Pentagon was forced to alter its original plan as the post-war violence escalated.21 Thus, it is not surprising that 80 percent of the damage to Iraq's oil infrastructure occurred after the war ended.22

Five months after the war, the U.S.-led coalition force in Iraq consists of 140,000 American troops and 20,000 international troops, including one British division and one Polish-led division. They are aided by over 54,000 Iraqi security personnel, including 37,000 police, 12,000 facility guards, and 5,000 border police and civil defense corps.

On September 4, in Baghdad, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called for putting up to 75,000-100,000 former Iraqi officers and soldiers back in uniform to protect their country and fight its enemies. He also criticized Saudi Arabia and Syria for not doing enough to seal Iraq's borders.23

Faced with attacks on oil pipelines, the CPA is working to expand the Iraqi force charged with infrastructure protection. During this past summer, it discussed the provision of training to this security force with Kroll Associates and other private U.S. companies.24 With more international troops coming to Iraq, they can also assume responsibility for guarding the pipelines and infrastructure and training the Iraqi security forces, which will be tasked with protecting the pipelines in the future. As long as security is not restored, however, the American taxpayer will pay for this security force.

Criticism on the Hill and Beyond
Senators and Representatives, including prominent Republicans, as well as retired senior military officers have criticized the planning, numbers, and troop deployments in Iraq. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stressed his criticism of the planning done for post-war deployment but called on his colleagues to "rejoice" that the plan has been corrected. Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA), vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed reservations about the planning for the war last winter.25

Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), Senator John McCain (R-AZ), columnist George Will, and Weekly Standard editor William Kristol--all outspoken proponents of Saddam's removal--have criticized the Administration for post-war mishaps.26 It is less surprising that Democrats, including Senators Joseph Biden (D-DE), ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Jack Reed (D-RI), a West Point graduate who served with the 82nd Airborne, are also criticizing the Administration for mistakes in post-war planning and deployment.

Among senior generals critical of the post-war performance in Iraq is General Anthony Zinni, the former head of the U.S. Central Command who has extensive experience in the Middle East and serves as a consultant to the U.S. State Department.27 The most prominent proponent of a bigger Army and a greater deployment in Iraq is General Eric Shinseki, the recently retired Army Chief of Staff, who called for "several hundreds of thousands of soldiers on the ground" and warned against a "twelve division strategy for the ten division army."28

Even if the actual size of the U.S. Iraqi deployment is not increased, it has to be refocused on intelligence and training of the Iraqi forces, while the number of coalition troops from other countries must go up, according to General John Abizaid, the current head of Central Command.29 This is also the opinion of the pre-eminent British military historian, John Keegan.30 Increased intelligence collection, anti-terrorist operations, and training should become the focus of the U.S.-led force in Iraq.

Protecting Iraqi Oil Revenue
The Bush Administration has issued an executive order barring claims in U.S. courts against Iraqi oil or proceeds from it.31 It has also coordinated with other permanent U.S. Security Council members--the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia--on the imposition of a moratorium on Iraq's national debt.

The U.S. should further coordinate its actions with companies and sovereign claimants (states) to delay reparations for Gulf War damages and other claims. Iraq needs breathing space in order to restart its cash flow and get its oil industry up and running again.